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INTRODUCTION 
Private actors play an important role in transnational economic activity, 
and corporations are one of the dominant vehicles through which private 
actors participate in the global economy.  Corporations wield tremendous 
economic, political, social, and legal influence.  Some transnational 
corporations have more economic, social, political, and legal clout than 
many developing countries.  The amount of money at stake gives 
  
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd 
School of Law; J.D. 2005, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law; M.A. 2002, 
Stanford University International Policy Studies; Zwischenprüfung 1998, Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin.  Research for this paper was supported by Dean John V. White.  I 
would like to express my gratitude for their support, comments, and suggestions to Larry 
Catá Backer, William Dodge, Daniel Droste, Linda Edwards, Doug Grant, Steve Johnson, 
Jane Korinek, Ann McGinley, Jay Mootz, Douglas Nordlinger, Nancy Rapoport, Paulette 
Reed-Anderson, John V. White, and Cynthia Williams, as well as my colleagues at the 
William S. Boyd School of Law, who attended the faculty brownbag on February 11, 2009, 
participants at the Michigan State Journal of International Law symposium on “The Global 
Interdependent Economy: New Explorations of the Boundaries of International Investment” 
at the Michigan State University College of Law on February 13, 2009, and participants at 
the Lytle Workshop at the Seattle University School of Law, June 25–28, 2009.  I am 
grateful to the Michigan State Journal of International Law editors for their hard work, 
organization, and professionalism.  I also would like to thank Sarig Armenian, Brandon 
Johansson, and Jakub Medrala for their excellent research assistance.  Finally, I would like to 
express my appreciation to Jeanne Price and Matthew Wright at the Wiener-Rogers Law 
Library for their outstanding assistance and support. 
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corporations a strong incentive to engage in politics through means ranging 
from lobbying to bribery.  The policies of corporations can directly 
stimulate or dampen urban development, promote or hinder access to 
education, and support or thwart family cohesiveness.  Large corporations 
have the human capacity and economic resources to engage in complex, 
long-term legal strategies to influence law-making in a manner that is 
beneficial to the corporations’ interests. 
Transnational corporations operate in and are subject to the laws of 
multiple jurisdictions.  As creatures of the state, the rights and obligations of 
corporations are determined in the first instance by the domestic law of their 
state of incorporation or real seat of business.  Transnational corporations 
— corporations that own, operate, or control business ventures in countries 
other than the country in which they are incorporated or have their real seat 
(their “home country”) — are subject to additional laws.  In addition to the 
national law of the countries in which they operate, transnational 
corporations are subject to international law, such as international trade law 
and foreign direct investment law. 
Although trade and foreign direct investment law are inherently 
intertwined, they followed very different paths in the second half of the 
twentieth century.  In 1948, eighteen national governments signed the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (“GATT”).1  In 1995, 128 
countries signed the World Trade Organization Agreements (“WTO 
Agreements”), which included the 1994 update of the GATT.2  By 1998, 
153 of the approximately 195 countries in the world had become members 
in the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and membership continues to 
grow.3  The WTO serves as a point of convergence for all international trade 
issues.  Under the umbrella of the WTO, a series of agreements and a body 
of cases have developed to govern international trade and the resolution of 
trade disputes.  In contrast, efforts to create an international organization to 
address foreign direct investment issues have been unsuccessful.  Although, 
international trade law developed and matured, multilateral foreign direct 
investment law stagnated. 
Foreign direct investment remains underregulated and underenforced.  
There is no comparable international body shaping foreign direct investment 
law and handling disputes.  Foreign direct investment policy-making 
continues to rely heavily on neoclassical economic theory.  Under the 
  
 1. Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, India, Luxembourg, 
Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, United 
Kingdom, United States of America, and Zimbabwe. 
 2. World Trade Organization [WTO], GATT Members, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) (listing the 128 countries that 
had signed GATT by 1994). 
 3. See WTO, Understanding the WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). 
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neoclassical economic development model,4 foreign direct investment will 
promote prosperity around the world, and so it should be promoted by 
minimizing government intervention.  In practice, this means minimal laws 
and regulations. 
However, despite inhibited regulatory development and cycles of 
deregulation, many of the anticipated benefits for developing countries and 
their citizens have yet to materialize.  True, laws encouraging foreign direct 
investment contribute to technology transfer, increased tax revenues, and 
other economic benefits.  However, existing laws are lax, one-sided, or 
limited in scope.  They allow transnational corporations to cause harms such 
as property damage, personal injury, and significant environmental 
damage.5  Insufficient protections and limited avenues for redress encourage 
transnational corporations to chase profits with limited concern for 
consequences.6 
Legal scholarship on foreign direct investment often follows lines of 
inquiry that dovetail with neoclassical economic theory and prioritizes the 
protection of investments by transnational corporations.7  Legal scholarship 
addresses issues ranging from attracting foreign direct investment to 
balancing differing interests of more developed and less developed 
  
 4. In the neoclassical economic development model, economic development and 
prosperity can be promoted through economic policy that reduces regulation and limits 
intervention in private economic activity. 
 5. For purposes of this article I have depicted foreign direct investment with broad 
brush strokes.  However, the types and extent of harms or benefits from foreign direct 
investment vary from sector to sector and region to region.  Foreign direct investment also 
affects different groups differently, for example, by gender.  See generally U.N. Research 
Inst. for Soc. Dev., Foreign Direct Investment, Development and Gender Equity: A Review of 
Research and Policy, Occasional Paper No. 12 (Jan. 2006) (prepared by Elissa Braunstein).  
Exploring foreign direct investment through the lens of specific sectors, regions, and specific 
groups offers an avenue to develop more nuanced recommendations for a mandatory legal 
framework for Global Corporate Citizenship.  See, e.g., Rachel J. Anderson, Gender, Foreign 
Direct Investment, & Global Corporate Citizenship, WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. (forthcoming 
2010) (manuscript on file with author).  I will explore specific sectors, regions, and affected 
groups in future articles.  For a more detailed discussion of future research, see generally 
Rachel J. Anderson, Global Corporate Citizenship: A Research Agenda (Working Paper 
Series, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1477137. 
 6. See generally Justice Ian Binnie, Legal Redress for Corporate Participation in 
International Human Rights Abuses, 38 THE BRIEF 44 (2009), available at 
http://www.icj.org/IMG/20091022093202185.pdf.  This problem is exacerbated by a general 
lack of international civil law.  See also Christopher L. Blakesley, Criminal Law: United 
States Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109 (1982) 
(“[I]nternational law has tended to focus on penal rather than civil jurisdiction.”). 
 7. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining 
the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 640 (1998) 
(“Although a substantial academic literature related to [bilateral investment] treaties exists, 
there has been surprisingly little analysis of the impact of BITs on the welfare of the 
countries that have signed them.”). 
4 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 18:1 
countries.8  The common thread remains the extent to which host states 
should protect or circumscribe the rights of transnational corporations to 
secure a hospitable atmosphere for foreign direct investment.  This 
emphasis neglects the interests of individuals and communities in 
developing countries.9 
The narrow approach to regulating foreign direct investment law 
proscribed by neoclassical economic theory and the corresponding 
circumscribed approach in legal scholarship are counterproductive to the 
point of being harmful.  One of the most common forms of foreign direct 
investment law, the bilateral investment treaty, is generally structured to 
protect transnational corporations from acts of expropriation or 
naturalization by host country governments without adequate compensation.  
Bilateral investment treaties and the scholarship that analyzes them tend to 
omit societal stakeholders, such as individuals and communities affected by 
businesses owned, operated, or managed by transnational corporations. 
Plaintiffs alleging harms by transnational corporations face substantive 
and procedural hurdles.  The United States is one of the primary venues to 
bring claims against transnational corporations.  This is particularly true 
when the defendant corporation is incorporated in the United States.  The 
Alien Tort Statue provides an opportunity to seek redress in U.S. courts 
against U.S. corporations.10  However, many claims do not rise to the level 
of violating the law of nations, as required under the Alien Tort Statute.11  
  
 8. See, e.g., Kojo Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies for Foreign Direct 
Investment: Alternatives to Tax Incentive Policies, 7 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 208 (1985); 
Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in 
Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 259 (1994); Richard J. 
Hunter, Jr., Robert E. Shapiro & Leo V. Ryan, C.S.V., Legal Considerations in Foreign 
Direct Investment, 28 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 851 (2003); Ted G. Telford & Heather A. Ures, 
The Role of Incentives in Foreign Direct Investment, 23 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
605 (2001); Kevin A. Hassett, The Role of Trade & Foreign Direct Investment in 
Development, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 355 (2004). 
 9. See, e.g., Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Enriching the World Bank’s Vision of National 
Legal Systems and Foreign Direct Investment, 2, Jan. 30, 2008, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1087547 (discussing the World Bank’s disregard for “the fact that 
legal reforms designed to attract investors may be [sic] impede the ability of other actors, 
such as civil society representatives, to pursue their individual objectives through the legal 
system”). 
 10. The applicability of the Alien Tort Statute to corporations is disputed.  Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari at 10–11, Abdullahi v. Pfizer, No. 09-34 (2d Cir. July 9, 2009), 2009 
WL 2173302 (arguing that there is a circuit split on the question of corporate liability under 
international law). 
 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”).  The law of nations is the Eighteenth Century term for what we 
now call customary international law.  William S. Dodge, After Sosa: The Future of 
Customary International Law in the United States, 1, Nov. 13, 2006, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=944245.  “Customary international law results from a general and 
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”  
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Thus, cases brought by plaintiffs alleging cultural genocide, certain human 
rights violations, and international environmental torts may be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim under the Alien Tort Statute.12  Allegations of 
violations of rights to life, health, and sustainable development are also 
deemed by U.S. courts not to rise to the standard of violating the law of 
nations.13  In addition to dismissal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
many cases in U.S. courts are dismissed on the basis of forum non 
conveniens, where a court determines that an alternative forum would be 
more appropriate.14  This example highlights some of the challenges facing 
plaintiffs seeking redress for alleged harms that result from the operations of 
transnational corporations. 
This Article argues for the reform of foreign direct investment law and 
proposes a new approach as a step toward a mandatory legal framework.  
Modern foreign direct investment law is a vestige of the colonial era during 
which early forms of transnational corporations emerged.  Unlike 
international trade law and despite the dramatic developments of the 
twentieth century, foreign direct investment law remains largely unchanged.  
Prior multilateral efforts to implement comprehensive foreign direct 
investment law reforms have been largely unsuccessful.  However, in recent 
years, growing political will has emerged under the umbrella of Global 
Corporate Citizenship and related movements. 
Global Corporate Citizenship emerged in management and business 
scholarship in the 1990s, but has not yet entered the legal discourse to any 
significant extent.  Theories of Global Corporate Citizenship address the 
ethical responsibilities of companies operating in a global market and the 
values that should guide corporations’ engagement with society.  
Management and business scholars propose Global Corporate Citizenship as 
a voluntary framework that should be adopted by officers and directors 
because it is good for business.  Theories of Global Corporate Citizenship 
offer a useful perspective with which to reframe and reform foreign direct 
investment law. 
  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §102(2) (1987).  
In the context of the Alien Tort Statute, this applies most clearly to “certain offenses 
recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, 
attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism 
. . . .”  Id. § 404.  Customary international law is not static but rather it changes over time. 
 12. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997) 
(dismissing the case without prejudice for failure to state a claim under the Alien Tort Statute 
because cultural genocide, certain human rights violations, and international environmental 
torts are not widely accepted as violations of the law of nations). 
 13. See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 515–19 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (finding that claims of violations of rights to life, health, and sustainable development 
did not violate the law of nations and dismissing the case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction). 
 14. See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an Emerging Fiduciary 
Duty to Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 75, 82–83 (2005). 
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This Article has three sections.  Section I, Early Flaws and Subsequent 
Failures, explains the origins of asymmetries in foreign direct investment 
law through the birth of the transnational corporation in the shadow of 
colonial economics and imperialist theory.  It highlights a subsequent lack 
of global leadership and corresponding failures to reform foreign direct 
investment law.  Finally, Section I briefly sets out the current state of 
foreign direct investment law.  Section II, Efforts to Regulate Transnational 
Corporations, identifies the existence of political will to reform foreign 
direct investment law expressed in decades of multilateral and private sector 
reform efforts.  Section II helps to flesh out a trend toward regulation of 
transnational corporations in which some voluntary efforts are successful 
but mandatory requirements have not yet been achieved.  Section III, 
Transforming Foreign Direct Investment Law, outlines the emergence of 
Global Corporate Citizenship theories in the management and business 
fields as a voluntary movement.  Section III proposes Global Corporate 
Citizenship as an alternative theory that can inform efforts to develop 
mandatory regulations for transnational corporations in foreign direct 
investment law. 
This Article is part of a larger project on Law and Global Corporate 
Citizenship analyzing ways to reform the regulation of transnational 
corporations.  This series of articles identifies gaps in the international and 
domestic regulation of transnational corporations, explores reasons for these 
gaps, provides a Global Corporate Citizenship framework for more 
comprehensive regulation, and develops proposals for the implementation 
of a mandatory legal framework. 
I.   EARLY FLAWS AND SUBSEQUENT FAILURES  
A.   Vestiges of a Colonial Heritage 
Historically, the purpose of foreign direct investment law was to protect 
the rights of investors.  Protection of investors’ rights encourages direct 
foreign investment by private actors.  Foreign direct investment is seen as 
risky because private actors, whether as individuals or in the form of a 
corporate entity, are not on equal footing with the state in which they own, 
manage, or operate a business.  Alone, private investors are often unable to 
protect their foreign assets against expropriation, the taking or modifying of 
their property rights by the government of a host country, or nationalization, 
the transfer of control or ownership of their assets to the government of a 
host country. Historically, military and political clout of a private actor’s 
home country or some form of international agreement protected the rights 
of private actors. 
Foreign direct investment law retains vestiges of the colonial era during 
which early forms of transnational corporations, colonial trading companies, 
were formed.  During the colonial era, colonized peoples and territories 
were generally not accorded rights that were equivalent to those claimed by 
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colonizing peoples and nations.  Asymmetries in modern foreign direct 
investment law can be traced back to the economic and legal contexts in 
which early forms of transnational corporations emerged.15 
Seventeenth century colonial trading companies are the predecessors of 
modern transnational corporations.16  Colonial trading companies received 
their charters from a colonial sovereign, were headquartered in a colonizing 
nation, and operated in a colonized territory.  During the colonial period, 
private trading companies engaged in foreign direct investment and 
international trade under the auspices of their home governments. 
Protections for this early form of foreign direct investment by colonial 
trading companies were asymmetrical.  Military power, colonial 
governments, and international treaties protected the rights and assets of 
colonial trading companies.  Governments of colonizing countries also 
protected the property rights of colonial trading companies through state-to-
state diplomacy.  The rights of the inhabitants of colonized territories were 
not equally respected by colonizing countries and their representatives, 
colonial trading companies. 
British and Dutch colonial trading companies are examples of early 
forms of transnational corporations.  The company, now commonly known 
as the British East India Trading Company,17 engaged in commercial 
activities in India under an English Royal Charter granted in 1600.  For 
example, the British East India Trading Company’s activities included the 
operation of a pepper factory in what is now Indonesia for approximately 
eighty years.18 
The Dutch granted charters to two “Indian Trading Companies.”  In a 
structure that would become entrenched in colonial economics, each 
company had a dedicated sphere of control, operation, and influence.  The 
Dutch East India Trading Company19 carried out commercial activities in 
  
 15. Transnational corporations significantly influenced the economic development of 
the host countries in which they operated — as colonies and later as independent states.  See, 
e.g., Rachel Anderson et al., The Caribbean and the Banana Trade, in BANANA WARS: THE 
ANATOMY OF A TRADE DISPUTE (Timothy E. Josling & Timothy G. Taylor eds., 2002) 
(discussing, among other things, the role of transnational corporations in the banana industry 
in the Windward Islands). 
 16. See Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy: 
Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REV. 401, 428 n.108 (2002); cf. PETER T. 
MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 19–20 (1995); Yitzhak Hadari, 
The Structure of the Private Multinational Enterprise, 71 MICH. L. REV. 729, 735 (1973). 
 17. The formal name under which the company received its charter was the 
“Governor and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies.”  This formal 
name reflects the fact that the companies exercised sovereign powers.  See ANTONY ANGHIE, 
IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68 (2004). 
 18. The pepper factory was established in Bantam in 1901 and was operated by the 
British East India Company until Bantam was captured by the Dutch in 1682.  JOHN F. 
RIDDICK, THE HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA: A CHRONOLOGY 126, 129 (2006). 
 19. The formal name under which the company received its charter was the 
“Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie.” 
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Asia, and the Dutch West India Company20 did the same in the Caribbean.  
The Dutch West India Company also engaged in the slave trade in Africa, 
Brazil, the Caribbean, and North America. 
In the course of their commercial activities in colonized territories, 
colonial trading companies engaged in activities that we would now 
describe as human rights violations.  They used child and forced labor.  
They engaged in slavery,21 torture, and summary execution.  In addition, the 
colonial trading companies often protected their investments with their own 
private security forces.  Many private security forces perpetrated substantial 
bodily and other harm on individuals and communities in colonized 
territories. 
Colonial trading companies’ discretion to shape their operations in 
colonized territories often was not circumscribed in any meaningful way by 
domestic or international law.  Colonial trading companies possessed broad 
powers that were inextricably linked with the governance of the colonized 
territories in which they operated.22  Colonizing nations posited that 
individuals and communities indigenous to colonized territories stood 
outside the community of “civilized nations.”  Colonizing nations, 
therefore, claimed that the people and communities in the colonized 
territories should not benefit from the rights and protections accorded to 
citizens of the so called “civilized nations.”23  This lack of checks on 
colonial trading companies contributed to an environment in which the 
pursuit of economic wealth trumped the values of civilized society and even 
human life. 
Harms perpetrated by colonial trading companies foreshadowed many 
harms resulting from the acts of modern transnational corporations.  
Although modern transnational corporations are now incorporated rather 
than chartered, they continue to enjoy many rights possessed by colonial 
trading companies.  Modern transnational corporations violate human rights 
and harm the environment in the course of their operations in developing 
countries, the successors of the colonized territories.24  The lack of 
  
 20. The formal name under which the company received its charter was the 
“Geoctroyeerde Westindische Compagnie.” 
 21. See, e.g., PAUL E. LOVEJOY, TRANSFORMATIONS IN SLAVERY: A HISTORY OF 
SLAVERY IN AFRICA 135 (2d ed. 2000) (“In the early years of the colony [at Cape Town], the 
Dutch East India Company owned most of the slaves at the Cape, who were used to maintain 
the port facilities, and the [Dutch East India] Company always remained the largest single 
owner of slaves.”). 
 22. See PETER WARREN SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE 
PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 34 (2008). 
 23. For a discussion of the theories and jurisprudence regarding the exclusion of non-
Christians and people not of European origin from the law of nations, see ANGHIE, supra note 
17, at 52–65. 
 24. See, e.g., Sarah A. Altschuller & Amy Lehr, Corporate Social Responsibility, 43 
INT'L LAW. 577, 580–87 (2009) (discussing recent litigation alleging corporate complicity in 
human rights abuses in China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Nigeria, 
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applicable foreign direct investment law combined with jurisdictional 
limitations often hinders potential plaintiffs alleging harms by transnational 
operations in less developed countries from seeking redress. 
Modern foreign direct investment law retains asymmetrical legal 
protections that are its colonial heritage.  More developed countries replaced 
colonizing countries as the more politically and economically advantaged 
group of nations.  Less developed countries replaced colonized territories as 
the less politically and economically advantaged group of nations.  
Although the terminology changed, the asymmetrical power and rights 
relationships remained.  Individuals in more developed countries are 
afforded more rights and protections against the excesses of transnational 
corporations.  Individuals in less developed countries have fewer rights and 
protections against acts of transnational corporations that are incorporated in 
or have their real seat in more developed countries.  This asymmetry is 
exacerbated by the fragmentation of foreign direct investment law on the 
international level. 
B.   Lack of Global Leadership  
A lack of global leadership impeded the development of a 
comprehensive multilateral framework for foreign direct investment law.  
The twentieth century presented several distinct opportunities to reform 
foreign direct investment law.  Although some opportunities were utilized to 
develop institutional and legal frameworks for international trade, national 
governments did not exploit these same opportunities to achieve a 
comprehensive reform of foreign direct investment law.  As a result, foreign 
direct investment law and international trade law followed widely diverging 
paths since at least the mid-twentieth century. 
The lack of political will among colonizing nations, and later more 
developed countries, to develop a comprehensive framework for foreign 
direct investment law is consistent with theories of imperialism underlying 
the colonial model.  A legal framework balancing the rights of all interested 
parties is antithetical to the dominion of one group over another that is a 
central and foundational element of imperialism.  Colonial trading 
  
Papua New Guinea, and South Africa).  However, this is not to suggest that transnational 
corporations are always or inherently harmful.  Transnational corporations do not operate in 
a vacuum but rather within legal, social, and economic structures.  See Colin Marks & Nancy 
Rapoport, The Corporate Lawyer's Role in a Contemporary Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV, 1283, 1281–84, 1283 n.93 (2009) (discussing a tripartite approach to the legal, ethical, 
and economic responsibilities of corporations).  Entrenched inequities and weak rule of law 
inhibit investment and the enforcement of rights and protections for individuals and 
communities in many developing countries.  See, e.g., Rachel J. Anderson, Comment, 
Linking the Rule of Law and Trade Liberalization in Jamaica, 7 AFR.-AMER. L. & POL’Y 
REP. 49, 51–52 (2005) (discussing the effects of Jamaica’s history of democracy and weaker 
rule of law track record). 
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companies acted with the permission, and often explicit approval, of their 
national governments.  Therefore, it is not surprising that effective action 
was not taken to limit the power of and regulate the operations of colonial 
trading companies in colonized territories. 
Adopting a principle of limited interference helped governments of 
colonizing nations reap the benefits of imperialism and colonial commerce.  
At the same time, the principle of limited interference allowed governments 
of colonizing nations to turn a blind eye to egregious acts perpetrated by 
colonial trading companies.  This principle of limited interference in 
transnational economic activity of private actors remains embedded in 
modern foreign direct investment law. 
The international community missed an opportunity to reform foreign 
direct investment law during the period following the First World War.  It 
was an era of reconstruction.  In the post-World War I period, the rights of 
private actors regarding their foreign assets were a subject of dispute 
between national governments.  One camp, which included the United 
States and the United Kingdom, believed that private property should be 
protected and that expropriation required compensation under customary 
international law.25  Another camp, which included Russia and countries in 
Latin America, believed that a state’s rights to expropriate and nationalize 
trumped the interests of private actors in foreign assets.26  These two camps 
did not resolve their differences in the post-World War I period. 
In the United States, the U.S. government missed opportunities to reform 
foreign direct investment law during the period following the Great 
Depression.  It was an era of increasing regulation of investment activities.  
After the 1929 stock market crash, the U.S. Congress passed the Securities 
Act of 1933 to ensure investors’ access to information and legal recourse in 
the case of fraud or illegality.27  This act was followed shortly thereafter by 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which created the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and gave the SEC broad oversight and 
enforcement powers.28  However, the regulations promulgated in the 
Securities Act of 1933 and those promulgated in the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 focused on protecting shareholders and potential investors and 
not on protecting individuals and communities in developing countries.  
  
 25. See Andrew Newcombe & Lluís Paradell, Historical Development of Investment 
Treaty Law, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 
12–14 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2009). 
 26. This position would later be recognized in a U.N. Resolution.  See, Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), ¶ 4, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 
Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962). 
 27. Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000); see also U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Sept. 8, 2009). 
 28. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006); see also U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Sept. 8, 2009). 
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They did not extend protections for non-investors harmed by the foreign 
operations of transnational corporations. 
The period following the Second World War was another missed 
opportunity to reform foreign direct investment law.  It was an era of 
transformation.  Participants at the U.N. Monetary and Financial 
Conference at Bretton Woods created several institutions in an effort to 
create a global economic system.  These institutions included the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“World Bank”) 
and the International Monetary Fund.29  The U.N. Economic and Social 
Committee also proposed an International Trade Organization to address 
international trade and investment.30  However, these efforts were 
unsuccessful in part because of continuing disagreements about standards 
for investment protection, compensation for expropriation, and minimum 
standards for treatment of foreign direct investment.31  These differences 
remained unresolved during the post-World War II period. 
After World War II, decolonization resulted in the political independence 
of many countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, and the 
Middle East.  It was an era of reform.  This was an opportunity for newly-
independent, developing countries to exercise their sovereign rights and 
advocate for the rights of and protections for their citizens and 
communities.32  However, developing countries began to compete for 
foreign capital prompted by a belief that international investment facilitates 
economic growth and prosperity.33  This competition benefitted 
transnational corporations and their home countries. 
  
 29. Gerald M. Meier, The Bretton Woods Agreement — Twenty-Five Years After, 23 
STAN. L. REV. 235, 235 (1971); International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1944), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-articlesofagreement.pdf; 
International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund 
(1944), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm. 
 30. U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana Charter for an International 
Trade Organization and Final Act and Related Documents, 14, 19–21, 65, 125 (Nov. 1947 – 
Mar. 1948), UN Doc. ICITO/1/4/1948, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/ 
legal_e/havana_e.pdf. 
 31. See Newcombe & Paradell, supra note 25, at 19–20. 
 32. In 1962, the United Nations recognized the right of sovereign nations to 
nationalize investments in their national resources.  G.A. Res. 1803(XVII), U.N. Doc. 
A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962).  See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 7, at 648 (“From 1962 through the 
mid 1970s, the United Nations General Assembly—dominated by LDCs—passed a series of 
resolutions intended to emphasize the sovereignty of nations with respect to foreign 
investment.”). 
 33. Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital: 
The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 299 
(2008) (“This competition is driven by the desire of developing countries to participate in the 
global capitalist system.”). 
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Transnational corporations and their home countries have a resource that 
is mobile and in high demand: foreign capital.34  This allows transnational 
corporations to shop for the most hospitable political and legal environment 
for their operations, which, in turn, contributes to a race to the bottom in 
terms of the regulation of foreign direct investment in host countries.  
Competition for foreign capital creates an incentive for governments of 
developing countries to prefer laws that attracted foreign direct investment.  
From a purely economic perspective, such laws are often most attractive if 
they do not hinder the activities of transnational corporations with 
protections for the environment or human rights.  In the end, the rights of 
individuals and communities in developing countries that are affected by the 
operations of transnational corporations lose out to the power of neo-
classical economic development theory and the pursuit of profit. 
C.   A Fragmented Body of Law  
The lack of a multilateral framework left a void, specifically the lack of 
an international organization or targeted international agreements.  Bilateral 
investment treaties are flourishing in this vacuum as a means of regulating 
foreign direct investment.35  Bilateral investment treaties are the progeny of 
Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, a form of international 
agreement that was common among colonizing countries.36  Treaties of 
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation allocated rights to colonial 
territories among colonizing countries to avoid war between the colonizing 
countries.   
The number of bilateral investment treaties being entered into each year 
is increasing at a rapid pace.  According to the U.N. Conference on Trade 
and Development, approximately four times as many bilateral investment 
treaties were entered into in the 1990s as were entered into during the 
  
 34. Mobility varies based on a variety of factors, including timing and the 
availability of resources.  It is harder to move once a transnational corporation has invested 
in projects that cannot be moved like infrastructure projects.  Transnational corporations 
engaged in resource extraction are limited to locations where oil or other resources are 
available. 
 35. One explanation for the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties is the 
concerns of investors regarding political risk and corruption in host countries.  I do not intend 
to suggest that the concerns of investors are invalid.  However, the need to address investors’ 
valid concerns does not negate the need to shape laws to also protect the rights of citizens 
and communities in host countries. 
 36. See M. SORNARAJAH, INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 229 (1994).  
For a discussion of the development from primarily diplomatic protection of foreign direct 
investment to bilateral investment treaties, see William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United States Free 
Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 5–9 (2006). 
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1980s.37  Approximately ninety percent of the world’s countries have 
entered into bilateral investment treaties.38   
The substance of post-World War II bilateral investment treaties has not 
changed substantially over time, and they still omit many rights of and 
protections for individuals and communities in host countries.39  However, 
bilateral investment treaties differ from Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, 
and Navigation in several respects.  Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and 
Navigation focused on the broad promotion of trade and commercial 
relationships.  Bilateral investment treaties are narrower because they focus 
on investment, target less developed countries, and allow direct investor 
claims prior to exhausting local remedies.40  Modern bilateral investment 
treaties focus on specific rights of and protections for foreign direct 
investment by nationals of countries that are a party to the treaty.  This shift 
and the steady increase in bilateral investment treaties highlight the gap in 
the regulation of foreign direct investment by international law. 
In part, the shift in the scope of bilateral investment treaties can be 
explained by the successful creation of the WTO as a multinational 
framework for international trade law.  In the post-World War II period, the 
GATT was ratified and implemented.  Since its implementation in 1947, the 
GATT, and later, the WTO Agreements facilitated the development and 
reform of international trade law.  Broad goals of promoting trade and 
commercial relationships addressed in Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, 
and Navigation were subsumed into the GATT and the WTO Agreements.  
Bilateral investment treaties address issues that are beyond the scope of the 
WTO’s activities. 
In more recent years, foreign direct investment issues are increasingly 
incorporated into multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements such 
as the WTO Agreements on Trade-Related Investment Measures, the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services, and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement.41  Despite the incorporation of foreign direct investment 
issues into international trade agreements, foreign direct investment remains 
predominantly regulated by bilateral investment treaties and principles 
derived from customary international law.42 
  
 37. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 1959–1999, iii, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (Dec. 2000), available 
at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. at 20. 
 40. See Dodge, supra note 36, at 14. 
 41. Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and 
Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 
50 (2008). 
 42. See, e.g., id. at 48; cf. David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New 
Constitutionalism, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 757, 768 (2000) (“An interlocking network of 
rules for the protection and liberalization of [foreign direct investment] can be found in 
[bilateral investment treaties], in regional trade agreements such as NAFTA and the 
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Bilateral investment treaties represent an important site for the formation 
of foreign direct investment law.  The shift from treaties of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation to bilateral investment treaties represents a shift 
from North-North agreements to North-South agreements.43  Modern 
bilateral investment treaties give investors even more advantages than under 
treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. Bilateral investment 
treaties do not require the exhaustion of local remedies before allowing 
investors to file direct claims.44  Bilateral investment treaties limit 
interference by host countries in the foreign activities of transnational 
corporations within their territorial jurisdiction.  Customary international 
law and bilateral investment treaties protect the assets of transnational 
corporations in developing countries from uncompensated expropriation or 
nationalization.  However, they do not generally promote comprehensive 
protections for individuals or communities in host countries. 
Despite windows of opportunity and sporadic efforts by the international 
community, international law governing foreign direct investment has not 
moved far from the rules and principles that governed and protected 
colonial trading companies.  Modern foreign direct investment law 
continues to protect the rights of transnational corporations.  This 
encourages direct foreign investment by private actors despite potential 
risks and significant changes in the global economy.  As a result, reforms 
are piecemeal and foreign direct investment law remains fragmented.  Left 
unreformed, transnational corporations are allowed and even encouraged to 
act with impunity in ways that are harmful to individuals and communities 
in the countries in which they operate.  Proposals to reform foreign direct 
investment law should capitalize on growing political will to reform the 
international economic system. 
  
European Energy Charter Treaty, and at the multilateral level in the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs).  The World Bank has issued Guidelines on the Legal 
Treatment of Foreign Investment, and a similar set of nonbinding investment principles has 
been agreed to in Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), while the OECD attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to complete the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) to which other 
states outside the OECD would have been invited to accede.”) (citations omitted). 
 43. Dodge, supra note 36, at 14.  However, more recently, bilateral investment 
treaties have been used to structure relationships between developing countries.  One 
question this trend raises is whether this will result in a shift in the substance of bilateral 
investment treaties that is more beneficial to the citizens and communities in developing 
countries.  See Larry Catá Backer & Augusto Molina, Cuba and the Construction of 
Alternative Global Trade Systems: ALBA and Free Trade in the Americas, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L 
L. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 153, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407705) 
(discussing certain bilateral investment agreements among developing countries). 
 44. Dodge, supra note 36, at 13–14. 
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II.   EFFORTS TO REGULATE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
Although state initiatives to develop a global multilateral agreement on 
foreign direct investment were unsuccessful, there are some noteworthy 
initiatives.  This section discusses selected examples, including the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the U.N. Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations, and Protect, Respect and Remedy: A 
Framework for Business and Human Rights.  Non-governmental 
organizations and private sector entities have also put forth several 
initiatives.  This section is not intended to be a comprehensive survey of 
initiatives, but rather to highlight points on a trajectory toward Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Corporate Social Accountability. 
A.   OECD Guidelines 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) developed a set of voluntary guidelines that had some success.45  
The OECD membership is comprised of more developed countries and was 
established by the 1960 Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development.46  In 1962, the OECD published the Draft 
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property.47  This convention never 
went into effect.  However, later efforts by the OECD were more successful. 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (“OECD 
Guidelines”) is a voluntary code of conduct OECD member countries 
  
 45. Similar initiatives are set out in documents such as the Basel Principles, the 
Equator Principles, and the IFC Performance Standards.  See Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A 
Revised Framework (Nov. 2005), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs118.pdf; The "Equator 
Principles": A Financial Industry Benchmark for Determining, Assessing, and Managing 
Social & Environmental Risk in Project Financing (July 2006), http://www.equator-
principles.com/documents/Equator_Principles.pdf; International Finance Corporation [IFC], 
Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability (Apr. 30, 2006), http:// 
www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/pol_PerformanceStandards2006_ 
full/$FILE/IFC+Performance+Standards.pdf. 
 46. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Convention 
on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1960), 
http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1915847_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2009) (stating that the founding member countries were Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, the Republic of Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the Swiss Confederation, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States). 
 47. See OECD, Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, 2 I.L.M. 
241 (1962).  The OECD adopted a revised version in 1967.  See also OECD, Draft 
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, Oct. 12, 1967, O.E.C.D. Pub. No. 23081, 
reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 117 (1968). 
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adopted in 1976.48  The OECD Guidelines address a range of issues, 
including labor and the environment.49  Although the OECD Guidelines 
themselves are voluntary standards, each country that adopts them is 
obligated to establish a National Contact Point to promote and implement 
the OECD Guidelines.  Numerous cases have been brought under the 
OECD Guidelines.50  When a company is believed to be in breach of the 
OECD Guidelines, any interested party can raise the case with the 
appropriate National Contact Point.  National Contact Points have had 
varying success.51  The OECD Guidelines are currently being reviewed and 
a revised set of guidelines is expected to be completed by mid-2010.52 
B.   U.N. Initiatives 
The United Nations also attempted to address the question of regulating 
transnational corporations.  Although the United Nations was unsuccessful 
in its efforts to achieve a mandatory, legally-binding framework for 
transnational corporations, it has had some success with developing 
voluntary guidelines. 
The U.N. Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations is an early 
attempt by the United Nations to develop hard law rules governing foreign 
direct investment.  The U.N. Economic and Social Council requested the 
drafting of a code of conduct for transnational corporations in 1982.53  In 
1984, the Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of Conduct drafted 
the U.N. Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations.54  It addressed a 
wide range of issues including human rights, environmental issues, and 
  
 48. For more on the early years of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, see, e.g., DUNCAN C. CAMPBELL & RICHARD L. ROWAN, MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES AND THE OECD INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GUIDELINES (1983). 
 49. OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (1976), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf. 
 50. Over 200 cases have been filed with to National Contact Points between 2000 
and 2009.  OECD, Summary Report of the 2009 Annual Meeting of the National Contact 
Points 2 (2009), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/25/43753441.pdf. 
 51. See Amanda Perry Kessaris, Corporate Liability for Environmental Harm, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Malgosia Fitzmaurice & 
David Ong eds., forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 13-14), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1087548 (discussing examples of environmental issues considered 
by the National Contact Points); see generally OECD Watch, The OECD Guidelines for 
MNEs: Are They ‘Fit for the Job’? (June 2009), available at 
http://oecdwatch.org/publications-en/Publication_3201/at_download/fullfile. 
 52. See OECD Watch, OECD Watch Open Letter to the OECD Council at 
Ministerial Level (June 23, 2009), available at http://oecdwatch.org/publications-
en/Publication_3104/at_download/fullfile. 
 53. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Res. 1982/68, ¶¶ 3–4, 6, U.N. Doc. 
E/1982/68 (Oct. 27, 1982). 
 54. U.N. Draft International Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. 
Doc. E/C. 10/1984/S/5 (May 29, 1984). 
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respect for social and cultural objectives and policies.55  However, the 
drafters were unable to reach agreement on all issues and the United 
Nations never adopted the U.N. Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations.  Among other issues, the drafters did not resolve whether the 
U.N. Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations would be a 
universally applicable, legally binding framework or a voluntary guideline 
for transnational corporations.56 
Continuing the success it achieved developing soft law norms, the 
United Nations launched the U.N. Global Compact in 2000.  The U.N. 
Global Compact is a voluntary international policy initiative that seeks to 
align the interests of business, governments, civil society, labor, and the 
United Nations.  The U.N. Global Compact focuses on public 
accountability, transparency, and disclosure as tools to further “a more 
sustainable and inclusive global economy.”57  It promotes ten core 
principles that are grouped into four categories: human rights, labor, 
environment, and anti-corruption.  Although its effectiveness is disputed, 
the U.N. Global Compact has over 5,000 business participants in 135 
countries.58 
In a subsequent attempt to regulate transnational corporations, the U.N. 
Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational 
Corporations began drafting the Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights.59  The Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights 
are based on human rights standards and numerous legal documents, 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.60  The U.N. Sub-Commission on the 
  
 55. See id. 
 56. ECOSOC, Comm’n on Transnational Corps., Report of the Secretariat on the 
Outstanding Issues in the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 23 I.L.M. 
602, 614 (1984). 
 57. U.N. Global Compact, Corporate Citizenship in the World Economy 2 (Oct. 
2008), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/GC_brochure_ 
FINAL.pdf. 
 58. U.N. Global Compact, Annual Review 2008, at 5 (Mar. 2009), available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9.1_news_archives/2009_04_08/GC_20
08AR_FINAL.pdf. 
 59. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of H.R., Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard 
to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 13, 2003). 
 60. In the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights states “that transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, their officers and persons working for them are also obligated to respect 
generally recognized responsibilities and norms contained in United Nations treaties and 
other international instruments.”  Id. at 2. 
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Promotion and Protection of Human Rights approved the Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights on August 13, 2003.61  However, 
the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights is a soft law document, 
and therefore, did not establish mandatory rules for transnational 
corporations.62  The strength of the Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights lies in the potential for soft law to shape voluntary behavior, 
become the basis for developing binding treaties, influence public opinion, 
and document political will. 
In 2005, the Commission on Human Rights recognized the relationship 
between transnational corporations and human rights.63  Further, the 
Commission on Human Rights requested the Secretary-General to appoint a 
special representative for human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises.64  John Ruggie was appointed the U.N. Special 
Representative of the Secretary General on Human Rights. In June of 2008, 
John Ruggie submitted his final report to the Human Rights Council 
(“Ruggie Report”).  This report set out a framework with three core 
principles: “the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third 
parties, including business; the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights; and the need for more effective access to remedies.”65  The Ruggie 
Report and its related documents set out current perspectives on the 
relationship between business and human rights at the international level.66  
Although the Ruggie Report mentions environmental issues, its primary 
focus is the relationship between business and human rights.  The Ruggie 
Report is an important step toward comprehensive laws regulating foreign 
direct investment by transnational corporations.  It identifies a conceptual 
and policy framework that can integrate laws and regulations with other 
measures to address human rights abuses.   
  
 61. Id. 
 62. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of H.R., Res. 2003/16, at 52, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L.11 (2003). 
 63. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights [OHCHR], Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprise, U.N. Comm’n on H.R. Res. 
2005/69, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.17 (Apr. 20, 2005), available at 
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-2005-69.doc. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, delivered to the Human Rights Council, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (prepared by John Ruggie), available at http://www.reports-
and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf [hereinafter Ruggie Report]. 
 66. Christiana Ochoa, The 2008 Ruggie Report: A Framework for Business and 
Human Rights, ASIL INSIGHTS, June 18, 2008, http://www.asil.org/insights080618.cfm# 
_edn1. 
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C.   Private Sector Initiatives 
The private sector put forward several initiatives in the second half of the 
twentieth century.67  More recently, a group of institutional investors 
engaged in the development of the Principles for Responsible Investment at 
the request of the U.N. Secretary-General.68  The U.N. Environment 
Programme Finance Initiative and the U.N. Global Compact coordinated the 
process.69  The voluntary Principles for Responsible Investment require 
signatories to incorporate environmental, social, and corporate governance 
issues into their investment decision-making processes and ownership 
practices.  In July 2009, there were over 550 signatories to the Principles for 
Responsible Investment.70 
Private sector initiatives are necessarily voluntary, and so far, successful 
multilateral efforts to regulate transnational corporations are also voluntary.  
However, financial crises and the stock market crash of 2008 called into 
question the neoclassical economical model and principle of non-
interference into the economic activities of private actors.  Voluntary 
measures are insufficient because foreign direct investment law does not 
create incentives for officers and directors of transnational corporations to 
act in a way that would result in a more equitable distribution of economic 
development and prosperity.  Instead, foreign direct investment law grants 
rights to and protects the rights of transnational corporations without 
establishing corresponding obligations.  Without enforceable legal 
  
 67. Early efforts to draft multilateral agreements governing foreign direct investment 
included the 1957 Draft International Convention for the Mutual Protection of Private 
Property Rights in Foreign Countries.  SOC’Y TO ADVANCE THE PROT. OF FOREIGN INV., 
DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE MUTUAL PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES (1957).  Also, European business leaders and attorneys 
proposed the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention of Investments Abroad, but it never 
went into effect.  The Proposed Convention to Protect Foreign Investment: A Round Table, 9 
J. PUB. L. 115 (1960).  The failures of these attempts are highlighted by the 1959 signing of 
the first bilateral investment treaty, a treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.  Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
F.R.G.-Pack., Nov. 25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 24. 
 68. Principles for Responsible Investment, About, http://www.unpri.org/about/ (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2009). 
 69. Id. 
 70. There are 616 signatories to the Principles for Responsible Investment, including 
some of the top financial companies in the world such as BNP Paribas-France ($2,969,315 
million total assets), HSBC-United Kingdom ($2,527,465 million total assets), JPMorgan-
United States ($2,175,052 million total assets), and Mitsubishi ($2,200,818 million total 
assets).  Principles for Responsible Investment, Signatories, http://www.unpri.org/ 
signatories/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).  The data on total assets is for 2008 and these 
companies ranked 11th, 5th, 29th, and 38th, respectively, among the top fifty financial 
companies in the world in 2008.  UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009: Transnational 
Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development 234, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WIR/2009 (Sept. 17, 2009), available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/ 
dite_dir/docs/wir2009top50_geospread_en.pdf. 
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obligations, parties injured by transnational corporations will continue to 
have insufficient legal protections and avenues to seek legal remedies. 
III.   TRANSFORMING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT LAW 
Transforming foreign direct investment law requires rethinking the role 
of corporations, and particularly transnational corporations, in society.  The 
debate about the role and responsibilities of public corporations is not new.  
In the United States, corporations generally are considered to have a 
primarily economic function with corresponding economic goals and 
responsibilities.  This economic function is then tempered by legal and 
ethical restraints while still allowing corporations to take on discretionary 
responsibilities such as philanthropy.71  However, the primacy of the 
economic function is questioned by both practitioners and theorists, and 
these voices became louder and gained broader credence in light of the 
recent financial crises.  Nonetheless, however one comes out on this 
question, there is general agreement that corporations do not enjoy 
unlimited power. Legal and ethical restraints set the limits of corporate 
activity.  Thus, the question remains where lines should be drawn and what 
constraints should be applied to corporate activity. 
Although it may be more difficult to make the close calls, there is a 
strong argument to be made that certain core values are so important that 
they should be protected by law.  These include human rights and 
environmental protection.  This section discusses Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Accountability Movements, the emergence of Global 
Corporate Citizenship in the business and management literature, and 
opportunities and challenges for reform. 
A.   Corporate Social Responsibility and Accountability 
Generally, when U.S. legal scholars question the role of corporations in 
society, they do so either in the context of Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Corporate Social Accountability, or both.  These theoretical frameworks can 
be traced back to arguments advanced by E. Merrick Dodd in a debate 
between Adolph Berle and E. Merrick Dodd in the 1930s.72  Berle 
  
 71. See Jeffrey P. Katz, Diane L. Swanson & Lori K. Nelson, Culture-Based 
Expectations of Corporate Citizenship: A Propositional Framework and Comparison of Four 
Cultures, 9 INT’L J. OF ORG. ANALYSIS 149, 151 (2001) (discussing Archie B. Caroll, A 
Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance, 4 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 
497 (1979)). 
 72. Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transactional Law: The United 
Nations’ Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of 
Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 
298–99 (2006). 
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essentially argued for the primacy of obligations to shareholders.73  Dodd 
essentially argued that corporations have responsibilities to shareholders 
and societal stakeholders.  The roots of the modern legal discourse on 
Corporate Social Responsibility are in Dodd’s position.74  In more recent 
decades, the Corporate Social Accountability movement expanded the 
discourse.75 
The exact scope and contours of Corporate Social Responsibility are 
disputed within the U.S. legal discourse,76 and they also vary from country 
to country.  However, it is fair to say that Corporate Social Responsibility 
relates to the scope of ethical obligations that corporations have to 
shareholders, societal stakeholders, and society as a whole.  In corporate 
legal theory, Corporate Social Responsibility generally focuses on economic 
and governance issues.  The underlying question revolves around the 
purpose of the corporation.  In the U.S. corporate law context, the rules 
governing Corporate Social Responsibility tend to be found in state and 
federal statutes.  These “hard laws” are generally enforceable in a court of 
law. 
In international legal theory, Corporate Social Responsibility generally 
focuses on human rights.  The underlying question revolves around what 
constitutes acceptable conduct from a moral and societal standpoint.  In 
international and transnational business, the rules governing Corporate 
Social Responsibility tend to be found in codes of conduct or documents 
produced by international organizations.  These types of “soft law” tend to 
be non-binding and unenforceable in a court of law.  In U.S. legal discourse, 
domestic corporate governance and international human rights occasionally 
have uncomfortable meetings.  However, they have not yet been integrated 
into one overarching theoretical framework. 
The Corporate Social Accountability movement attempts to implement 
the principles of Corporate Social Responsibility as legally enforceable 
“hard law.”  Among other things, Corporate Social Accountability is an 
attempt to link human rights, the environment, and other societal issues to 
the economic and corporate governance concerns of corporations.  This can 
take the form of disclosure rules, national and international standards, and 
legal liability for the social and environmental effects of corporate actions. 
Corporate Social Accountability is a shift from Corporate Social 
Responsibility because it moves from a discussion of moral and ethical 
obligations and responsibilities to a discussion of socially and legally 
  
 73. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 
1049 (1931). 
 74. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. 
L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1932). 
 75. See Backer, supra note 72, at 300–01. 
 76. For a categorization of the positions taken on Corporate Social Responsibility in 
the U.S. legal discourse, see Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era 
of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 711–20 (2002). 
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enforceable obligations and responsibilities.  Accordingly, Corporate Social 
Accountability is more instrumental than theoretical.  It allows us to link 
domestic corporate governance with international human rights, but it does 
not offer a comprehensive theoretical framework for bridging gaps between 
the interests of shareholders and societal stakeholders. 
There are many options for reframing foreign direct investment law, 
some more traditional and some more novel.77  An alternative that some 
scholars have suggested is the multilateral negotiation of foreign direct 
investment law in a new international organization.  The idea is that such an 
organization would do for foreign direct investment what the GATT and the 
WTO have done for international trade.78  Another option would be to 
strengthen the role of the WTO in regulating foreign direct investment law.  
Alternatively, a non-governmental organization, also known as civil society, 
like the International Labor Organization, could be created in the area of 
foreign direct investment.  Codes of conduct and other soft law options 
present further alternatives.  Scholars have argued that these forms of non-
binding soft law can contribute to the creation of responsibilities and 
obligations over time.79 
A new international institution might be able to reduce fragmentation in 
international foreign direct investment law but would not necessarily be 
ideally equipped to reduce the asymmetries discussed above.  A new 
international institution would be only one piece of the puzzle.  Without the 
development of a new theoretical framework and mandate, such an 
institution may be insufficiently novel to resolve the underlying 
asymmetries.  These asymmetries must be resolved to bring foreign direct 
investment law into the twenty-first century. 
B.   The Emergence of Global Corporate Citizenship 
Global Corporate Citizenship80 offers a useful theoretical framework 
with which to integrate and analyze the interests of shareholders and 
societal stakeholders in this age of globalization.  Global Corporate 
  
 77. The need to reform foreign direct investment law is not a new issue and there is a 
wealth of scholarship on legal and policy regimes that have the potential to affect and 
transform foreign direct investment law.  See, e.g., LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT (Daniel D. Bradlow & Alfred Escher eds., 1999). 
 78. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational 
Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 5 (2003) (proposing a model for analyzing the application of national laws to 
multinational enterprises operating within their territories). 
 79. See, e.g., Mary E. Footer, The Role of 'Soft' Law Norms in Reconciling the 
Antinomies of WTO Law (July 14, 2008), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1159929. 
 80. “Global Corporate Citizenship” seems to be the term that is predominantly used 
in the management literature.  “Global Business Citizenship” seems to be the term that is 
predominantly used in the business literature. 
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Citizenship posits that corporations have rights and obligations in society 
similar to citizens.  It addresses the ethical responsibilities of companies 
operating in a global market and the values that should guide corporations’ 
engagement with society.81  In effect, principles of Global Corporate 
Citizenship require corporations to engage with shareholders and societal 
stakeholders as well as act as stakeholders themselves. 
Global Corporate Citizenship is already influential in terms of policy and 
practice in several areas.  International institutions are endorsing Global 
Corporate Citizenship as a framework for international development and 
economic policy.  Many transnational corporations have incorporated 
Global Corporate Citizenship into their business goals and policies.82 
Management and business scholars began theorizing Global Corporate 
Citizenship in the 1990s, and a substantial body of scholarship developed 
since that time.83  Global Corporate Citizenship has been defined a variety 
of ways.84  While the definitions vary, there are substantial commonalities.  
For example, corporations have direct duties to local, regional, national, and 
global societal stakeholders.  Societal stakeholders include individuals, 
employees, shareholders, customers, suppliers, and communities where 
corporations conduct business and serve markets.  Some scholars go further 
and argue that corporations should understand themselves as societal 
stakeholders with duties to contribute to the well-being of the world in 
general in addition to their duties to individual stakeholders and groups of 
stakeholders.85 
  
 81. World Economic Forum, Corporate Global Citizenship: The Leadership 
Challenge for CEOs and Boards 6 (2002), http://www.weforum.org/pdf/GCCI/GCC_ 
CEOstatement.pdf.  Scholars do not agree on one definition of “Global Corporate 
Citizenship.”  In part, this discussion follows the lines of the universalism versus cultural 
relativism debate.  For an argument in support of a universal definition, see Jacob Dahl 
Rendtorff, Towards Ethical Guidelines for International Business Corporations: Aspects of 
Global Corporate Citizenship, http://www.isbee.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task= 
doc_download&gid=247&Itemid=39.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
 82. For example, the Boeing web site announces that Global Corporate Citizenship is 
one of Boeing’s core values and the Mitsubishi Corporation has added a “Global Corporate 
Citizenship” section to the  its web site.  Boeing, Global Corporate Citizenship, 
http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutus/community/ (last visited on Oct. 16, 2009); 
Mitsubishi Corporation, Corporate Citizenship, http://www.mitsubishicorp.com/jp/en/csr/ 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2009). 
 83. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON GLOBAL CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 
(Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo eds., Edward Elgar, 2008); Klaus Schwab, Global 
Corporate Citizenship: Working With Governments and Civil Society, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-
Feb. 2008, at 107, 111–12; Grahame F. Thompson, Global Corporate Citizenship: What 
Does it Mean?, 9 COMPETITION AND CHANGE 131, 131–52 (2005); see also Creative 
Capitalism, Corporate Social Confusion, http://creativecapitalism.typepad.com/ 
creative_capitalism/2008/08/corporate-socia.html (last visited July 11, 2009) (suggesting that 
these issues are also being discussed by economists). 
 84. See, e.g., DAVID LOGAN ET AL., GLOBAL CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP: RATIONALE 
AND STRATEGIES 6 (1997); Schwab, supra note 83, at 108. 
 85. Schwab, supra note 83, at 108, 114. 
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There is not universal agreement on the scope of Global Corporate 
Citizenship.  Some management scholars view Global Corporate 
Citizenship as an umbrella for various forms of Corporate Social 
Responsibility.86  Others claim that Global Corporate Citizenship is one of 
five core aspects of business engagement along with corporate governance, 
corporate philanthropy, corporate social responsibility, and corporate social 
entrepreneurship.87  Going forward, this question will also need to be 
addressed in the legal context.  However, human rights and environmental 
protection are core values that fall easily within the scope of Global 
Corporate Citizenship. 
The underlying values of Global Corporate Citizenship are recognized by 
an increasing number of corporations and business leaders.88  Corporations 
are becoming increasingly engaged in promoting Global Corporate 
Citizenship as a result of a lack of global leadership in the political, policy, 
governance, and legal fields.89  In 2003, Chief Executive Officers of over 
seventy transnational corporations90 published a joint statement with the 
World Economic Forum.  This statement set out a framework for the 
implementation of Global Corporate Citizenship principles in the business 
context.91  The integration of Global Corporate Citizenship into the policies 
of transnational corporations has moved beyond the group of companies and 
Chief Executive Officers associated with the joint statement.  Transnational 
corporations have begun including Global Corporate Citizenship into the 
portfolios of their in-house counsel.92 
  
 86. Lee E. Preston & Danielle Mihalko, Corporate Responsibility: Comparative 
Analysis of Current Documents, in PRINCIPLES OF STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT 21, 46 
(1999), available at http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/ccbe/Other/Principles%20of% 
20Stakeholder%20Management.pdf. 
 87. Schwab, supra note 83, at 110. 
 88. See, e.g., The Conference Board, The Expanding Parameters of Global Corporate 
Citizenship, rep. 1246 (1999), in COMMUNICATING THE FUTURE (The Conference Board ed. 
1999). 
 89. Schwab, supra note 83, at 108–09. 
 90. The corporations represented included ABB Limited, Abbott Laboratories, Abril 
Group, Accenture, Anglo American Plc, Anglovaal Mining Limited, Aramex International, 
Arthur D. Little Inc., Artoc Group for Investment & Development, Ayala Corporation, Bajaj 
Auto Limited, The Boots Company PLC, Budimex SA, Carlson Companies, The Coca-Cola 
Company, Corporacion Nacional del Cobre de Chile (Codelco Chile), Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, Deutsche Bank Group, DHL Worldwide Express, Diageo plc, Electricité de 
France (EDF), Empresas Polar, Fleetboston Global Bank, Infosys Technologies Ltd, ING 
Group, Lafarge, McDonald’s Corporation, Merck & Co., Inc., MTR Corporation Ltd, 
Organizações Globo, Phillips-Van Heusen Corporation, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
International Limited, Renault, Rio Tinto Plc, Royal Ahold, S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 
Siemens AG, Statoil ASA, Thames Water Plc, Transnet Ltd, UBS AG, WMC Resources 
Limited, and Xenel Industries Limited. 
 91. See generally World Economic Forum, supra note 81. 
 92. See, e.g., Joe W. (Chip) Pitts III, Business, Human Rights, & the Environment: 
The Role of the Lawyer in CSR & Ethical Globalization, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 479, 482 
(2008). 
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In addition to its integration into business policy and practice, Global 
Corporate Citizenship is also becoming institutionalized at the international 
level.  For example, Global Corporate Citizenship is being promulgated by 
international institutions such as the U.N. Global Compact and the World 
Economic Forum.93  The U.N. Global Compact94 is a public-private 
initiative that seeks to promote ten principles that focus on human rights, 
labor standards, the environment, and anti-corruption.95  The World 
Economic Forum is a Swiss non-profit foundation that focuses on values 
and rules shaping corporate governance and ensuring that economic 
progress and social development go hand-in-hand.96  The U.N. Global 
Compact and the World Economic Forum support the creation of a 
framework that incorporates values and morals into corporate governance 
and transnational operations while simultaneously taking the interests of 
shareholders and societal stakeholders into consideration — key principles 
of Global Corporate Citizenship. 
Although legal scholars noted as early as 2002 that the concept of Global 
Corporate Citizenship had entered the business lexicon, it has received only 
minimal resonance in the U.S. legal discourse.97  There has not yet been an 
attempt to develop a theoretical framework for Global Corporate 
Citizenship in the legal context.  Global Corporate Citizenship has been 
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 95. United Nations, About the Global Compact: The Ten Principles, 
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 96. See World Economic Forum, Our Organization: World Class Governance, 
http://www.weforum.org/en/about/Our%20Organization/index.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 
2009). 
 97. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, War and the Business Corporation, 35 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 549, 556 (2002) (noting that the concept of Global Corporate Citizenship had 
entered the business lexicon).   Searches on July 11, 2009 for “global corporate citizenship” 
resulted in only 28 hits on Westlaw, 21 hits on Lexis, and 3 hits on SSRN.  Searches on July 
11, 2008 for “global business citizenship” resulted in only 2 hits on Westlaw, 2 hits on Lexis, 
and 2 hits on SSRN. 
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mentioned briefly in several international law articles in connection with 
descriptions or discussions of the Global Compact98 and the Millennium 
Development Goals.99  While some legal articles mention Global Corporate 
Citizenship in discussions of Corporate Social Responsibility and human 
rights,100 others go further and contemplate the definition of a good global 
corporate citizen or propose regulating accountability for Global Corporate 
Citizenship.101  A few legal articles briefly mention Global Corporate 
Citizenship in discussing how non-governmental organizations can 
strengthen their international roles and the role of non-governmental 
organizations in building global democracy.102  Still others briefly mention 
the role that policymakers have in promoting Global Corporate Citizenship 
and how the tax advice of law firms and accounting firms may undermine 
Global Corporate Citizenship.103 
  
 98. Adrienne Bernhard, Response: Sara L. Seck, Home State Responsibility and 
Local Communities: The Case of Global Mining, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 207, 213 
(2008); Luis E. Cuervo, OPEC from Myth To Reality, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 433, 489 (2008); 
Deva, supra note 94 at 136; Paul Redmond, Transnational Enterprise and Human Rights: 
Options for Standard Setting and Compliance, 37 INT’L LAW. 69, 100 (2003); Erin Elizabeth 
Macek, Scratching the Corporate Back: Why Corporations Have No Incentive to Define 
Human Rights, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 101, 122 (2002). 
 99. Cuervo, supra note 98, at 550–51; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Building Global 
Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 223, 227 (2000). 
 100. Caroline Kaeb, Emerging Issues of Human Rights Responsibility in the 
Extractive and Manufacturing Industries: Patterns and Liability Risks, 6 NW. U. J. INT’L 
HUM. RTS. 327, 353 (2008); Pitts III, supra note 92, at 482; Gary Lynch-Wood, The Market 
for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility by David Vogel, 19 J. 
ENVTL. L. 145, 146 (2007) (reviewing DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE 
POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2005)). 
 101. Symposium, The Multinational Enterprise as Global Corporate Citizen, 21 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 12–14 (2001); Joel R. Paul, Holding Multinational 
Corporations Responsible under International Law, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
285, 295 (2001) (“Halina Ward discusses the concept of global corporate citizenship. Ward 
argues that there is a 'governance deficit' created by the power disparities between 
developing countries and global corporations. In her view, the equities of the situation 
demand that the 'flipside' of foreign direct investment should be 'foreign direct liability' and 
that the home country of the multinationals should insist that they are subject to the same 
standards of conduct abroad as they are at home. Ward suggests that the threat of liability 
could pressure multinational corporations to conform their behavior to international 
standards. She proposes an international convention to regulate foreign direct investment that 
would empower developing countries to hold multinational corporations accountable as 
global citizens.”). 
 102. Cuervo, supra note 98, at 603–04; Slaughter, supra note 99, at 227. 
 103. Ethan S. Burger et al., KPMG and “Abusive” Tax Shelters: Key Ethical 
Implications for Legal and Accounting Professionals, 31 J. LEGAL PROF. 43, 51 (2007) 
(stating that “by crafting questionable tax shelters or encouraging lawmakers to look the 
other way as profits and gains (both legitimate or otherwise) are routinely concealed in 
offshore tax havens”); David Barnhizer, Waking from Sustainability’s “Impossible Dream”: 
The Decisionmaking Realities of Business and Government, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 
595, 621 n.64 (2006). 
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Developing Global Corporate Citizenship in the legal literature is an 
opportunity to reframe foreign direct investment law and policy and 
establish a legal theoretical framework that values ethics and morality as 
well as the interests of shareholders and societal stakeholders.  Global 
Corporate Citizenship theory facilitates an analysis of the intersection of 
corporate governance and human rights from a legal perspective.  It allows 
us to reframe foreign direct investment law so that we no longer focus 
exclusively on the nature of the corporation, but instead we are also able to 
focus on moral and ethical issues as they relate to transnational business.  
The development of Global Corporate Citizenship as a theoretical 
framework will make it possible to postulate that shareholder and 
stakeholder interests are interrelated and to systematically develop, analyze, 
and answer questions about the issues raised by their convergence. 
C.   Opportunities and Challenges for Reform 
In 2008, business, economic, and financial institutions and systems 
around the world were in a state of crisis.  The United States experienced 
the most severe financial disaster since the Great Depression and several 
major U.S. investment banks failed.  Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.  
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation seized Washington Mutual.  
Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of America.  Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley converted to bank holding companies.  This financial crisis was not 
limited to the United States; its reverberations were felt around the world.  
Two banks in Iceland, Landesbanki and Glitnir, were seized.  Yamamoto 
Life, a Japanese life insurance company, filed for bankruptcy. Global stock 
markets fell dramatically, and in some cases, the depreciation was the worst 
since the stock market crash of 1929. 
In an effort to stop the economic freefall, the U.S. government and 
governments around the world took action.  The Federal Housing Finance 
Agency placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship.  The 
Federal Reserve stepped in to save American International Group from 
insolvency.  The U.S. government passed the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008.  The governments of Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Luxembourg partially nationalized Fortis, a Benelux banking and 
finance company.  National governments set up rescue plans for numerous 
major banks including the Swiss banks UBS and Credit Suisse.  Several 
countries including Australia, Austria, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, and Spain introduced or increased guarantees of 
bank deposits.  Several countries including Brazil, Iceland, Indonesia, and 
Russia temporarily suspended trading on their stock markets.  Several 
countries including Iceland, Hungary, Pakistan, Serbia, and Ukraine 
requested aid from the International Monetary Fund.  However, although 
these and other emergency measures may prevent total collapse of the 
global economy, they do not suggest a model for the future. 
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Despite periodic reforms to the global economic system, the task of 
developing a comprehensive reform of foreign direct investment law 
remains incomplete.  If history is any predictor, the most recent cycle of 
deregulation will end and we will enter a new cycle of increasing regulation 
in an effort to prevent a repeat of the stock market crash of 2008 and related 
financial crises.  There are many vehicles for reform, whether through 
harmonization of domestic regulations, revising standards for multilateral, 
regional, and bilateral trade agreements, or the creation of a new 
international organization for international investment.  Regardless of the 
vehicle, reforms should incorporate the development of a more consistent 
and comprehensive legal framework for foreign direct investment. 
The present economic crisis presents challenges and opportunities.104  
Decreased willingness of companies to invest during a financial crisis is 
likely to increase competition for foreign investment among developing 
nations.  Increased competition for foreign capital further reduces the 
likelihood of achieving an international consensus on the duty of states and 
companies to protect citizens and communities in developing countries.  
However, this is also an opportunity for governments and other societal 
stakeholders to engage or become re-engaged in defining the role of 
corporations in the global economy.105  This question has long been left to 
the corporate actors themselves and the theorizing of academics as a result 
of a lack of global leadership in the political, policy, governance, and legal 
fields.106 
Law and policy in this area is ripe for development.  Principles of Global 
Corporate Citizenship can contribute to the reform of foreign direct 
investment law.  Principles of Global Corporate Citizenship can be 
formalized and integrated into international law in multiple ways. 107  These 
  
 104. See generally Daniel Bradlow, Charting a Progressive Financial Agenda, 
FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS, Dec. 8, 2008, available at http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5723. 
 105. This applies to host countries and the countries of origin of transnational 
corporations. Lack of laws or lack of enforcement of existing law in host countries is an 
important contributing factor to exploitation by foreign investors as well as the proliferation 
of bilateral investment treaties. 
 106. Schwab, supra note 83, at 108–09. 
 107. This raises numerous questions which I will flesh out in future articles.  For 
example, on what theory or theories of jurisdiction would a legal theory of Global Corporate 
Citizenship rely?  Addressing this question will have significant implications for the structure 
of a mandatory legal framework.  Theories of criminal jurisdiction and extradition offer 
insights that may be useful in establishing jurisdiction in civil law for the protection of core 
values.  For a discussion of the five traditional theories of criminal jurisdiction, see generally 
Blakesley, supra note 6, at 1110-11.   See also Christopher L. Blakesley, Autumn of The 
Patriarch: The Pinochet Extradition Debacle and Beyond - Human Rights Clauses 
Compared To Traditional Derivative Protections such as Double Criminality, 91 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1, 15(2000) (“Extradition is an admixture of national and international law.  
It presents an interesting tension between principles of dualism and monism, between 
sovereignty and cooperation and between comparative and international criminal law.” 
(citations omitted)). 
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include multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements; guidelines and 
investment principles issued by international or multilateral organizations; 
and domestic regulations.  However, in each of these cases, the problem 
remains that foreign direct investment law, as opposed to international trade 
law, is being approached in a piecemeal manner. 
There are numerous sources of norms and law that, read together, offer 
standards by which protections for societal stakeholders can be judged. One 
important source is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.108  For 
example, the rights espoused by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
include “economic, social and cultural rights” and the right to “a social and 
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in [the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights] can be fully realized.”109  Although 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is non-binding and aspirational, 
it helps flesh out the meaning of the prosperity to which foreign direct 
investment is believed to contribute. 
This Article proposes transforming theories and practices of voluntary 
Global Corporate Citizenship into a mandatory legal framework.  This 
framework would define the duties of transnational corporations to 
contribute to sustaining and improving the world's well-being and identify 
ways to incorporate this into binding and enforceable “hard law.”  Thus, a 
legal theory of Global Corporate Citizenship requires the re-
conceptualization of the role of transnational corporations in the global 
economy.  The voluntary Global Corporate Citizenship measures taken by 
transnational corporations, U.N. initiatives, and scholarship on human rights 
and environmental, social, and governance issues provide a starting point 
from which to determine the duties and obligations of transnational 
corporations in a legal theory of Global Corporate Citizenship. 
As transnational corporations expand their operations and their reliance 
on contracting and sourcing in developing countries, there is an increasing 
need to integrate environmental, social, and governance issues into 
corporate decision-making.  Environmental issues include climate change, 
water scarcity, local environmental pollution and waste management, new 
regulations expanding the boundaries of environmental product liability, 
and new markets for environmental services and environmentally-friendly 
products.110  Social issues include workplace health and safety, knowledge 
and human capital management, labor and human rights issues within 
companies and their supply chains, and government and community 
  
 108. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 109. Id. 
 110. IVO KNOEPFEL & GORDON HAGART, WHO CARES WINS INITIATIVE 2004–2008, 
FUTURE PROOF?: EMBEDDING ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN 
INVESTMENT MARKETS 1, 13 (2009), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ 
docs/news_events/8.1/who_cares_wins_29Jan09webversion.pdf. 
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relations in developing countries.111  Reforming international investment 
law from a Global Corporate Citizenship perspective includes integrating 
environmental and social issues into the duties and responsibilities of 
transnational corporations.112 
Achieving the benefits of foreign direct investment requires managing a 
delicate balance.  On one hand, transnational corporations must be 
sufficiently interested to invest despite potential risks.  This means that 
transnational corporations must determine that the risk is appropriate in 
light of the expected returns.  At the same time, the pendulum should not 
swing so far that the potential negative effects of foreign direct investment 
are ignored in the competition to attract foreign capital.  Encouraging 
foreign direct investment and providing protections for societal stakeholders 
requires a comprehensive legal framework that balances the rights and 
obligations of states, transnational corporations, and societal stakeholders.113 
CONCLUSION 
A new theoretical framework should meet multiple criteria.  It should 
differentiate between different types of foreign direct investment.114  It 
should reflect the increasingly interlinked nature of global politics and 
economics.  It should take into consideration the substantial economic, 
political, legal, and social influence of transnational corporations.  It should 
be able to address issues arising out of the extreme legal, economic, and 
physical mobility of transnational corporations.  It should promote 
economic, social, and cultural rights.  It should promote more ethical 
economic activity that, in turn, promotes prosperity around the world.  
Global Corporate Citizenship is a theoretical and practical framework that 
has the potential to meet these criteria.  Finally, it should be compatible with 
the protect, respect, and remedy framework for business and human rights 
set out in the Ruggie Report.115 
  
 111. Id. 
 112. Admittedly, many host countries have laws that protect the environment. This is 
to say that the problem in many cases is not the lack of applicable law but the lack of 
enforcement. A legal framework for Global Corporate Citizenship will need to include a 
viable enforcement structure to be effective. 
 113. Developing mandatory Global Corporate Citizenship for foreign direct 
investment will necessarily implicate domestic law. This raises a series of policy issues, 
which I will address in future articles. 
 114. The potential influence of foreign direct investment, whether for harm or for 
good, differs from sector to sector. For example, the extraction and chemical industries may 
have more of an effect on the environment while the effects of high tech and service 
industries may be more likely to be felt in terms of employment and wages. Focusing on 
specific sectors will facilitate a more differentiated analysis of foreign direct investment law 
and help refine details of a legal framework for Global Corporate Citizenship. 
 115. See generally Ruggie Report, supra note 65. 
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Political will to rethink the regulation of transnational corporations has 
grown rapidly and exponentially. Successful reform of foreign direct 
investment law requires new ways of thinking and a new theoretical 
framework. A new approach should: (1) address substantive and procedural 
challenges facing potential plaintiffs from developing countries, (2) take 
into consideration the amount of economic, political, legal, and social 
influence wielded by transnational corporations, (3) capitalize on the 
growing political will to reform the international economic system, (4) 
incorporate modern notions of human rights and sustainable development, 
and (5) encourage moral and ethical business practices in transnational 
economic activities. In future articles, I will set out a law and Global 
Corporate Citizenship research agenda and propose options for the 
implementation of more comprehensive regulation of transnational 
corporations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Foreign investment is developing a social conscience.  There are three 
developments that herald this movement.  The first is the expanding body of 
case law arising from arbitral tribunals, the jurisdiction of which is based on 
  
 * Professor of International Economic Law, University of Nottingham School of 
Law; B.A. (Hons.), University of East Anglia (1976); J.D., Universiteit van de Nederlandse 
Antillen (1985); LL.M. in Public International Law, University College London (1988); PhD 
cum laude Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam (2005).  This article was originally presented as a 
paper at the conference on ‘The Global Interdependent Economy: New Explorations of the 
Boundaries of International Investment’ at Michigan State University College of Law on 
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Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”)1 or 
an arbitration clause in a bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”), and which is 
coming to terms with new perceptions about the multilateral regulation of 
foreign direct investment (“FDI”).  While investment instruments are 
traditionally geared towards the protection of investors and investment, 
many of them now contain a quid pro quo, calling for standards of corporate 
social responsibility.2  Much of this thinking has arisen in the context of 
recent arbitration, which is predicated upon claims arising out of the breach 
of property rights or investor standards, but is increasingly challenged by 
the right of host States to regulate in the fields of social and cultural policy 
or environmental protection.  It has led to the appearance of a new 
generation of “model” BITs spearheaded by the governments of the United 
States and Canada, which seek to regulate these competing interests through 
the negotiation of social and environmental clauses in their treaty-making 
practice. 
A second related development is the introduction of broader social and 
environmental justice issues by civil society organizations (“CSOs”) before 
international arbitral tribunals by means of amicus curiae briefs.  While it is 
still at the discretion of an arbitral tribunal to determine whether it will 
entertain such briefs, there is evidence of their increased use in practice.  
This trend is set to expand in international investment arbitration.  The 2003 
Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party 
Participation under NAFTA3 and the amendment in 2006 to the World 
Bank’s International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“ICSID”)4 Rules on Arbitration Proceedings5 open the way for CSOs to 
make submissions to arbitral tribunals on a range of social and societal 
issues.  These new rules on greater transparency and participation by non-
parties to an investment dispute are finding their way into several model 
BITs, and other governments may in the future feel compelled to include 
similar clauses in their investment treaties. 
A third development, which is slowly gaining ground, is the introduction 
of a more tenable link between business and human rights into investment 
treaty instruments.  This development has come about as a result of the 
  
 1. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 2. Peter Muchlinski, Policy Issues, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 3, 37 (Peter Muchlinski, et. al.  eds., 2008). 
 3. See generally NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Statement of the Free Trade 
Commission on Non-disputing Party Participation, Oct. 7, 2003, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov [hereinafter NAFTA FTC Statement]. 
 4. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270,  575 U.N.T.S. 159, as amended 
through Apr. 10, 2006 [hereinafter ICSID]. 
 5. ICSID, ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, 99, April 2006, 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.js [hereinafter ICSID Arbitration 
Rules]. 
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work of John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises,6 who is seeking to define the relationship of 
corporations to human rights.  There have been earlier attempts to hold 
transnational corporations (“TNCs”) accountable for standards of minimum 
social and environmental protection in the jurisdictions in which they 
operate.  This has been done mostly through voluntary, non-binding codes 
of conduct, such as the International Labour Organization (“ILO”) with its 
Tripartite Declaration of Principles on Multinationals and Social Policy,7 the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,8 and the UN Global 
Compact,9 the latter of which advocates ten universally accepted principles 
in the areas of human rights, labour, environment, and anti-corruption. 
A significant factor in this respect is that some model BITs aim to 
incorporate by reference, these ‘soft’ law norms into their treaty 
instruments.  But to what extent, if at all, are such putative corporate social 
responsibility clauses enforceable, and what do they mean for international 
firms seeking to invest overseas?  Going a step further is it possible that an 
instrument like the abortive U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights10 or a set of mutually agreed principles or guidelines on the 
relationship of corporations to fundamental human rights could resonate 
with treaty-making in the field of foreign investment? 
Drawing upon the recent practice of claimants and respondents before 
international investment tribunals, I examine the extent to which BITs and 
other international investment agreements (“IIAs”) have (a) followed up on 
the substantive implications arising from those decisions in the fields of 
  
 6. See Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, delivered to the Human Rights Council, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/11/13 (Apr. 22, 2009), (prepared by John Ruggie) (following up on his earlier 
report, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights to the 
HRC, A/HRC/8/5 (2008)) [hereinafter Ruggie, U.N. Framework]. 
 7. International Labour Organisation [ILO], Tripartite Declaration of Principles on 
Multinationals and Social Policy, 61 ILO Official Bull. Series A No. 1 (1978) available at 
http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/triparti.htm [hereinafter ILO 
Tripartite Declaration] (adopted by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office at 
its 204th Session in Geneva). 
 8. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, June 27, 2000, http://www.oecd.org/daf/ 
investment/guidelines [hereinafter OECD Guidelines 2000]. 
 9. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced the Global Compact at the 
World Economic Forum at its 1999 meeting in Dais.  It was formally launched on Jul. 26, 
2000, available at http://unglobalcompact.org [hereinafter UN Global Compact]. 
 10. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on Promotion and Prot. of 
Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 
(Aug. 13, 2003) [hereinafter UN Norms on Responsibilities of TNCs]. 
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social and environmental protection, and have (b) introduced procedural 
innovations, securing non-disputing party rights before investment 
arbitration tribunals.  A number of questions arise.  (1) Do the new 
generation of model BITs and other forms of IIAs potentially support or 
hamper competing goals and policies in the fields of social and cultural 
policy or environmental protection?  (2) To what extent is the right of the 
host States to regulate in such matters given recognition comparable to that 
of the investor? 
This Article is divided into three further sections, each of which 
addresses the developments mentioned in the introduction, and is followed 
by a final section, which contains some conclusions. 
II. INVESTOR PROTECTION VERSUS SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
In the past decade, there has been an explosion of BITs, and other forms 
of IIAs, for the promotion and protection of foreign investment.  The United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”),11 which 
actively monitors and analizes all forms of IIAs, has estimated the number 
of BITs to be 2,608 as of mid-June 2008.12  It also notes that 179 states are 
now a contracting party to at least one BIT, while many others, such as the 
United States and Germany, are party to a significant number of BITs.  Both 
the United States and Germany, as well as Canada, China, France, Norway, 
and the United Kingdom, have developed a new generation of model 
BITs,13 which they are using in investor-state relations for the regulation of 
foreign investment globally.  Some of the newer BITs reflect a growing 
trend on the part of governments to negotiate new agreements or to re-
negotiate older ones, in order to reflect concerns about social and 
environmental issues, including the host state’s right to regulate in these 
matters.14  
  
 11. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was 
established on Dec. 8, 1962, and it became an official organ of the UN General Assembly on 
December 30, 1964.  See G.A. Res. 1785, ¶ 1, U.N. GOAR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 4, 
U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 8,, 1962); G.A. Res. 1995, UN GOAR, 19th Sess., Supp. No. 19, at 
1, U.N. Doc. A/5818 (Dec. 30, 1964). 
 12. ECOSOC, Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements (2007 – 
2008), IIA MONITOR 2, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2008/1 (2008) [hereinafter 
UNCTAD IIA Monitor 2008].  
 13. For some recent model BITs of the Governments of China, France, Germany, the 
UK and the US respectively, see the Annexes in Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 352, 360, 368, 376, 385 (2008). 
 14. UNCTAD IIA Monitor 2008, supra note 12, at 5. 
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A. Trends in First and Second Generation Investment Instruments 
The political will of governments during the negotiation and adoption of 
BITs directly affects the extent to which host state responsibilities will be 
balanced by corporate social responsibility provisions directed at the 
investor or the investment.  Many existing BITs are of the first generation, 
concluding somewhere between 195915 and the early 1990s.  By and large 
they reflect the demands of the major capital-exporting states in the 
developed, industrialized world, which were previously situated in the 
Northern hemisphere.  An almost exclusive emphasis on the protection of 
the foreign investment was served by the conclusion of BITs that provided 
for the substantive protection and promotion of investment.16  Basic 
treatment guarantees against the discriminatory, unfair, and expropriable 
conduct of host states.17  Notwithstanding rapid developments in the field of 
investment treaty-making, the majority of these early BITs are still in force 
and usually form the basis for the settlement of investment disputes. 
A second, “newer” generation of BITs and other IIAs either contain 
individual investment chapters, have separate protocols on investment 
attached to them, or include substantive provisions on investment protection 
and liberalization.18  They embrace regional agreements like NAFTA,19 
MERCOSUR,20 or ASEAN,21 or sectoral investment agreements like the 
  
 15. Germany entered into the first modern bilateral investment treaty with Pakistan 
in 1959; see Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, F.R.G.-Pak., Nov. 25, 
1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 23 (entered into force Apr. 28, 1962). 
 16. Peter Muchlinski, Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 681 (Peter Muchlinski, et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter 
Corporate Social Responsibility]. 
 17. Federico Ortino, The Social Dimension of International Investment Agreements: 
Draft a New BIT/MIT Model? 7 INT’L L. FORUM DU DROIT INT’L 243, 243 (2005). 
 18. UNCTAD, Systemic Issues in International Investment Agreements (IIAs), 2, 
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2006/2 (2006). 
 19. See generally NAFTA, supra note 1. 
 20. Tratado para la constitución de un Mercado Comun entre la República Argentina 
[MERCOSUR], la República Federativa del Brasil, la República del Paraguay y la República 
Oriental del Uruguay [Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine 
Republic, the Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic 
of Uruguay], Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041, available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/agreemts/Mercin_e.asp#MERCOSUR.  A specific instrument on 
investment, known as the Colonia Protocol on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments in Mercosur, which provides BIT-like protection to MERCOSUR member 
nations, was signed on Jan. 17, 1994; however, it is not yet in force.  See Protocolo de 
Colonia para la promoción y protección reciproca de inversions en el MERCOSUR [Colonia 
Protocol for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments in MERCOSUR], 
MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC No. 11/93 (Jan. 17, 1994), available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org.trade.mrcsrs/decisions/DEC1193.asp.  It was followed by the 
Buenos Aires Protocol on the Promotion and Protection of Investments made by Countries 
that are not Parties to the MERCOSUR, which was signed on Aug. 5, 1994; however, it is 
not yet in force.  See Protocol on Promotion and Protection of Investments Coming from 
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Energy Charter Treaty.22  Many of these IIAs, including the newer BITs, 
build on the first generation of investment treaties but place more emphasis 
on the liberalization of investment, as there is a reduction of market access 
barriers.  The principal aim of these IIAs is the promotion of economic 
growth among the states that are parties to them. 
Some of the IIAs, like the NAFTA or the Energy Charter Treaty, offer 
strong investor protection standards and internationalized dispute 
settlement.  Other IIAs, like the various ASEAN investment instruments, 
are pure market access instruments, which have more in common with 
modern trade agreements and specialised instruments on trade in services.  
A feature of NAFTA is its more holistic approach to trade and the 
regulation of foreign investment, as evidenced by the preambular text to the 
treaty, which seeks inter alia to “promote sustainable development; and 
protect, enhance and enforce basic workers’ rights.”23  Two additional 
agreements to NAFTA, on specific social issues in the fields of 
environmental24 and labor25 cooperation, endorse this approach.  The North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (“NAAEC”) and the 
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (“NAALC”) came into 
existence after intense lobbying by environmental groups and labor unions, 
who were worried about inadequate environmental protection and trade 
union representation in Mexico.  In practice, civil society organizations 
  
Non-MERCOSUR State Parties, MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC. No. 11/94 (Aug. 5, 1994); see 
also ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 
1, 50–51 (2009). 
 21. Agreement Among the Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the Republic of 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore & the 
Kingdom of Thailand for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Dec. 15, 1987, 27 
I.L.M. 612; Agreement Among the Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the Republic of 
Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the 
Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand & the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam Establishing a Framework Agreement on the ASEAN 
Investment Area (AIA), Oct. 7, 1998, 39 I.L.M. 708.  Both have been superseded by the 
Agreement Between the Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the 
Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of 
Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of 
Thailand & the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Member States of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), known as the Comprehensive Investment Agreement 
(ACIA), Feb. 26, 2009, available at http://www.aseansec.org/22219.htm (not yet in force). 
 22. The Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 381 (1995), reprinted in 
THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY AND RELATED DOCUMENTS: A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY COOPERATION (Energy Charter Secretariat ed., 2004).  
 23. NAFTA, supra note 1, at Preamble; see also Ortino, supra note 17, 245–246 
(concerning the importance of the preambular text of treaty instruments because they provide 
the relative contextual basis for interpreting substantive treaty provisions). 
 24. See generally North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-
Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480. 
 25. See generally North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1547 [hereinafter NAALC]. 
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(“CSOs”) have considered the NAAEC and the NAALC to be “weak and 
ineffectual”.26  Instead, there is an increased emphasis on raising social and 
environmental issues before investment tribunals, which is the topic that I 
will turn to next. 
B. Towards Social and Environmental Protection Through 
Investment Arbitration 
The most recent generation of IIAs has arisen largely as a result of two 
developments.  One of those developments is the burgeoning case law under 
NAFTA Chapter 11 concerning regulatory and environmental ‘takings.’  In 
Ethyl Corporation v. Canada,27 a U.S. corporation, which was the sole 
manufacturer in Canada of the manganese-based gasoline additive 
(“MMT”), challenged a Canadian statute28 banning inter-provincial and 
international import of MMT as a pollutant and harmful to human health.  
The arbitral tribunal’s award on jurisdiction raised concerns as to whether 
regulatory measures in the field of the environment, public health, and other 
social issues could possibly amount to compensable takings under the 
relevant treaty provisions.29  This would effectively interfere with the right 
of a host state, such as Canada, to regulate in the public interest.30 
A domestic challenge by four Canadian provinces,31 under Canada’s 
Agreement on Internal Trade (“AIT”),32 led the panel33 to find the Canadian 
Statute to be invalid because it constituted an undue burden on Canada’s 
internal commerce.34  Meanwhile, the Canadian Government settled the 
  
 26. Rajib N. Sanyal, The Social Clause in Trade Treaties: Implications for 
International Firms, 29 J. BUS. ETHICS 379, 381 (2001). 
 27. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, 38 I.L.M. 708, (NAFTA Ch. 11 
Arb. Trib. 1998),  [hereinafter Ethyl Award on Jurisdiction]. 
 28. The Manganese-Based Fuel Additives Act, 1997 banned the importation or inter-
provincial sale of methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MMT), an octane booster, 
which when added to gasoline enhances fuel efficiency.  The Act left local sales of MMT in 
Canada undisturbed.  Manganese-Based Fuel Additives Act [MBFAA], 1997 S.C., ch. 11 
(Can.). 
 29. Ethyl Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 27. 
 30. See  M. Sornarajah, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 293 (2d 
ed. 2004). 
 31. The four relevant Canadian provinces are Alberta, Québec, Nova Scotia, and 
Saskatchewan. 
 32. Agreement on Internal Trade, July 18, 1994, Can., available at 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ait-aci.nsf/eng/home. 
 33. Agreement on International Trade, Report of the Article 1704 Panel Concerning 
the Dispute Between Alberta and Canada Regarding the Manganese-Based Fuel Additives 
Act, (June 12, 1998),   http://www.ait-aci.ca/index_en/dispute.htm (Governments of Québec, 
Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan intervening as co-complainants). 
 34. See Sanford E. Gaines, Protecting Investors, Protecting the Environment: The 
Unexpected Story of Chapter 11 in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 173, 182–83 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 
2003). 
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NAFTA claim by agreeing to rescind the MMT ban and pay Ethyl $13 
million, which was considered to be the reasonable cost of the dispute and 
Ethyl’s lost profits in Canada.  Canada also took the unprecedented step of 
issuing a statement that there was no scientific basis for banning MMT on 
either environmental or health grounds. 
Contrary to the decision in Ethyl, the Arbitral Tribunal in Methanex 
Corporation v. United States35 found that a California state ban on the 
manufacturing and sale of the gasoline additive methyl tertiary butyl ether 
(“MTBE”), did not amount to expropriation, nor was it compensable.36  This 
was based on the Tribunal’s findings that the measure was non-
discriminatory, that it had been adopted for a public purpose, and that it was 
in accordance with due process.  Moreover, no specific commitments had 
been given to the putative foreign investor, and therefore, no legitimate 
expectations had been created upon which the Methanex Corporation could 
rely.37 
While this form of regulatory taking,38 or indirect expropriation, may 
potentially deprive the investor of utilizing the investment in a meaningful 
way, it allows the state to give effect to environmental and societal concerns 
while avoiding the payment of compensation.  Not only is this an 
unattractive proposition for some investors, but it may also have a 
detrimental effect on some host state governments.  Some states may feel 
that the regulation of foreign investment by BITs and other IIAs limits their 
national policy space by hindering their right to regulate for social or 
environmental purposes.  At the same time those same states do not wish to 
put off potential foreign investors with burdensome regulation.  Moreover, 
there are uncertainties surrounding what constitutes a regulatory taking, and 
which takings are non-compensable or compensable.  
This is not considering the effect of various, sometimes inconsistent, 
investment arbitration awards.  In particular, those awards that pit investor 
protection standards against the right of the host state to regulate in order to 
ensure provision of essential public services or to deal with the effects of a 
particular economic crisis are arguably the most sensitive.  The Argentinean 
economic and financial crisis of 2001–2002 is particularly instructive in this 
respect.  It  has given rise to more than forty-three ICSID proceedings 
instituted under relevant BITs as to which Argentina is a party,  which 
resulted in liabilities for Argentina conservatively estimated at around $8 
  
 35. See generally 44 I.L.M. 1345 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2005). 
 36. Id. pt. IV, ch. D, ¶ 6. 
 37. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 13, at 110. 
 38. A regulatory taking in some jurisdictions is equated with takings of property that 
fall within the police powers of the State.  See generally UNCTAD, Taking of Property, 
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/15 (2000); see also SORNARAJAH, supra note 29, at 353–354. 
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billion, although others estimate the potential claims to be around $80 
billion.39 
However, it is the cases of government interference with an investment 
involving the operation of public services — mostly in the utilities sector 
such as water, sanitation, or power — that have struck a chord in some 
investor-host state relations.  For example, in the case of Aguas del Tunari 
v. Bolivia,40 brought under the Netherlands/Bolivia BIT, widespread popular 
protests followed the privatization of water services in the City of 
Cochabamba, including the grant of a 40-year concession to Aguas del 
Tunari (a subsidiary of the US corporation Bechtel) and a sharp increase in 
water prices.  The investor abandoned its concession in 2000 and filed for 
compensation under ICSID.  An “out of court” settlement left Bechtel being 
paid only nominal compensation. 
Other investment disputes under BITs that have generated considerable 
public interest include two cases involving the Government of Argentina’s 
decision to abandon the pegging of the peso to the dollar and to freeze rates 
in the water sector.  One dispute was Suez/InterAguas v. Argentina,41 and 
the second dispute was Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina.42 These disputes were 
brought under the Spain/Argentina and France/Argentina BITs respectively.  
Similarly, privatization of the water industry and subsequent cancellation of 
the investor’s concession to supply water to the country’s capital Dar-es-
Salaam was at issue in the case of Biwater v. Tanzania,43 brought under the 
UK/Tanzania BIT.  As is evident from the amicus curiae briefs that were 
filed before the relevant tribunals in all three disputes, and which are 
discussed in the next section, the arbitral tribunals were encouraged to 
balance the interests of the foreign investor against the right of the host state 
to legitimately regulate on environmental and public health grounds. 
When it comes to regulatory takings and indirect expropriation, NAFTA 
tribunals, as well as other arbitral tribunals constituted on the basis of 
BITs,44 have begun to apply some differentiation.  While each claim must 
be judged on its own individual merits, investment arbitration tribunals are 
applying certain criteria.  The tribunals look at whether the investor has 
suffered “substantial deprivation”, the effect of the expropriatary measure, 
  
 39. William Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under 
BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 199, 204 (2008). 
 40. Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Bolivia, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to 
Jurisdiction, 20 ICSID REV. 450 (ICSID Arb. Trib.  2005) [hereinafter Aguas del Tunari, 
Decision on Jurisdiction]. 
 41. ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2004) [hereinafter 
Suez/InterAguas]. 
 42. ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2004) [hereinafter Suez/Vivendi]. 
 43. Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. United Rep. of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22 
(ICSID Arb. Trib. 2008) [hereinafter Biwater Gauff]. 
 44. For example, other cases arose out of the Argentinean economic crisis under 
various BITs.  See Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Rep., 47 I.L.M. 445 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2007); 
LG & E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Rep., 46 I.L.M. 36 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2006). 
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the duration of the investment, whether the investor has retained “continued 
control” over the enterprise, and the legitimate expectations of the 
investor.45 
In practice, the effect of this exercise is that tribunals are striving to 
reach a balance between the right of the investor to derive protection from 
specific treaty standards, and the right of the host state to act in the public 
interest.  As the NAFTA Tribunal in Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States46 
remarked, when considering a claim of indirect expropriation of an open-pit 
mine on environmental and cultural policy grounds, its award was important 
for the “private and public entities concerned with environmental 
regulation, [and] the interests of indigenous peoples.”  However, the 
Tribunal also noted “the tension . . . between private rights in property and 
the need of the State to regulate the use of property.”47 
C.  “Modeling” Social and Environmental Protection Clauses in Third 
Generation Investment Instruments 
It is becoming increasingly common for states to expand on their 
legitimate right to regulate for social or environmental purposes by 
imposing restrictions in one of two ways.  One is for governments to 
provide exceptions to the general prohibition on the imposition of 
performance requirements in many IIAs.  For example, Article 1106 of 
NAFTA outlaws performance requirements but permits measures where 
they are “necessary” for the protection of the environment; they are for 
reasons of human, animal, or plant health and safety; or they are related to 
the conservation of living and non-living exhaustible natural resources.48 
The second condition for the application of such measures by the host state 
is that it must not be “arbitrary” or “unjustifiable,” nor must it “constitute a 
disguised restriction on international trade or investment.”49 
This wording is drawn from the preamble, or chapeau, to Article XX of 
the GATT 1994.50  It implies that the host state’s discretion in applying such 
measures will be subject to a series of tests.  When it comes to a measure 
that is “necessary” for the protection of human, animal, or plant life or 
health, the host state government adopting the measure will have to 
demonstrate that the BIT-inconsistent measure is reasonably available given 
  
 45. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 13, 96–115. 
 46. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Final Award (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2009),  
http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter Glamis Gold]. 
 47. Id. 
 48. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1106(6). 
 49. Id. 
 50. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. XX, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (adopting The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, 
55 U.N.T.S. 187).  
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the objective to be sought, i.e. reasonably necessary and proportionate to the 
aim.51 
Similarly, a host state government adopting a measure for the 
conservation of living and non-living exhaustible natural resources will 
have to show that the BIT-inconsistent measure is “reasonably related” to 
the objective of the measure.  It will also have to demonstrate that the 
investment measure is “primarily aimed” at conservation.52  GATT and 
WTO case law requires that there is “a genuine relationship of ends and 
means between the objective pursued and the measure at issue.”53  What is 
evident is that any treaty interpreter, including an arbitrator, will be called 
upon to balance the right of the host state to invoke the exception and its 
obligation to respect the rights of other states and their 
investors/investments, under the relevant IIA. 
The other means of restriction, which is common to some third 
generation BITs, is a so-called “non-lowering of standards” clause.  Such a 
provision aims to suppress the temptation of host states to lower their 
environmental or labour standards as an incentive to attract foreign 
investment.  It is intended to respond to the “pollution haven” hypothesis 
and the phenomenon of “social dumping”; whereby, the host state seeks to 
attract foreign investment that is environmentally damaging or fails to 
address violations of fundamental labour standards, and subsequently 
lowers its environmental or labour standards as an inducement to inward 
investment.54  An example of this is found at Article 1114(2) of NAFTA,55 
which is a non-binding “best efforts” approach to a “non-lowering of 
standards” on environmental protection.  It recognizes that it is 
“inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety 
or environmental measures.” 
The U.S. Model BIT,56 the Canadian Model FIPA,57 as well as the draft 
Norwegian Model BIT,58 reflect both trends.  For example the U.S. Model 
  
 51. Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 16, at 637, 670–71.  
 52. Panel Report, Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed 
Herring and Salmon, ¶ 4.6, L/6268 (Nov. 20, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 
(1989). 
 53. Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 
¶ 145, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 17, 2007). 
 54. Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 16, at 671. 
 55. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1114(2). 
 56. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2004 Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (2004), http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/c644.htm [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT (2004)]. 
 57. Canada’s model bilateral investment treaty is known as a Foreign Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreement or FIPA.  See Canada’s Foreign Investment Protection 
and Promotion Agreement Model, 2003, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/index.aspx [hereinafter Canadian Model FIPA 
(2003)]. 
 58. Norway’s Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 
2007,www.regjeringen.no/upload/.../Utkast%20til%20modellavtale2.doc [hereinafter 
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BIT, besides providing exceptions to the prohibition on performance 
requirements on environmental grounds in Article 8(3)(c),59 also 
incorporates two “non-lowering of standards” provisions.   The language in 
Article 12 on “Investment and Environment” and in Article 13 on 
“Investment and Labor” is more strident than in Article 1114(2) of NAFTA.  
Paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the U.S. Model BIT states, with respect to 
protection offered by domestic environmental law, that “each Party shall 
strive to ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, . . .  such 
laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the protection afforded in those 
laws as encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or 
retention of an investment in its territory.”60 
There is a repetition of this text in paragraph 1 of Article 13 concerning 
domestic labor laws, with the additional requirement that each party must 
not derogate from its domestic labor laws in a manner that “weakens or 
reduces adherence to the internationally recognized labor rights referred to 
in paragraph 2.”61  The “internationally recognized labor rights” are 
specifically listed in the second paragraph of Article 13 as: 
 
(a) the right of association;  
(b) the right to organize and bargain collectively; 
(c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor;  
(d) labor protections for children and young people, including a minimum 
age for the employment of children and the prohibition and elimination 
of the worst forms of discrimination; and  
(e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of 
work, and occupational safety and health.62 
 
  
Norwegian Model BIT (2007)]. Following critical public comments, the Government of 
Norway subsequently withdrew the Norwegian Model BIT 2007 in June, 2009; see Damon 
Vis-Dunbar, Norway Shelves its Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, INV. TREATY 
NEWS, June 8, 2009, available at http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive 
/2009/08/08; see SOUTH CENTRE, COMMENTS ON NORWAY’S DRAFT MODEL BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATY (BIT): POTENTIALLY DIMINISHING THE DEVELOPMENT POLICY SPACE OF 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY PARTNERS 3 (2008), http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option 
=com_content&task=view&id=942&Itemid=77 [hereinafter South Centre comment, 2008]. 
 59. U.S. Model BIT (2004), supra note 56, art. VIII, ¶ 3. 
 60. Id. at art. XII, ¶ 1. 
 61. Id. at art. XIII, ¶ 1. 
 62. These internationally recognized labor rights have all been endorsed in the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up, June 18, 
1998,  37 I.L.M. 1233  [hereinafter ILO Declaration 1998] (adopted by the International 
Labour Conference at its 86th Session in Geneva).  Only the final requirements in Art. 
13(2)(e) of the U.S. Model BIT, concerning minimum wages, hours of work, and 
occupational safety and health, fall outside of the ILO Declaration 1998.  See also NAALC, 
supra note 25, art. 1(2) (referencing the Labor Principles in ¶¶ 6, 9, 10 of the NAALC’s 
Annex 1, which also concern the issues of minimum wage and occupational safety and 
health).  Related provisions have been emphasized in many other modern international 
agreements and model BITs. 
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These two “non-lowering of standards” clauses in respect of 
environmental protection and labour standards have already been 
incorporated into the U.S./Uruguay BIT.63 
The draft Norwegian Model BIT contains a “General Exceptions” 
provision in Article 24,64 which is modeled on Article XX of GATT, and 
similar language in the U.S. and Canadian Model BITs.  It is not 
specifically linked to exceptions concerning the prohibition on performance 
requirements, such as the one found in the second paragraph of Article 8, 
which relates to “[a] measure that requires an investment to use a 
technology to meet generally applicable health, safety or environmental 
requirements.”65  In fact, Article 24 is horizontal in character, such that it 
could operate as an exception not only for performance requirements but 
also with respect to any obligation, including the protection of investor 
standards under the Model BIT.  The draft Norwegian Model BIT also 
provides for a separate cultural exception in Article 27, which is “designed 
to preserve and promote linguistic and cultural diversity, cultural and 
audiovisual policy.”66  However, when it comes to the “non-lowering of 
standards”, paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the Model BIT states that “it is 
inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety 
or environmental and core labour standards.”67  The next sentence is 
modeled almost verbatim on a similar provision in Article 1114(2) of 
NAFTA and the model BITs of Canada68 and the U.S., besides being 
strongly reminiscent of the former negotiating text of the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment.69  It stipulates that “a Party should not waive or 
otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such 
measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion 
or retention of an investment of an investor.”70 
  
 63. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment, U.S.-Uru., art. XII & XIII, Nov. 4, 2005, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 109-9, 44 I.L.M. 
268, 278 [hereinafter US/Uruguay BIT, 2005]; see also Corporate Social Responsibility, 
supra note 16, at 653 (noting “‘no lowering of standards’ clauses concerning labour rights in 
US BITs”). 
 64. Norwegian Model BIT (2007), supra  note 58, art. 24. 
 65.  Id. art. 8(2). 
 66.  Id. art. 27. 
 67.  Id. art. 11(1). 
 68. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1114(2); see also U.S. Model BIT (2004), supra 
note 56, arts. XII & XIII. 
 69. The proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (“MAI”) (1995–1998) was 
negotiated under the auspices of the OECD but abandoned in 1998.  During the negotiating 
phase some delegations had proposed appending the OECD Declaration and Decisions on 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.  OECD Guidelines 2000, supra note 
8. The text and commentary are present at The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Apr. 
22, 1998, OECD Doc. No. DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1, available at 
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/htm/2.htm. 
 70. Norwegian Model BIT (2007), supra note 58, art. 11(1), at 10. 
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Given that many countries have a large number of BITs, which are 
nearing their expiry date and need to be renegotiated or replaced by more 
modern forms of investment treaty,71 we may expect similar changes from 
other major capital exporting countries, although the trend has not been 
followed by all governments, as is clear from the case of Germany.72  
However, generally speaking, it is clear that many of these third generation 
agreements are striving to reflect a better balance between the rights of 
investors on the one hand and the right of the host state to regulate where 
there are legitimate public concerns related to social, environmental, health, 
and safety issues. 
III. LINKING SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE TO FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT: FROM A NOISE TO A SIGNAL 
Historically, there has not been a role for amicus curiae briefs in 
international investment arbitration, which has placed much emphasis on 
the privity of parties and the consensual nature of arbitration.73  However, 
things are changing with a growing trend towards acceptance by investment 
arbitration tribunals of amicus curiae briefs, and the extension of non-
disputing party rights in the matter of access to documents and the arbitral 
proceeding, particularly where there are sensitive matters of public interest 
about which an arbitral tribunal may know very little.  It is against this 
background that I map the growing trend towards the acceptance of amicus 
curiae briefs, and other non-disputing party rights before investment 
arbitration tribunals, and examine the current status of case law on the 
matter. 
It is my contention that the issue of social and environmental justice has 
moved beyond the noise of amici and has been received as a signal by a 
number of governments.74  This has happened as a result of an increased 
  
 71. For example, just under a quarter of the 44 new BITs signed in 2007 replaced 
earlier treaties.  See UNCTAD IIA Monitor 2008, supra note 12, at 5. 
 72. German Model Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investments, 2008, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/investmenttreaties.htm.  The situation with 
respect to EU Member States is somewhat complicated and is currently under review.  This 
is because now that the Lisbon Treaty has come into force on 1 December 2009, the 
European Commission will in the future occupy the field in investment treaty-making.  It has 
already given rise to the development of a first generation of European Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreements (“EIPAs”), which may come to replace many of the 
existing BITs of Member States upon their expiry. 
 73. Eduardo Savarese, Amicus Curiae Participation in Investor-State Arbitral 
Proceedings, 17 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 99, 103 (2007) (noting fn. 17 at 103, concerning the 
tribunal’s decision in Aguas del Tunari not to admit amicus curiae submissions);  Aguas del 
Tunari, Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 40, ¶ 17. 
 74. The idea of a “noise” and a “signal” has been seen as the means by which social 
justice issues are moved from simply representing the voice of public concern to being 
mooted before courts and tribunals, where they can no longer be ignored.  See also Robyn 
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willingness on the part of investment arbitration tribunals to grant non-
disputing party rights to CSOs and other non-state actors.  The move has 
been bolstered by the issuance of the NAFTA FTC Statement in 2003, 
concerning non-disputing party participation in Chapter 11 investment 
arbitration.75  This was followed three years later by an amendment to the 
ICSID Rules in 2006,76 which henceforth allow for the filing of amicus 
curiae briefs before ICSID arbitral tribunals.  Subsequently, Canada, the 
United States, and Norway each have chosen to incorporate direct reference 
to the rights of non-disputing parties in their model BITs.77 
A. Non-Disputing Party Participation in NAFTA Investment 
Arbitration 
The story starts in North America with the Methanex case, a NAFTA 
Chapter 11 dispute involving a Canadian investor against the United States, 
which we came across in the previous section.  The Tribunal in Methanex, 
at the jurisdictional stage, when applying Article 15 of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules,78concluded that it had the discretionary power to accept 
an amicus curiae submission79 from the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (“IISD”) and a joint submission from the 
Commission for a Better Environment, the Bluewater Network of Earth 
Island Institute, and the Center for International Environmental Law 
(“Communities/Bluewater/Center petition”).80  However, at the 
jurisdictional stage, it decided that it did not have the power to authorize 
access to materials or to allow the petitioners to attend the hearings at this 
stage.81 
  
Eckersley, A Green Public Sphere in the WTO?: The Amicus Curiae Interventions in the 
Transatlantic Biotech Dispute, 13 EUR. J. INT’L RELS. 329, 337 (2007). 
 75. NAFTA FTC Statement 2003, supra note 3, § A, ¶¶ 1-3 (setting out the rationale 
behind non-disputing party participation, i.e. that the NAFTA itself does not “[limit] a 
Tribunal’s discretion to accept written submissions from [a non-disputing party]” nor does it 
in any way “[prejudice] the rights of NAFTA parties under Article 1128 of the NAFTA.”). 
 76. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 5. 
 77. See generally Savarese, supra note 73; Kyla Tienhaara, Third Party 
Participation in Investment-Environment Disputes: Recent Developments, 16 REV. OF EUR. 
CMTY. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 230, 230–42 (2007). 
 78. G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 15(1), U.N. Doc. A/Res/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976), 15 I.L.M. 
701 (allowing an arbitral tribunal to conduct proceedings in the manner it considers 
appropriate, provided that the parties are treated equally) [hereinafter UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules 1976]. 
 79. See generally Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Petitions from Third Persons to intervene as Amici Curiae (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2001) 
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexDecision 
ReAuthorityAmicus.pdf [hereinafter Methanex Amicus Curiae Order 2001]. 
 80. Savarese, supra note 73, at 101. 
 81. Methanex Amicus Curiae Order 2001, supra note 79, ¶¶ 47–53; see Howard 
Mann, Opening the Doors, at Least a Little: Comment on the Amicus Decision in Methanex 
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Almost contemporaneous with Methanex is the decision by another 
NAFTA investment tribunal, also operating under UNCITRAL Arbitral 
Rules, to allow amicus curiae intervention at the jurisdictional stage in UPS 
v. Canada, with the hearings being made open to the public before 
Methanex.82  In this NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute, UPS, a U.S. corporation, 
alleged discrimination by its competitor, Canada Post, which used its 
monopoly over the delivery of posted letters to run a courier service that 
allowed it to collect parcels from post offices.  UPS was denied the 
opportunity to operate a similar courier service to compete with Canada 
Post.  The Tribunal accepted amicus submissions on behalf of a joint 
submission by the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (“CUPW”) and the 
Council of Canadians.83  The Amicus Curiae Petitioners argued against a 
potential breach of the minimum treatment standard in Article 1105 of 
NAFTA, calling upon the Tribunal to dismiss UPS’s claims of alleged 
unfair competition between it and Canada Post.  They claimed that the use 
of Canada Post was as a result of the lower costs of the Canadian postal 
workers, who allegedly did not enjoy the same collective bargaining powers 
as UPS employees.   
Both the Methanex  and UPS decisions, at the earlier jurisdictional phase, 
pre-date and anticipate the NAFTA FTC Statement, which besides 
stipulating who can intervene as a non-disputing party before an arbitral 
tribunal in NAFTA Chapter 11 proceedings,84 includes guidelines for the 
submission of amicus curiae briefs.  The Statement suggests how a Chapter 
11 Tribunal should exercise its discretionary power in deciding whether to 
grant leave to file a non-disputing party submission.  It should consider “the 
extent to which:”  
 
(a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the 
determination of a factual or legal issue related to the arbitration by 
bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from 
that of the disputing parties; 
(b) the non-disputing party submission would address matters within the scope 
of the dispute; 
(c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the arbitration; and  
(d) there is a public interest in the subject-matter of the arbitration.85 
  
v. United States, 10 REV. OF EUR. CMTY. & INT’L ENVTL. L.  241, 241–45 (2001) (describing 
how the Methanex Tribunal arrived at its decision). 
 82. UPS, Inc. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002), 
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com. 
 83. UPS, Inc. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction: Decision on Petition for 
Intervention and Participation as Amicus Curiae (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.  2001), available 
at http://naftaclaims,com/Disputes/Canada/UPS/UPSDecisionReParticipationAmici 
Curiae.pdf. 
 84. NAFTA FTC Statement 2003, supra note 3, §B, ¶¶ 1–10 (setting out procedures 
for non-disputing party participation before Chapter 11 investment tribunals). 
 85. Id. § B, ¶ 6.  
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Soon after the NAFTA FTC Statement was issued, the claimant, 
Methanex Corporation, wrote to the Tribunal on behalf of both disputing 
parties, suggesting that it adopt the NAFTA FTC Statement guidelines for 
the acceptance of amicus submissions,86 which it did.  Consequently, six 
months later, in March, 2004, the first amicus curiae filings on the merits in 
Methanex were received by the Tribunal from IISD and the 
Communities/Bluewater/Center, filed on their behalf by Earthjustice.  
Acting on the NAFTA FTC Statement 2003, the Tribunal, at the merits 
stage, also provided access to documentation and allowed the amici to be 
present during the oral hearing, although it did not allow the amici to make 
any oral statement themselves.87 
Ultimately the effect of the amici on the substance of the dispute in the 
final Methanex award on the jurisdiction and merits is questionable, given 
that the Tribunal made little express reference to the Petitioners’ 
submissions.88  Where it did, it chose to highlight the procedural aspects of 
the non-disputing parties’ participation in the dispute.89  The tribunal did, 
however, endorse the arguments advanced by IISD concerning the notion 
that trade law approaches cannot simply be transferred to the arena of 
international investment law.90  Similarly, in the Final UPS Award91 the 
Tribunal chose to make no mention whatsoever of the non-disputing parties’ 
participation, including their previously accepted amicus curiae briefs. 
A rather different approach is evident in Glamis Gold92 where Glamis 
Gold, Ltd., a publicly-held Canadian corporation, claimed damages arising 
from the need to comply with state and federal land reclamation 
requirements and cultural protection measures involving the sacred sites of 
local indigenous people in the Californian desert.  A total of four amicus 
curiae briefs were filed by non-disputing parties, including two from 
environmental lobbyists, Friends of the Earth and a coalition of Sierra Club, 
Earthworks and the Western Mining Action Project;93 one from an industry 
  
 86. Letter from Methanex Corporation to the Tribunal, Oct. 31, 2003,  
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexAgreementReScope.pdf 
(expressing disputing parties’ agreement on amicus participation). 
 87. Methanex, supra note 34, at part II, ch. C, ¶ 27, App. 5 (referring to the earlier 
Methanex Amicus Curiae Order 2001, supra note 79). 
 88. Savarese, supra note 73, at 102. 
 89. Methanex, supra note 34, at part II, ch. C, ¶¶ 26–30. 
 90. Id. part IV, ch. B, ¶ 27. 
 91. UPS, Inc. v. Canada, Final Award, 46 I.L.M. 922 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 
2007). 
 92. Glamis Gold, supra note 46. 
 93. Brief for Friends of the Earth Canada & Friends of the Earth United States as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Claimants, Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, (NAFTA Ch. 11 
Arb. Trib. 2009), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Glamis/Glamis-
Amiccus-FOE-01B--30-09-05.pdf; Application of Non-Disputing Parties for Leave to File a 
Written Submission, Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2009), 
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group, the National Mining Association;94 and one from the indigenous or 
first nations group, the Quechan Indian Nation,95 whose land and related 
cultural and religious rights were affected.  The amicus curiae brief from 
the Quechan Indian Nation argued for the interpretation of the relevant 
provisions in NAFTA in accordance with international law,96 relevant 
provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),97 the ILO Convention No. 69, concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries,98 and the U.N. Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples.99 
In seeking to balance issues of cultural heritage and environmental 
protection against the private property rights and the right of the host state 
to regulate, the Tribunal in Glamis Gold not only provided CSOs and the 
indigenous Quechan Nation with the opportunity to present their views 
through written amicus curiae submissions, but also fully articulated the 
guidelines contained in the NAFTA FTC Statement.100  Additionally, 
following a request from two sets of amici, the Tribunal made arrangements 
for public access to the oral hearings and facilitated the viewing by the 
Quechan Nation at a remote location of the “otherwise restricted discussion 
of tribal locations.”101 
A further point about the Glamis Gold award is that the Tribunal 
recognised the value of “significant involvement by non-disputing parties 
  
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Glamis/Glamis-USA-Amicius-
Sierra_Club_Earthworks-Application.pdf.  
 94. Submission of Non-Disputing Party National Mining Association, Glamis Gold, 
Ltd. v. United States, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2009), available at 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_us_glamis.htm. 
 95. Submission of Non-Disputing Party Quechan Indian Nation, Glamis Gold, Ltd. 
v. United States, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib., 2009), available at 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Glamis/Glamis-USA-Amicus-Quechan-01--19-
08-05.pdf [hereinafter First Quechan Indian Nation Amicus]; Supplemental Submission of 
Non-Disputing Party Quechuan Indian Nation, Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, (NAFTA 
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib., 2009), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Glamis/ 
Glamis-USA-Amicus-Quechan_Band-Submission_2/pdf [hereinafter Second Quechan 
Indian Nation Amicus]. 
 96. First Quechan Indian Nation Amicus, supra note 95, at 8–15.  
 97. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 18, 27, Mar. 23, 1976, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; First Quechuan Indian Nation Amicus, supra note 
95, at 8; Second Quechan Indian Nation Amicus, supra note 95, at 4. 
 98. ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, June 27, 1989, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm 
(adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Office at its 67th Session 
and entered into force Sept. 5, 1991); First Quechan Indian Nation Amicus, supra note 95, at 
10–12; Second Quechan Indian Nation Amicus, supra note 95, at 2–3. 
 99. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. 
Doc. A/Res/61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007); Second Quechan Indian Nation Amicus, supra note 95, at 
4, 6–7. 
 100. Glamis Gold, supra note 46, ¶¶ 268–74, 284–86. 
 101. Id. ¶ 290 (referencing Procedural Order No. 11, ¶15 (Jul. 9, 2007), available at 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Glamis?Glamis-USA-Tribunal-Order_11.pdf). 
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and civil society, in general” and more particularly “the helpful involvement 
of the Quechan Nation in assisting both the Tribunal and the Parties in 
ensuring the confidentially of information concerning tribal lands.”102 
B. Non-Disputing Party Participation in ICSID Arbitration 
In the case of ICSID arbitration, there has been a similar development 
with respect to the growing recognition of amici in investment disputes, 
which has led to the introduction, and subsequent formal recognition, of 
amicus curiae briefs before ICSID tribunals.  Just as the initial impetus for 
change in Methanex and UPS came with the interpretation of Article 15 of 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, ICSID tribunals have turned to Article 
44 of the ICSID Convention,103 which grants a residual power to an ICSID 
tribunal to determine procedural issues.104 
Social and environmental concerns were first raised in 2003 before an 
ICSID tribunal by a group of amici in the case of Aguas del Tunari,105 to 
which I made reference in Section II.  However, the petition was dismissed 
by the Tribunal on the grounds that the “interplay of the ICSID Convention 
and the BIT, and the consensual nature of arbitration” left the core issue of 
such participation with the parties to the dispute.106 
A couple of years later the issue of non-disputing party participation 
arose again in two Argentinean water distribution and sewerage systems 
cases before ICSID tribunals.  Both tribunals followed the earlier 2001 
NAFTA decisions of Methanex and UPS and reversed the stand taken in 
2003 by the ICSID tribunal in Aguas del Tunari.  In Suez/Vivendi the 
Tribunal set out three conditions, upon which, five CSOs, representing 
  
 102. Id. ¶ 12, fn. 10(2). 
 103. ICSID, supra note 4, art. 44 (giving tribunals the discretionary power to decide 
upon any questions of procedure not covered in ICSID, the ICSID Arbitration Rules, or any 
rules agreed upon by the parties to the dispute). 
 104. Savarese, supra note 73, at 104; Suez, et al. v. Argentine Rep., ¶ 10, Order in 
Response to a Petition for Permission to make an Amicus Curiae Submission, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/19, (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2007) [hereinafter Suez/Vivendi Amicus Curiae Order]. 
 105. On August 29, 2002, a petition of La Coordinadora para la Defensa del Agua y 
Vida, La Federación Departamental Cochabambina de Organizaciones Regantes, SEMAPA 
Sur, Friends of the Earth-Netherlands, Oscar Olivera, Omar Fernandez, Father Luis Sánchez, 
and Congressman Jorge Alvarado was submitted on their behalf to the Tribunal by 
Earthjustice.  See James D. Wolfensohn, et al., Demanda de Participación Pública (Demand 
for Participation), Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia, Case No. ARB/02/3 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 
2002), available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/CIADI_CARTA_DEAPOYO.pdf. 
 106. Aguas del Tunari, Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 40, ¶ 17, in which the 
President of the Tribunal referred to a letter of Jan. 29, 2003, sent to the Earthjustice, on 
behalf of the petitioners denying their request for non-disputing party participation, including 
the right to submit an amicus curiae brief.  Id. app. III; see also Alexis Mourre, Are Amici 
Curiae the Proper Response to the Public’s Concerns on Transparency in Investment 
Arbitration? 5 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 257, 259 (2006). 
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environmental and consumer welfare concerns,107 would be considered as 
amici, although it denied them access to the arbitral hearings, which they had 
also requested.  The three conditions they had to meet were ‘‘appropriateness 
of the subject matter’’, ‘‘suitability of a . . . non-party to act as amicus curiae’’, 
and ‘‘the procedure by which the amicus submission is made and 
considered.’’108 
Based upon the evidence before it, the Tribunal took the view that the 
subject matter of the investment dispute was of “significant public interest 
since the underlying dispute relates to water and sewerage systems serving 
millions of people” and could raise “a variety of complex public and 
international law questions, including human rights considerations.”109  
Moreover, it was prepared to accept amicus submissions, but only from 
persons who could satisfy the Tribunal that they had “the expertise, 
experience, and independence to be of assistance” to it.110  In the end, the 
Tribunal denied the non-disputing parties’ request to attend the hearings and 
chose to defer a decision on their request for access to documents until such 
time as the Tribunal might grant a non-disputing party leave to file an 
amicus curiae brief.111 
In Suez/Interaguas,112 the Tribunal was faced with a similar request to 
that in Suez/Vivendi.  One CSO and three further individuals requested to be 
allowed to file amicus curiae briefs and to have access to the hearings.113  
But despite the Tribunal being composed of the same members as 
Suez/Vivendi, it reached a different conclusion.  While it laid down the same 
three conditions for the amici as it had done in Suez/Vivendi,114 it decided 
that the Petitioners had only met the first of the three conditions, i.e. the 
subject matter of the investment dispute was of significant public interest.  
However, on the second condition they had failed to provide “sufficient 
specific information and reasons to . . . qualify as amici curiae,” although it 
was pointed out that if they were to do so the Tribunal would be able to 
consider their request.115  
  
 107. Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia (ACIJ), Centro de Estudios Legales 
y Sociales (CELS),  Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), Consumidores 
Libres Cooperativa Ltda. de Provisión de Servicios de Acción Comunitaria, and Unión de 
Usuarios y Consumidores. 
 108. Suez/Vivendi Amicus Curiae Order, supra note 104, ¶ 17. 
 109. Id. ¶¶ 18, 19. 
 110. Id. ¶ 24. 
 111. Id. ¶ 33. 
 112. Suez, et al. v. Argentine Rep., Order in Response to a Petition for Participation as 
Amicus Curiae ICSID, Case No. ARB/03/17 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2006), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ARB0317-AC-en.pdf. 
 113. The Fundación para el Desarrollo Sustentable, as well as Professor Ricardo 
Ignacio Beltramino, Dr. Ana María Herren and Dr. Omar Darío Heffes, had all filed a 
petition seeking to participate in the hearings.  Id. 
 114. Id. ¶ 4.  
 115. Id. ¶ 34.  
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Meanwhile, a further stage in the enhanced recognition of non-party 
participation in investment arbitration came about against the backdrop of 
this second request in the Argentinean water and sewerage disputes.  In 
April 2006, ICSID updated its Arbitration Rules in order to allow non-
disputing parties to address environmental and other public policy issues of 
which an arbitral tribunal may not be adequately informed by either the 
claimant or the respondent. 
While Rule 32 was amended to permit “with the consent of the parties,” 
persons other than the parties to attend the arbitral hearings,116 the most 
significant change was to Rule 37.  A new second paragraph, dealing with 
“Visits and Inquiries,” stipulates: 
 
After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person or entity that is 
not a party to the dispute (in this Rule called the ‘non-disputing party’) to file 
a written submission with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of 
the dispute.  In determining whether to allow such a filing, the Tribunal shall 
consider, among other things, the extent to which: 
 
 (a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the 
determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by bringing 
a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the 
disputing parties; 
 (b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within the 
scope of the dispute;  
 (c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the proceeding.117 
 
Moreover, the amended ICSID Arbitration Rule calls for “[t]he Tribunal 
. . . to ensure that the non-disputing party submission does not disrupt the 
proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party, and that both 
parties are given an opportunity to present their observations on the non-
disputing party submission.”118 
At the end of 2006, the Petitioners in Suez/Vivendi requested permission 
to file one joint amicus curiae brief, due to the matters of public interest 
arising in the dispute, and to be allowed access to the arbitration 
documents.119  However, the Tribunal, in responding to the Petition, 120  
noted that the new ICSID Rule did not apply to these proceedings.  Instead, 
it followed the criteria that it had set out in its 2005 Order,121 which 
nonetheless were very close to those in the amended ICSID Rule.  Having 
  
 116. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 5, art. 32(2); see also Savarese, supra note 
73, at 104–105. 
 117. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 5, art. 37(2). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Suez/Vivendi Amicus Curiae Order, supra note 104, ¶ 7. 
 120. Id. ¶ 11. 
 121. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. 
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determined that the CSOs in question fulfilled these criteria,122 the Tribunal 
considered that there was sufficient public interest in the outcome of the 
investment dispute to warrant the filing of an amicus curiae brief contrary 
to Claimant’s views.123  However, the Tribunal denied the Petitioners’ 
request for access to the record of the proceedings, noting that the new 
ICSID Rule did not provide any guidance on the matter.  They were also of 
the view that the amici already had a good deal of information about the 
case from other sources.124 
It was not until the case of Biwater Gauff v. United Republic of Tanzania 
that Rule 37(2) of the amended ICSID Arbitration Rules was finally applied 
by an ICSID tribunal.125  Following a number of skirmishes over 
transparency of the proceedings and access to pleadings and other 
documents, for which the Tribunal in Biwater Gauff issued Special Orders 
on Confidentiality, five CSOs126 were given leave to file one joint amicus 
curiae brief. 
The Tribunal’s Order on admission of amicus curiae briefs was handed 
down in February, 2007.127  In line with previous decisions, but more 
particularly the revised Rule 37 of ICSID Arbitration Rules, it allowed the 
submission of the joint amicus curiae brief on the grounds inter alia that it 
could potentially assist the Tribunal by providing a perspective or 
knowledge that was different from that of the disputing parties, and the 
petitioners demonstrated “sufficient interest” in the proceedings.128  It also 
noted that “allowing for the making of such submission by these entities in 
these proceedings is an important element in the overall discharge of the 
Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate and in securing wider confidence in the arbitral 
process itself.”129  However, the amici request for access to the 
documents,130 and to attend the hearings, was denied.131 
Furthermore, in issuing its Order, the Tribunal remarked on the relevance 
of the recent addition of Article 37(2) to the ICSID Rules and proceeded to 
apply it throughout.  It did, however, also acknowledge the decisions of the 
  
 122. Id. ¶ 16. 
 123. Id. ¶¶ 18–22.  
 124. Id. ¶¶ 24–25.  
 125. Savarese, supra note 73, at 105. 
 126. The Lawyers Environmental Action Team (“LEAT”), the Legal and Human 
Rights Centre (“LHRC”); the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (“TGNP”); the 
Center for International Environmental Law (“CIEL”) and the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (“IISD”).  Biwater Guff, supra note 43. 
 127. Biwater Gauff v. United Rep. of Tanzania, Procedural Order No. 5, (ICSID Arb. 
Trib. 2007) [hereinafter Biwater Gauff Procedure Order No. 5].  
 128. Id. ¶ 50. 
 129. Id. ¶ 62–68; see also Tienhaara, supra note 77 (providing a detailed overview of 
both the non-disputing party aspect and the relationship of that participation to broader issues 
of transparency and legitimacy in investment arbitration proceedings). 
 130. Biwater Gauff Procedural Order No. 5, supra note 127, ¶¶ 62–68. 
 131. Id. ¶ 69–72.  
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other two ICSID Tribunals in the Suez water and sewerage cases, who had 
employed similar terms and conditions for non-disputing party participation 
in the matter of amicus curiae briefs.132 
Noteworthy is the fact that, in their Petition,133 the amici in Biwater 
Gauff stressed the importance of investor responsibility,134 especially in the 
context of human rights (the right to water in this case)135 and sustainable 
development.136  They also emphasized the emerging issue of international 
corporate social responsibility (ICSR) in the sphere of investment, relying 
on certain international corporate and industry codes of conduct, which can 
be considered as “ethical standards” that serve as a “benchmark” against 
which TNCs may be judged.137  The inclusion of ICSR standards in BITs 
and other IIAs is an issue to which I return in Section IV below. 
C. Formalizing the Basis for Advancing Social and Environmental 
Justice Issues in Investment Treaties  
In the case of both NAFTA Chapter 11 and ICSID arbitration, we see a 
move from the mere noise of amici to a signal for governments to work pro-
actively towards the extension of non-disputing party rights and greater 
transparency in investment arbitration.  NAFTA and ICSID case law, an 
interpretative statement and an amendment to the rules governing arbitration 
respectively have brought about incremental changes in non-disputing party 
participation. 
However, this is not the end of the story.  Soon after the NAFTA FTC 
issued its Statement in 2003, both Canada and the United States revised 
their model BITs, in line with the trend towards the acceptance of amicus 
curiae briefs and greater transparency in proceedings, which had been 
signaled by some arbitral tribunals.  The Canadian Government had been a 
  
 132. Id. ¶ 52. 
 133. Brief for The Lawyers Environmental Action Team, et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Defendants, Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. United Rep. of Tanzania, Case No. 
ARB/05/22 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2007), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/investment_ 
amicus_final_march_2007.pdf [hereinafter Biwater Gauff Amicus Curiae].  
 134. Id. ¶¶ 48–49 (making specific reference to the right to water as a human right).   
 135. Id.; see Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [CESCR], General 
Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003). 
 136. Likewise, the Biwater Gauff Joint Amicus Curiae Submission references the 
importance of environmentally sustainable safe drinking water.  Biwater Gauff Amicus 
Curiae, supra note 133, ¶¶ 45–46.  This finds support from the U.N. Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), Goal #7 on Environmental Sustainability (Target 3 – safe 
drinking water) and is further supported by the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD).  See WORLD BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, THE 
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2009 47 (2009), available at 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/; World Summit on Sustainable Development [WSSD], 
http:www.un.org/events/wssd/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2009); World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development [WBSCD], http://wbscd.org/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2009). 
 137. Biwater Gauff Amicus Curiae, supra note 134, ¶¶ 52–53. 
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long-time supporter of non-disputing party participation in NAFTA Chapter 
11 disputes.  Not surprisingly its model FIPA of 2003 institutionalizes the 
role of amicus curiae submissions before arbitral tribunals in investment 
disputes.138  Article 39 of the Canada Model FIPA follows the text of the 
guidelines contained in the NAFTA FTC Statement almost to the letter,139 
although it points out that it is at the discretion of a tribunal to determine 
whether non-disputing parties have access to the proceedings on the basis of 
Article 38.140 
Since 2003, Canada has entered into a FIPA with Peru, which contains 
the language of Article 39.141  Moreover, the Government of Canada has 
recently concluded FIPAs with the Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Latvia, Madagascar, Romania, and Slovakia, and is currently in 
negotiations with Bahrain, China, Indonesia, Mongolia, Poland, Tanzania, 
Tunisia, and Vietnam142 based on its model FIPA. 
Similarly, the U.S. Model BIT states at Article 28(3) that “[t]he tribunal 
shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus curiae submissions 
from a person or entity that is not a disputing party.”143  This particular 
provision found its way into the U.S.-Uruguay BIT.144  It has also been 
included in U.S. free trade agreements (“FTAs”), which have investment 
chapters.  These include the U.S. FTAs with inter alia Singapore,145 
Chile,146 Morocco,147 and Oman,148 as well as the U.S.-Dominican 
  
 138. Tienhaara, supra note 77, at 232–233. 
 139.  Canada Model FIPA (2003), supra note 57, art. 39. 
 140. Id. art. 39(8) (referencing art. 38). 
 141. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Peru, Nov. 14, 
2006, available at http:// www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_peru.pdf  
(entered into force June 29, 2007). 
 142. See Foreign Affairs & International Trade Canada, Canada’s Foreign Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreements, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 2009) (listing all of 
Canada’s FIPAs and current treaty negotiations); Tienhaara, supra note 77, at 233. 
 143. U.S. Model BIT (2004), supra note 56, art. XXVIII, ¶ 3. 
 144. U.S./Uruguay BIT 2005, supra note 63, art. XXVIII, ¶ 3. 
 145. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 15.19(3), May 6, 2003, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/singapore-fta/final-text (entered 
into force Jan. 1, 2004). 
 146. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 10.19(3), June 6, 2003, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text (entered into 
force Jan. 1, 2004). 
 147. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, art. 10.19(3), June 15, 2004, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/morocco-fta/final-text (entered 
into force Jan. 1, 2006). 
 148. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Oman, art. 10.19(3), Jan. 19, 2006, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/oman-fta/final-text (entered into 
force Jan. 1, 2009). 
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Republic/Central America,149 and its Trade Promotion Agreements 
(“TPAs”) with Colombia and Peru.150 
The draft Norwegian Model BIT states, in more expansive terms than its 
U.S. counterpart, that an arbitral tribunal hearing an investment dispute 
“shall have the authority to accept and consider written amicus curiae 
submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing Party, provided 
that the Tribunal has determined that they are directly relevant to the factual 
and legal issues under consideration.”151  Unlike, the U.S. Model BIT, the 
draft Norwegian Model BIT also provides that “[t]he Tribunal shall conduct 
hearings open to the public”152 as part of the commitment to transparency 
process surrounding the arbitral proceedings.  The right of parties to the 
dispute to request that the hearings be closed wholly or partially is, 
however, retained.153 
IV. EMBEDDING INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
STANDARDS IN BITS: FROM THE PERIPHERY TO THE CORE 
In this Section, I turn my attention away from the substantive issues of 
social and environmental protection clauses in the regulation of foreign 
investment and procedural rights before investment arbitration tribunals to 
examine the  potential incorporation of so-called “international corporate 
social responsibility” (“ICSR”) standards in investment treaty instruments, 
such as BITs and other IIAs.  What could this mean for claims of social and 
environmental justice before investment arbitration tribunals?  It has been 
argued that ICSR obligations are “the quid pro quo for the protection of 
investors and investments under international investment protection 
agreements,”154 but they can be problematic. 
In discussing ICSR, there are some preliminary questions which need to 
be addressed, otherwise it may be difficult to realize the concept in practice.  
First, to what extent are multinational enterprises (“MNEs”), or 
  
 149. Dominican Republic-Central American States Free Trade Agreement, art. 
10.20(3), Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text (entered into force 
Jan. 1, 2009).  The countries that are a party to this agreement include Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, and the United States.  Id.  
 150. Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., art. 10.20(3), Nov. 22, 2006, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-
text (not yet in force); Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text (entered into 
force Feb. 1, 2009).  A second, additional sentence in Art. 10.20(3) in both treaties calls for 
the proper identification of amicus curiae and details of any financial or other assistance they 
may have had in preparing their submission.  See Tienhaara, supra note 77, at 230, 233. 
 151. Norwegian Model BIT (2007), supra note 58, art. 18(3). 
 152. Id. art. 21(2). 
 153. Id.  
 154. See Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 16, at 643. 
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transnational corporations (“TNCs”), directly, or even indirectly, 
responsible for corporate wrongs? Where direct corporate responsibility is 
lacking, to what extent can governments in host states, where multinational 
corporations operate, be held accountable for their conduct? Second, can 
international human rights instruments impose duties on non-governmental 
entities in the private sphere? 
In answering these questions, various attempts have been made to try and 
hold TNCs or MNEs accountable for standards of minimum social and 
environmental protection in the jurisdictions in which they operate, but the 
problem is that most of those efforts are on a voluntary, non-binding basis.  
This is because soft law instruments, such as codes of conduct, guidelines, 
declarations, and so forth are favoured for the regulation of ICSR in the 
field of foreign investment but may prove weak and ineffectual when it 
comes to enforcement. 
The issue is complicated by the fact that under international law, the 
state, rather than a corporation, is traditionally considered to be the bearer of 
responsibility for securing and enforcing fundamental human rights — 
many of which underpin social and environmental protection clauses.  
Where a TNC or MNE, which is operating overseas, acts in a manner that 
fails to uphold basic economic, social, and cultural rights, there is no legal 
redress for an individual against that corporation, except before the national 
courts of the host state.155 
A. Developments in International Corporate Social Responsibility 
Standards 
Notwithstanding this problem, there have been successive attempts over 
the past four decades to recognize a role for corporations to respect human 
rights, labour standards, and environmental protection in the conduct of 
their activities.  An early attempt to do just that is the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy of 1977.156  For example, in the matter of social policy with respect 
to employment, the ILO Tripartite Declaration aims to set out the principles 
in the field of employment; training; conditions of work and life; and 
industrial relations which governments, employers, and workers’ 
organisations and which multinational enterprises are recommended to 
observe on a voluntary basis.157  
  
 155. Vaughan Lowe, Corporations as International Actors and International Law 
Makers, 14 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 23, 26, 30 (2004). 
 156. ILO Tripartite Declaration 1977, supra note 7. 
 157. Id. at recital 7. 
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The ILO Tripartite Declaration takes, as its starting point, the 
international bill of rights,158 the ILO constitution, and the ILO fundamental 
principles of freedom of expression and association.159 The Declaration then 
calls upon Member governments of the ILO to ratify ILO Conventions 87, 
98, 111, 122, 138, and 182, if they have not yet done so, and to the greatest 
extent possible, through national policies.  Also, the Declaration calls for 
the Members to apply the principles embodied therein and in 
Recommendations 111, 119, 122, 146 and 190, which relate to freedom of 
association, collective bargaining, elimination of discrimination in 
employment and the prohibition of the worst forms of child labour and the 
prohibition on forced labour.160 
The revised OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of 2000,161 
which form part of the OECD Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises,162 are intended to provide a set of voluntary 
principles and standards for responsible business conduct consistent with 
applicable laws.  One of their stated aims is to ensure a harmonious 
relationship between these enterprises and government policies in the 
jurisdictions in which they operate.  To that end, they should seek to 
strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between MNEs and the societies 
in which they operate.  Similarly, MNEs should also “help improve the 
foreign investment climate” and “enhance the contribution to sustainable 
development.”163 
The OECD Guidelines also contain general policy requirements with 
respect to economic and social rights as well as environmental protection, 
when they states that, “[e]nterprises should take fully into account 
established policies in the countries in which they operate, and consider the 
views of other stakeholders.  In this regard, enterprises should contribute to 
economic, social and environmental progress with a view to achieving 
sustainable development.”164 
However, this particular guideline does not make any specific reference 
to internationally recognised labour standards or relevant international 
environmental protection.  It is also purely voluntary and non-binding in 
  
 158. The International Bill of Rights consists of: the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 (1948); the ICCPR, supra note 97; and the 
ICESCR, supra note 135. 
 159. ILO Tripartite Declaration 1977, supra note 7, recital 8. 
 160. These fundamental principles and rights at work have latterly been endorsed in 
the ILO Declaration 1998, supra note 62, which is considered to have declaratory force and 
currently acts as a minimum benchmark for the implementation of core labor rights around 
the globe. 
 161. OECD Guidelines 2000, supra note 8. 
 162. OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 
June 26, 1976, http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3343,d in 1979, 1984, and 1991). 
 163. OECD Guidelines 2000, supra note 8, at 5. 
 164. Id. at 14. 
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nature and operates more by way of a set of recommendations to 
corporations and other business enterprises when investing overseas. 
In 1999, the former U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Anan, challenged 
business leaders to abide by internationally recognised principles in the 
fields of human rights (two principles), labour (four principles — the core 
labour standards contained in the ILO Declaration 1998), the environment 
(three principles, including the precautionary principles), and anti-
corruption (one principle).  This call to arms was transformed into the UN 
Global Compact, which was officially launched in 2000,165 and is still 
ongoing. 
A different approach has been taken by the European Union when in 
January, 1999, the European Parliament passed a resolution on a code of 
conduct for European enterprises operating in developing countries.166  The 
resolution encouraged voluntary company codes of conduct “with effective 
and independent monitoring and verification, and stakeholder participation 
in the development, implementation, and monitoring of these codes.”167  It 
also recommended a model code of conduct for European businesses, which 
should consist of internationally recognised minimum standards in the 
matter of inter alia human rights, labour standards and environmental 
protection.168 
The original resolution also requested the European Commission to 
establish an independent body of experts to monitor and verify 
implementation of the code of conduct, to identify best practices, and to 
receive complaints about corporate conduct from interested parties.169  It 
was intended that, in monitoring the compliance of MNEs or TNCs, due 
attention should be paid to human rights norms and core labour standards. 
Finally, we should not forget the ongoing effort to provide a more tenable 
link between business and human rights generally, which is spearheaded by 
John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General on 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises.170 
    The earlier draft U.N. Norms on Responsibilities of TNCs,171 which were 
drawn up well before Ruggie embarked upon his mandate and preceded his 
work on the U.N. Framework,172 have been described as “a train wreck” by 
a developing country representative for the way in which they alienated 
  
 165. U.N. Global Compact, supra note 9. 
 166. Code of Conduct for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries,  
Res. A4-0508/98, 1999 O.J. (C104) 180. 
 167. Id. ¶ 1. 
 168. Id. ¶ 12. 
 169. Id. ¶¶ 14, 16, 17. 
 170. See Ruggie, U.N. Framework, supra note 6. 
  171. U.N. Norms on Responsibilities of TNCs, supra note 10. 
 172.  U.N. Framework, supra note 6. 
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various communities across the business and human rights divide.173  While 
the U.N. Norms on Responsibilities of TNCs are no longer in the picture, 
the ongoing work of John Ruggie within the U.N. Framework has gathered 
pace. There is now agreement among business, states and civil society on 
the content of the relationship of business to human rights, which is 
manifest in the responsibility of corporations to respect human rights. In 
operational terms, this translates into an emerging recognition that in order 
to discharge the responsibility to respect corporations must carry out due 
diligence.174 
B. Incorporating Corporate Social Responsibility into Legally 
Binding BITs     
What is significant about these various soft law approaches to ICSR is 
that they could be made to bite if incorporated into bilateral treaty 
instruments in order “to ensure the observance of higher standards 
throughout the network of countries in which an MNE operates.”175  The 
point is that, as Alex Wawryk explains, the incorporation of a code of 
conduct into a treaty can “create a legal basis for international 
administration and enforcement of the code” and the treaty format “formally 
binds the parties [to the treaty] to give effect to the code through good faith 
implementation and enforcement.”176  
In fact, the draft Norwegian Model BIT incorporates, by reference, an 
ICSR-style provision in Article 32, whereby “[p]arties agree to encourage 
investors to conduct their investment activities in compliance with the 
OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises and to participate in the 
United Nations Global Compact.”177  While this text on corporate social 
responsibility was perceived by some CSOs as containing weak language,178 
the Norwegian Government defended its inclusion.  It did so on the grounds 
that the provision was primarily aimed at countries outside the OECD area, 
noting that some non-OECD countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
  
 173. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Opening Statement to the 
United Nations Human Rights Council, June 5, 2008 (prepared by John Ruggie), available at 
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-statement-mandate-review-5-Jun-2008.doc 
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 174. Ruggie, U.N. Framework, supra note 6, paras. 56-64. 
 175. SRSG Opening Statement, supra note 173. 
 176. Alex Wawryk, Regulating Transnational Corporations Through Corporate 
Codes of Conduct, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 53, 56 (Jedrzej 
George Frynas & Scott Pegg eds., 2003). 
 177. Norwegian Model BIT (2007), supra note 58, at 24. 
 178. SOUTH CENTRE, supra note 58, at 12 (recommending that the text on corporate 
social responsibility be strengthened and calling for Norwegian investors to be held 
responsible for applying the U.N. Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and 
Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc.  TD/RBP/CONF/10 (May 
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Slovakia had already committed themselves to such efforts, and it was 
trying to encourage Norwegian commerce and industry to respect the 
guidelines and report potential breaches.179  Subsequently, the Norwegian 
Government withdrew its draft Model BIT in June 2009, following 
widespread public criticism.180  The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
simultaneously took the unprecedented step of distributing an English-
language version of its ICSR policy.181 
Such national policy approaches may be the first step on the way to 
hardening up some of the soft ICSR standards found in a range of 
instruments, provided enough states follow in sufficient number to create a 
critical mass in support of such standards.  Those soft ICSR standards could 
eventually be made to resonate in the same way by being “incorporated” 
into BITs and other forms of IIAs. 
Similarly, the work of John Ruggie may lead to an embedding of 
international standards for corporations with respect to human rights, as part 
of their ICSR.  This could lead to a renewed emphasis on making these 
norms enforceable at the international level.182  If the latter exercise is 
successful — if only from a monitoring and verification point of view — a 
further aspect of the Special Representative’s work could be that of ICSR 
benchmarks for corporations and other business entities when investing 
overseas.  However, there are early indications that the future relationship of 
business and human rights could take on an altogether different character, 
based on due diligence requirements as defined in the UN Framework. 
Given that such putative forms of ICSR or even corporate due diligence 
requirements with respect to human rights may be difficult if not impossible 
to enforce, do host state governments risk a chilling effect by incorporating 
such clauses into their investment treaties?  What might be the reaction of 
foreign investors?  Will they welcome the inclusion of ICSR provisions in 
investment instruments designed for their protection but also to monitor 
their behaviour?  What are the potential business and reputational costs of 
doing this? 
Answers to some of these questions may, as Peter Muchlinski suggests, 
arise in the course of litigation.  It is entirely possible that where an investor 
claims that there has been a breach of a fundamental investor protection 
  
 179. Comments on the Model for Future Investment Agreements, Government of 
Norway, § 4.6.3, Dec. 19, 2007, http://www.regjeringen.no/upload.NHD/Vedlegg/ 
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standard or a property right in a BIT, the host State will respond by 
reference to the foreign investor’s corporate social responsibility as a 
justification for, either failing to comply with basic standards of ICSR, or as 
part of its regulatory reaction.183  It may well be that some investment 
arbitration tribunals will take the investor’s conduct into account in 
determining the nature of the host state’s response, but it is equally possible 
that arbitral tribunals will construe ICSR provisions narrowly or disregard 
them altogether due to their soft, “best efforts” language. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
On the balance of developments so far in the field of BITs and other 
IIAs, it is clear that there is a growing trend in investor-state relations 
towards balancing investor standards and protection of property rights 
against the right of a state to regulate in the matter of social and 
environmental protection.  Some of the more advanced third generation 
model BITs and other IIAs have begun to reflect these changes with the 
inclusion of specific social and environmental protection clauses and a non-
lowering of standards in such investment treaty instruments.  What is less 
appreciated perhaps is that this remains a difficult balancing act for many 
governments when negotiating BITs and other IIAs. 
The movement towards greater transparency in investor-state arbitration 
has been propelled by the active role of CSOs, seeking social and 
environmental justice in North American investment treaty practice, 
principally under NAFTA, which has been followed by similar action 
before ICSID tribunals.  These events have triggered important changes in 
the way some investment arbitration tribunals conduct their proceedings.  It 
has led to a greater recognition of non-disputing party participation, 
including the right to submit amicus curiae briefs on human rights, social, 
environmental, and cultural policy grounds, and, in some cases, to be 
permitted to attend the proceedings.  More significant is the fact that in 
practice this change has now been entrenched in some of the newer IIAs, 
which are based on the Canadian Model FIPA184 or the U.S. Model BIT.185 
However, greater acceptance of non-disputing party rights in 
international investment arbitration is not yet universal.  Despite the 
NAFTA FTC Statement of 2003186 and the amendment to ICSID Arbitration 
Rules in 2006,187 any investment arbitration, which is conducted strictly in 
accordance with UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules 1976,188 and which is not a 
NAFTA tribunal, does not offer the same non-disputing party rights.  In 
  
 183. Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 16, at 682. 
 184. See Canadian Model FIPA (2003), supra note 57. 
 185. See U.S. Model BIT (2004), supra note 56. 
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 187. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 5. 
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fact, the UNCITRAL Working Group on Arbitration in February, 2008, 
rejected calls by many states and observer CSOs, such as IISD and CIEL, 
both of which have been active amici in a number of NAFTA Chapter 11 
and ICSID arbitral awards, to discuss the introduction of transparency 
requirements, including the submission of amicus curiae briefs, into 
international rules governing investor-state arbitration.189  Further attempts 
over the past year to advocate for more transparency in investor-state 
arbitration have continued in UNCITRAL Working Group II on Arbitration, 
including statements by John Ruggie to the UNCITRAL Commission on the 
matter,190 have yet to bear fruit. 
Finally, the move to try and develop social and environmental protection 
clauses in order to make them part of the broader panoply of ICSR 
standards, and to embed them in BITs and other IIAs, is just beginning.  
Yet, as the experience of Norway’s draft Model BIT191 demonstrates, there 
is a long way to go.  It seems that the world may not yet be ready for 
extensive inclusion of such ICSR standards, alongside enhanced social, 
environmental, and cultural protection, in investment treaty instruments. 
The question also arises as to the enforceability of these ICSR standards, 
even if taken up in BITs or other IIAs.  Nevertheless, once an investment 
arbitration tribunal reaches a decision in which it holds a foreign corporate 
investor to account on the basis of one or more of these standards, the spell 
will have been broken.  Such embedded ICSR standards could turn out to be 
the defining issue of investor-state relations in the decade to come. 
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Consider this press release from the future:  
 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
Office of the Press Secretary 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE          November 22, 2014 
WASHINGTON —   Today, President Mercedes Chávez announced that 
Americans will now be required to spend one day a week without 
electrical power.  Details of the implementation of the new “conservation 
blackouts” will be released tomorrow.  Conservation blackouts will be 
imposed across the United Sates, roughly corresponding to the geographic 
outlines of our time zones.  Hawaii will be included in the Mountain Time 
Zone; Alaska will be blacked out during the same times as the Eastern 
Time Zone.  
This latest step toward a greener America has become necessary because 
last evening the Board of Directors of Exxon Corporation unanimously 
voted to divert all hydrocarbons it produces outside the United States to 
the still booming Chinese market. After the board meeting, the Exxon 
directors, who for the past two years have been nominated and elected by 
the three sovereign wealth funds that together own 75.5% of Exxon’s 
outstanding voting stock, telephoned the President informing her, “as a 
courtesy,” that they “had reluctantly and with regret” determined that this 
decision was in the best interests of Exxon and its shareholders.  They 
stated that the expanding Chinese economy, which has grown at more than 
9% in each of the past fourteen years,  would obviously be able to make 
substantially more productive use of Exxon’s crude oil and natural gas 
than the U.S. economy, mired as it has been, in the Great Recession which 
dates from 2007. 
As we know, in 2010 and 2011, the escalation of fuel prices added trillions 
of additional dollars to the sovereign wealth funds of a number of foreign 
nations.  Beginning in late 2011, in strict compliance with the Federal 
Emergency Public Company Relief Act of 2011 (“EPCRA 2011”), 
controlling interests in many of America’s largest corporations were 
purchased by the sovereign wealth funds of Singapore, China, and four of  
the United Arab Emirates.  Their two-year buying spree in 2011 and 2012 
resulted in what President Chávez referred to in her election campaign as 
the “extra-nationalization”1 of most major U.S. corporations.  To 
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“recycle” their huge dollar surpluses these sovereign wealth funds 
purchased controlling interests in eighty-eight of the corporations 
constituting the “Fortune 100.”  Once control of these companies had 
been transferred offshore, the primary focus of each of these corporations 
became support for the expanding consumer markets of Asia and Latin 
America.  This redirection of corporate purposes was in accord with 
Restated Santiago Principle 25, adopted by the sovereign wealth funds 
making up the International Working Group (“IWG”) Principle 25 of the 
IWG’s Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (“GAPP”) had been 
announced by the IWG in August, 2011.  GAPP 25 conditions the rescue of 
America’s struggling corporate giants by these sovereign wealth funds on 
prior agreement by the U.S. Congress and the Administration’s Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) to the realignment 
of the primary business focus of the rescued companies to the vibrant, 
expanding economies of China and Latin America.  The reorientation of 
the business purposes of the rescued companies required by GAPP 25 was 
explicitly mandated in EPCRA 2011.   
****** 
“In a separate announcement  today, President Chávez also lauded the 
performance of America’s new Smartmatique voting machines in the 
recent mid-term election which gave her the support of an unprecedented 
68.7% of the House of Representatives and 70% of the Senate.  The 
President also thanked her husband, Venezuela’s Great Leader and 
President for Life, Hugo Chávez, for sending 1900 Venezuelan technicians 
on very short notice to clear up what at first had appeared to be a major 
technical flaw in the nation’s electronic voting machines.”2 
I.   THE THREAT FROM SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 
The foregoing scenario is ridiculous, is it not?3  Given the current state of 
hysteria, hyperbole, and utter nonsense in current American political 
discourse, there may be those who assert that this is the fate we face from 
the threat of sovereign wealth funds (“SWFs”). 
Some believe SWFs have already begun to take over the world.  A 
headline in the Christian Science Monitor asks, Will Sovereign Wealth 
Funds Rule the World?4  The New York Times picked up this theme in an 
editorial headlined, Who Will Come to the Rescue?5  In the popular press, 
  
 1. This term was first used in 2009 by Douglas Koenig, a law student in my 
Strategic International Transactions Seminar, to describe companies headquartered in one 
country but under constructive control of a different sovereign. 
 2. See infra note 126. 
 3. Please note, the above scenario is entirely hypothetical. 
 4. David R. Francis, Will Sovereign Wealth Funds Rule the World?, THE CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 26, 2007, at 16. 
 5. Editorial, Who Will Come to the Rescue?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, at A22.  
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Robert Samuelson, a respected columnist for Newsweek magazine, refers to 
China’s predatory trade practices, feeding the fear that China’s investment 
practices may also be predatory.6  The International Herald Tribune 
described concern in the European Union in an article entitled, Europe 
Looks to Control State-Run Investors: Officials Wary of Intentions of China 
and Russia.7  
Candidates for political office have also chimed in.  In a debate during 
her campaign to become the Democratic Party’s nominee for President in 
2008, Senator Hillary Clinton declared, “[w]e need to have a lot more 
control over what [sovereign wealth funds] do and how they do it.”8 
Professors Milhaupt and Gilson, stars of the corporate governance 
academy, have characterized the issue as one of “state capitalism as 
opposed to market capitalism”9 and proposed that shares of U.S.  companies 
in the hands of foreign states should lose their votes while so held.  
Even Hollywood has picked up this theme.  A recent James Bond 
adventure takes on the global struggle for oil in “The World Is Not 
Enough.”10  Perhaps the world is not enough, but Bond’s title song reveals 
that it is a “perfect place to start.”11  
This Article presents the background of the current SWF phenomenon 
and considers the supposed threat posed when SWFs either acquire outright 
ownership of U.S. companies or accumulate significant equity ownership 
stakes.12   
Part II of this Article reviews the evolution and development of SWFs 
from their first appearance in the mid-twentieth century to the economic 
crisis of 2007–2009.  SWFs have been established by more than fifty 
nations and subdivisions thereof with excess dollars and other foreign 
currencies generated either by sales of oil and natural gas and other 
commodities or by well-managed13 balance of trade regimes.  In particular, 
Part II analyzes (i) the explosive growth of assets under management by 
SWFs since 2004; (ii) their recent rise to prominence in public political 
debate; and (iii) the outsized investments in major financial institutions that 
  
 6. Robert J. Samuelson, The China Conundrum: Using Tires to Send a Message, 
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 28, 2009, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/215729. 
 7. Carter Dougherty, Europe Looks to Control State-Run Investors: Officials Wary 
of Intentions of China and Russia, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, July 14, 2007, § News, at 1. 
 8. The Democratic Debate in Las Vegas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/15/us/politics/15demdebate-
transcript.html?scp=1&sq=Democratic%20Debate%20in%20Las%20Vegas&st=cse. 
 9. Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate 
Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1346, 
1362–65 (2008).  
 10. THE WORLD IS NOT ENOUGH (MGM Studios 1999).  
 11. GARBAGE, THE WORLD IS NOT ENOUGH (MCA 1999).  
 12. See infra, part II.A, for a discussion of various definitions of this term.  
 13. The descriptor “well managed” is required because there are economies where 
more than every available dollar is spent.  The United States is only one such example. 
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were once referred to as the “commanding heights”14 of the economy, as an 
important example of the role SWFs will have in the future. 
Part III of this Article briefly summarizes America’s long history of 
regulation of investments by foreigners.  Beginning with protections 
originating in the early nineteenth century, Part III highlights the efforts to 
regulate foreign investment, including the Congressional response to the 
threat posed by SWFs, manifested in the July 2007 enactment of the Foreign 
Investment and National Security Act (“FINSA”).15  Part III further outlines 
the impact of FINSA on the administration of governmental reviews of 
foreign investments by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (“CFIUS”),16 an entity within the Executive Branch. 
Part IV of this Article considers recent actions taken by the leading 
SWFs through the IWG to address concerns raised by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), whose member 
countries have enjoyed large SWF investments.  The IWG published its 
Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (“GAPP”) in October, 2008.  
The GAPP starkly demonstrates my principal assertion: SWFs will not, and 
cannot be expected to, make commitments that will satisfy those who fear 
the consequences of investments by such funds.  The suggestion that 
principles or practices, such as those included in GAPP, could be 
implemented in a way that would alleviate such fears is at best self-
deluding.  At worst it is a cynical political ploy.  Indeed, such commitments 
are impossible for any category of investor.  To pretend that SWFs, created 
by and ultimately responsible to sovereign nations, will make meaningful, 
binding commitments not to act in their own best interests, is absurd on its 
face.  What has been suggested as “protection” for investee states would not 
be agreed to by private investors and is a complete non-starter for SWFs.   
Part V of this Article details the behavior of a few of the very largest 
SWFs since the extent of the current economic crisis became apparent.17  It 
  
 14.  
The term goes back three quarters of a century. . . . Lenin had 
initiated the New Economic Policy, permitting a resumption of small 
trade and private agriculture.  Now, communist militants were 
attacking him for compromising with capitalism and selling out the 
revolution. . . . Lenin defended the program.  Although the policy 
allowed markets to function, he declared, the state would control the 
“commanding heights,” the most important elements of the economy. 
See DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE FOR THE 
WORLD ECONOMY xii (2002). 
 15. See generally U.S. Treasury, Office International Affairs, 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/cfius/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).  See infra, 
note 127. 
 16. See infra, note 115. 
 17. Charles Roxburgh, et al., Global Capital Markets: Entering a New Era, 
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., Sept. 2009, at 10 (stating that every equity market in the 112 
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is instructive to consider how SWFs have acted because many of the tens of 
billions of dollars they invested in the world’s leading financial institutions 
in 2007 and 2008 vanished in 2008 with the demise of Bear Stearns, 
Lehman Brothers, AIG, and others.  How the SWFs behaved once the 
enormity of the financial black hole that the crisis spawned became apparent 
is an indicator of the threat they pose. 
Part VI of this Article concludes with an appraisal of the behavior of 
SWFs in the crisis and what is to be learned concerning the threat SWFs 
pose.  
II.   THE EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 
A.   What is a Sovereign Wealth Fund? 
The key characteristic of a SWF is its ownership and control by a 
sovereign government.18  There are a wide variety of definitions of a SWF. 
The U.S. Treasury Department defines SWFs as “a government investment 
vehicle which is funded by foreign exchange assets, and which manages 
those assets separately from the official reserves of the monetary 
authorities.”19 Deutsche Bank, a leading financial institution that follows 
SWFs exhaustively, defines SWFs as “government-owned investment funds 
which are commonly funded by the transfer of foreign exchange assets, and 
which are set up to serve [their] objectives . . . by investing the funds on a 
long-term basis, often overseas.”20  The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 
(“SWF Institute”) describes a SWF as “a state-owned investment fund 
composed of financial assets such as stocks, bonds, real estate, or other 
financial instruments funded by foreign exchange assets.”21   
  
nations it studies fell in 2008.  Global equity losses totaled $28 trillion or 50% of the 
aggregate). 
 18. “Sovereign” when used herein includes individual states of the United States, 
such as Alaska, and individual emirates within the United Arab Emirates, such as Abu 
Dhabi. 
 19. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES: APPENDIX SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 1 (June 2007), 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/economic-exchange-rates/pdf/2007_ 
Appendix-3.pdf. 
 20. Steven Kern, SWFs and Foreign Investment Policies: An Update, DEUTSCHE 
BANK RES. Oct. 22, 2008, at 2. 
 21. See, e.g., Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, What is a Sovereign Wealth Fund, 
http://www.swfinstitute.org/swf.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2009) [hereinafter SWF Institute]; 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, 
http://www.swfinstitute.org/funds.php [hereinafter SWF Rankings].  
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The Monitor Company Group Ltd (“Monitor”) - Fondazione Eni Enrico 
Mattei (“FEEM”), a joint research project that focuses on SWFs, defines 
SWFs narrowly so as to only include seventeen in their list of SWFs.22  
A Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) study entitled “Report on 
Foreign Investments” defines SWFs based upon their “outside” focus and 
provides a four-element test for government policymakers.23  
There are at least fifty-two funds that fall within the SWF Institute’s 
broad definition.24  The smallest SWFs hold less half a billion dollars.25  
Each of the ten largest SWFs has assets exceeding $500 billion.26 
  
 22. Monitor and FEEM define a SWF on the basis of the essential characteristics that 
differentiate them from other government-owned investment vehicles. Specifically, a SWF 
must meet the following five criteria: 
1. It is owned directly by a sovereign government; 
2. It is managed independently of other state financial institutions; 
3. It does not have predominant explicit pension obligations; 
4. It invests in a diverse set of financial asset classes in pursuit of commercial 
returns; and 
5. It has made a significant proportion of its publicly-reported investments 
internationally. 
 See generally MONITOR GROUP, Q1 2009 ANNUAL REPORT (2009), available at 
http://www.monitor.com/Portals/0/MonitorContent/documents/Monitor_SWF_Q1_2009_Re
port.pdf.  
 23.  
[The GAO] classified SWFs with the most interest to policymakers 
as those that (1) are government-chartered or sponsored investment 
vehicles; (2) invest some or all of their funds in assets other than 
sovereign debt outside the country that established them; (3) are 
funded through government transfers arising primarily from 
sovereign budget surpluses, trade surpluses, central bank currency 
reserves, or revenues from the commodity wealth of a country; and 
(4) are not actively functioning as a pension fund (money received 
from individuals). 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE [GAO], SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: LAWS LIMITING 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AFFECT CERTAIN U.S. ASSETS AND AGENCIES HAVE VARIOUS 
ENFORCEMENT PROCESSES, GAO-09-608, at 5 (2009). 
 24. See infra App. A. 
 25. SWF Rankings, supra note 21 (noting Kiribati, Mauritania, and Indonesia 
rankings). 
 26. The ten largest SWFs are Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Authority (“SAMA”), Norway’s Government Pension Fund —Global, China’s 
State Agency for Foreign Exchange (“SAFE”), China Investment Corporation, Government 
of Singapore Investment Corporation, Kuwait Investment Authority, Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority Investment Portfolio, Russia’s National Welfare Fund, and Singapore’s Temasek 
Holdings.  SWF Rankings, supra note 21.  The extreme size range of SWF assets becomes 
clear when we compare the $550 million Kiribati fund with the Abu Dhabi fund, which is 
more than1000 times larger.  Id.  
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B.   When Did Sovereign Wealth Funds Appear? 
The first of what we now label SWFs appeared in 1953.  The first SWFs 
were referred to by terms descriptive of their purpose or origin,27 such as 
“revenue equalization reserve funds,”28 “stabilization funds,”29 or simply 
“investment funds.”30  This Article uses the accepted term, “sovereign 
wealth fund,” coined in 2005 by Andrew Rozanov at State Street Global 
Markets.31   
Only fourteen SWFs existed prior to 1990.32  The first three SWFs were 
established prior to 1967.33  Following those, five were established during 
the 1970s; six were established in the 1980s; eight were established in the 
1990s; ten were established during the five years beginning with 2000 and 
ending in 2004; and nineteen were established after 2004.34  However, the 
date the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority began to act as a SWF is 
unknown.35  
Thirty of these SWFs are funded with proceeds from the export of crude 
oil or natural gas.36  Given the great commodity and consumer debt bubbles 
of the first decade of the twenty-first century, bubbles that took the price of 
crude oil from below $20 per barrel in the late 1990s to above $140 in 
2007,37 it is not a surprise that many SWFs are funded through the sale of 
crude oil and other commodities.  The commodity and debt bubbles also 
help explain why nineteen SWFs have been established since 2004.  Ten of 
the SWFs established in the twenty-first century are funded, not by 
  
 27. “The Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund, a trust fund financed by phosphate 
earnings over the years, is still an important part of the government’s assets and contained 
more than [ ] $554 million in 2006. Kiribati has prudently managed the reserve fund, which 
is vital for the long-term welfare of the country.”  U.S. Department of State, Background 
Note: Kiribati, (May 2009), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1836.htm. 
 28. “The Kiribati Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund, [was] established in 1956 to 
invest the profits from a tax on bird-manure fertilizer exports . . . .”  Kevin Hassett, 
Sovereign Funds Offer U.S. Big Gains, Small Risk, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 24, 2007, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=au8DAW5jHEks&refer=home. 
 29. For example, in 1953, the Kuwait Investment Board began and now maintains 
the Kuwaiti Future Generation Fund, and the Iran Oil Stabilisation fund was established in 
1999.  See SWF Institute, supra note 21. 
 30. Lee Hudson Teslik, Backgrounder on Sovereign Wealth Funds, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL., Jan. 28, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/15251/ (“SWFs can invest in 
whatever they want, just as if they were independent investment funds.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Andrew Rozanov, Who Holds the Wealth of Nations?, ST. STREET 
GLOBAL ADVISORS, Aug. 2005, at 1. 
 32. SWF Rankings, supra note 21; see infra App. A. 
 33. SWF Rankings, supra note 21; see infra App. A. 
 34. SWF Rankings, supra note 21; see infra App. A. 
 35. SWF Rankings, supra note 21 (“The . . . Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(“SAMA”), was established as the central bank of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1952 to 
handle growing foreign reserve funds.”). 
 36. Id.  
 37. See infra Chart 3. 
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commodity exports, but by balance of trade surpluses,38 derived in part from 
the excessive debt that the United States and other consumers incurred and 
spent in this period. 
C.   Why Were Sovereign Wealth Funds Established? 
Each SWF has unique objectives.  Since we are dealing with entities 
controlled by sovereign governments, their investment philosophies and 
goals need not be disclosed.  They  may also be changed or ignored at any 
time. Nevertheless, SWFs often publish investment goals, and there are 
likely purposes or goals which are common to SWFs.  These goals include 
investing to: 
• Diversify away from non-renewable commodities; 39 
• Increase the return on national savings;40 
• Directly implement domestic economic development objectives; 41  
• Invest currently unneeded dollar liquidity; 42 and 
• Achieve long-term returns which preserve and enhance international 
purchasing power of national assets.43 
D.   Why Is the Spotlight Now on Sovereign Wealth Funds? 
SWFs have been extensively covered in the news since 2006.  Some 
SWFs have existed for decades and have been quietly, and not entirely 
secretly, investing internationally.  For example, it is known that Temasek, a 
SWF established by Singapore in 1974, has long held major interests in 
regional entities such as Singapore Airlines and SingTel.44  But Temasek 
and other early SWFs also invested internationally for decades without 
attracting adverse attention.  This Section explores the changes in the 
economic milieu and in the SWFs themselves that raised the profile of 
SWFs. 
The current high profile of SWFs is not explained by their size.  
Compared to other large investors, SWFs are relatively insignificant. 
  
 38. See infra App. A. 
 39. For example, SWFs from Iran, Kazakhstan, Qatar, and Kuwait share this stated 
goal.  See id. 
 40. For example, SWFs from Alaska and Botswana share this goal.  See id. 
 41. One such example is Vietnam’s SWF.  See id. 
 42. For example, SAFE and the State General Reserve Fund of Oman share this goal.  
See id. 
 43. For example, SWFs from Azerbaijan, Brazil, Norway, China (CIC), and Abu 
Dhabi (Mubadala) share this goal.  See id. 
 44. “SingTel is the largest company listed on the Singapore Exchange with a market 
capitalization of more than S$40 billion.”  See SingTel, Company Profile, 
http://home.singtel.com/about_singtel/company_profile/default.asp (last visited Nov. 4, 
2009).   
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Table 145 
 
 
Table 1 reveals that while SWFs have some $3.8 trillion in assets under 
management, pension funds worldwide have an estimated $19 trillion of 
assets under management.  Insurance companies have approximately $21 
trillion in investable assets, and investment funds of all sorts manage an 
estimated $22 trillion. 
Notwithstanding the comparatively insignificant size of investable funds 
controlled by SWFs, their sudden appearance in the equity markets and the 
massive size of their individual investment positions has triggered concerns 
in both the popular media and in the U.S. Congress.  The unique 
characteristic of a SWF investment is that it is controlled by a sovereign 
whose true present and future investment intentions are unknown and 
unknowable.   The economic, diplomatic, and political interests of a 
sovereign will almost always coincide with the goals of a SWF, but they 
need not always do so.  At times, diplomatic or political interests could 
trump traditional investment goals.  This lack of knowledge makes it 
possible for Congress and the media to see SWFs as a threat.  
In principle, SWF investments should be managed with a multi-year 
horizon, with investments made for the long term, and with the goal of 
wealth maximization within the fund.  To date there is no evidence to 
suggest that any SWF, no matter how opaque its operations, has acted in 
any instance for political or diplomatic, or non-economic, purposes.46 
  
 45. Steffen Kern, Sovereign Wealth Funds: State Investments During the Financial 
Crisis, DEUTSCHE BANK RES., July 15, 2009, at 1, 5, available at 
http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_DE-PROD/PROD0000000000 
244283.pdf.  Table 1 is used with authorization from its Author.   The figure for SWFs has 
been updated with information from the SWF Institute to reflect SWF assets estimated as of 
August 2009.  See infra App A. 
 46. Justin O’Brien, Barriers to Entry: Foreign Direct Investment and the Regulation 
of Sovereign Wealth Funds, BERKLEY CENTER FOR L. & SOC’Y 10 (2008); Ashby H.B. Monk, 
Recasting the Sovereign Wealth Fund Debate: Trust, Legitimacy, and Governance, 13 
(Working Paper, May 1, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/bastract=1134862; Opinion of 
the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The Impact of Private Equity, Hedge and 
Sovereign Funds on Industrial Change in Europe,’ ¶ 5.6 (Oct. 15, 2006), 
http://www.eesc.europa.eu (“There is no substantive evidence that SWFs make investments 
for political or strategic motives.”). 
Hedge Funds $ 1.0 
SWFs $ 3.8 
Pension Funds $ 19 
Insurance Co. $ 21 
Mutual funds  $ 22 
Global GDP $ 61 
 
(in trillions of U.S. dollars)
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Nearly every publicly-held enterprise welcomes passive long-term 
investors.  Any large investor could threaten an unwelcome change of 
control.  Typically this threat is a private matter between these parties and 
of little interest to the government or the public.  With SWFs, however, the 
question is not simply whether the SWF is interested in gaining control of 
an entity, but whether such an investor might one day use its influence or 
outright control over an investee company to further the diplomatic policies 
or political interests of the sovereign.  After all, SWFs do not answer to or 
seek investment funds from other investors. SWFs are ultimately 
responsible to a sovereign with political and other interests. 
Although lack of enforceable transparency rules makes this point 
impossible to determine, SWFs traditionally sought to protect their cash 
surpluses by investing in risk-free U.S. Treasury instruments.  Treasury 
bonds, bills, and notes, together with U.S. agency instruments,47 provided 
the ultimate in financial security and stability for offshore and domestic 
holders of the U.S. dollar.  When a SWF invests in debt or equity 
instruments issued by private or public companies, there is seldom an 
obligation for them to disclose such investments.  This is not a unique or 
threatening feature of funds controlled by a foreign sovereign.  It is also the 
status of private investors. 
We can better understand the sudden, recent rise to media and political 
prominence of the SWFs when we consider three factors: (i) the rapid 
growth of SWFs in the twenty-first century; (ii) the marked increased in 
their publicly disclosed investments since 2004; and (iii) the low returns 
available on U.S. Treasury and agency instruments over the last few years. 
Two recently aborted investments focused public attention on SWFs.48  
These affairs also contributed to the notoriety SWFs now have. 
Chart 1 below, prepared by Steffen Kern at Deutsche Bank Research, 
illustrates the phenomenal rise of SWF investments after 2003.  Because 
there are no mandatory disclosure rules applicable to SWFs, the data 
utilized in this chart reflects only that small portion of SWF investments 
that has become public.  The lack of transparency of SWFs generally is not 
limited to investments made or portfolio holdings.  This absence of 
verifiable data on SWFs as a category is complete.49  It applies to the overall 
size of SWFs, portfolio allocations, their individual investment goals and 
philosophies, historical investment performance, as well as other categories.  
  
 47. See infra note 51. 
 48. See infra text following note 66. 
 49. One of the more transparent SWFs is the Government of Singapore Investment 
Corporation Pte Ltd (“GIC”).  Its policy on disclosures is set forth in its first annual report, 
issued in 2008, twenty-seven years after it was created.   “As the Government of Singapore is 
the owner of the funds that GIC manages, we take our lead from the Government regarding 
the disclosure of any information on the funds.”  GOV’T OF SING. INV. CORP., 2008 SUMMARY 
ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2008). 
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Nevertheless, Chart 1 starkly reveals another cause of the current focus on 
SWFs. 
 
Chart 150 
 
 
Chart 1 reveals that from 1995 through 2003, known SWF investments 
aggregated about $10 billion.  Throughout this early period there are only 
two years when these investments exceeded $1 billion.  In 1999, it is 
estimated that a total of $2 billion was invested by SWFs; in 2001, this 
estimate is $4 billion.  Dramatic changes appear after 2003, as SWFs 
accumulated more assets and sought higher returns than those offered by 
U.S. treasuries and related instruments.  During 2004, the aggregate of all 
known investments made by SWFs grew to $8 billion.  These investments 
jumped to $19 billion in 2005, $35 billion in 2006, $44 billion in 2007, and 
  
 50. Kern, supra note 45, at 13 (indicating that the information presented in Chart 1 is 
based upon transactions occurring between 1995 and 2009 as reported by Dealogic involving 
at least one state-sponsored investor on the acquirer side.  The reported transactions are 
likely to entail only a fraction of the transaction de facto undertaken by such vehicles, many 
of which are not publically disclosed.  The data presented here should, therefore, be 
understood as tentative indicators of broad trends).  Chart 1 is reprinted with the permission 
of its Author.   
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$58 billion in 2008.  This explosive growth explains, in part, the 
significantly higher profile SWFs now have.   
E.   Explaining the Explosion in Disclosed Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Investments 
Two contributing factors explain this increase in disclosed investments: 
(i) the unprecedentedly low rates of return offered by U.S. Treasury and 
related instruments and (ii) the rapid accumulation of assets under 
management by the SWFs. Until recently the typical investment for excess 
dollar holdings of foreign nations was the safest and most secure 
investments available: U.S. Treasuries or other instruments, such as those 
issued by the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”), the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), and certain 
other government supported enterprises (“GSEs”).51  The U.S. Federal 
Reserve Board’s Open Market Committee (colloquially referred to as the 
“Fed”) manages certain short term interest rates applicable to commercial 
banks.  The Fed sets the “discount rate,”52 the benchmark for many other 
market-based interest rates in the United States.  This discount rate was 
lowered to combat the recession of 2001, and was then maintained by the 
Fed at unusually low levels for several years as Chart 2 reveals.53  The 
  
 51. See, e.g., Foreign Holdings of U.S. Government Securities and the U.S. Current 
Account: CBO Testimony before the U.S. House of Reps. Comm. on the Budget, June 26, 
2007 (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Dir., CBO), 
http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2007/06.26orszag.pdf.  The housing GSEs are the 
twelve Federal Home Loan Banks; Federal National Mortgage Association;  Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation; Government National Mortgage Association; Farming: Federal 
Farm Credit Banks; and Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation.  See Kevin R. Kosar, 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Government-Sponsored Enterprises 
(GSEs): An Institutional Overview, RS21663, Apr. 23, 2007, at 3, available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21663.pdf.  Prior to September 2008, no GSE obligations 
were directly supported by the U.S. Government.  See Press Release, Statement by Secretary 
Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect 
Financial Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm.  The added risk from the lack of an outright 
guarantee meant that such instruments returned a slightly higher yield.  See Federal Subsidies 
for the Housing GSEs: CBO Testimony  before the U.S. House of Reps. Subcomm. on Fin. 
Serv., May 23, 2001 (statement of Dan L. Crippen, Dir., CBO), 
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/052301cr.pdf.  Notwithstanding the lack of such 
guarantee the investment community considered these agency instruments attractive because 
of their higher yield and the assumption that they were backed by an “implicit” guarantee 
from the U.S. Treasury.  Id.  
 52. The Federal Reserve at times uses the term “discount rate” to mean the primary 
credit rate. Federal Reserve, Monetary Policy, The Discount Rate, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/discountrate.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2009). 
 53. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED Graph, 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?s[1][id]=FEDFUNDS (last visited Oct. 29, 2009). 
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discount rate was later set even lower as the Fed battled the economic crisis 
in 2008. 
 
Chart 254 
 
 
These low Fed discount rates, in turn, meant that the investment return 
on U.S. Treasury and related obligations was unusually low.  Such low 
returns logically led SWFs to seek for higher returns elsewhere.  Higher 
returns were available in equity interests in Western companies.  The 
chosen companies had to be large to absorb the SWFs’ large investments 
and thus were likely to have a high public profile. 
A second factor contributing to the post-2003 investment surge shown in 
Table 1 was a large increase in commodity prices. Chart 355 illustrates the 
remarkable rise in the price of crude oil, which accounts for most of the 
commodity funded SWFs.  In the ten years from 1998 to 2007, crude oil 
benchmark prices rose from less than $20 to more than $140 per barrel.56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 54. Id.  
 55. See infra Chart 3. 
 56. These prices are specifically for barrels of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) at 
Cushing. 
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Chart 357 
 
There was no apparent end to this trend of rising crude oil prices in 2006.  
With projections into the future of many more trillions soon to be held by 
SWFs,58 headline writers, movie producers, and other commercially-
motivated individuals announced that SWFs would shortly “own the 
world!”59  
There is no consensus view of the total value of SWF assets.  Different 
estimates arise from the varying definitions of SWFs and the lack of 
transparency of most of these funds.60 The International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”) estimated that SWFs’ controlled assets valued at $500 billion in 
1990.61  SWF assets doubled to $1 trillion by 2005.62  In mid-2009, the SWF 
Institute estimated that the fifty-two funds it follows controlled assets 
valued at $3.8 trillion.63   It was in this context that the commodity 
exporting nations and Asian nations with large balance of trade surpluses64 
  
 57. EIA, International Energy Price Information, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ 
international/prices.html#Crude (last visited Nov. 17, 2009). 
 58. James Surowiecki, Sovereign Wealth World, NEW YORKER, Nov. 26, 2007, 
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2007/11/26/071126ta_talk_surowiecki (estimating 
that SWFs would be in control of $12 trillion in assets by 2015). 
 59. Supra notes 4–10. 
 60. See infra discussion in Part IV, The Santiago Principles. 
 61. Simon Johnson, The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 44 FIN. DEV. (2007), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/straight/htm. 
 62. Id.  
 63. See infra App. A. 
 64. Korea, Singapore, Japan, and China are some of those among the Asian nations 
with trade  balances.  China was estimated to be increasing its foreign currency reserves by 
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sought to increase the historically low returns on U.S. Treasuries and related 
instruments.65 
1.   High Profile Investments 
Public awareness of SWFs was also enhanced by two proposed 
transactions that developed into center-ring attractions in media circuses.  
The first was a transaction involving the Chinese National Offshore Oil 
Company (“CNOOC”) which hit the news in June 2005.  CNOOC is not a 
SWF, but the Chinese government owns 70% of it, and CNOOC is therefore 
referred to as a state-owned enterprise (“SOE”).  This ownership by China 
is sufficient to perfect the analogy to a formal SWF and to the threat, if any, 
posed by SWFs.66 
Within weeks of the resolution of the CNOOC affair, a second 
controversial transaction became public.  Dubai Ports World (“DPW”), a 
subsidiary of a SWF based in Dubai, stumbled into an inexplicable political 
fight, best explained by the weakness of the Executive Branch and “the 
exigencies of the electoral calendar,”67 rather than the substance of what 
Congress claimed to have discovered.  When the DPW affair subsided in the 
spring of 2006, crude oil prices were still steadily climbing and the 
supposed threat to the American way of life posed by these large 
accumulations of U.S. dollars in the hands of foreigners was a common 
theme heard by anyone exposed to the media. 
2.   CNOOC — Unocal  — Chevron 
In 2005, CNOOC made an $18.5 billion offer for Unocal, a California-
based oil company.68  This offer to Unocal stockholders trumped an 
outstanding $16 billion offer from Chevron Oil Company, also based in 
California.  The CNOOC bid enlivened politics and consumed the media for 
weeks during the summer of 2005. 
The New York Times reported: “The offer is . . . the latest symbol of 
China’s growing economic power and of the soaring ambitions of its 
corporate giants, particularly when it comes to the energy resources it needs 
  
$1 billion per day in 2007.  Wayne M. Morrison & Marc Labonte, Congressional Research 
Service Report for Congress, China’s Currency: Economic Issues and Options for U.S. 
Trade Policy, RL32165, Jan. 9, 2008, at 9, available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32165.pdf. 
 65. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
 66. As one commentator has noted, in the end CNOOC is controlled by the Chinese 
Communist Party.  Jason Buhi, Negocio de China: Building upon the Santiago Principles to 
Form an Effective International Approach to Sovereign Wealth Fund Regulation, 39 H. K. L. 
J. 197, 202  (2009). 
 67. O’Brien, supra note 50, at 1236. 
 68. Unocal was founded in 1890 as the Union Oil Company of California. 
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desperately to continue feeding its rapid growth.”69  CNOOC said its offer 
represents a premium of about $1.5 billion over the value of Unocal’s deal 
with Chevron after a $500 million breakup fee.70 
The New York Times also reported that “Two Republican representatives 
from California, Richard W. Pombo and Duncan Hunter, wrote a letter last 
week to President Bush urging that the transaction be scrutinized on the 
grounds of national security.”71  The California politicians noted in their 
letter to President Bush: 
As the world energy landscape shifts, we believe that it is critical to 
understand the implications for American interests and most especially, 
the threat posed by China’s governmental pursuit of world energy 
resources. The United States increasingly needs to view meeting its energy 
requirements within the context of our foreign policy, national security and 
economic security agenda.72 
Reacting to the intensive media attention generated by its bid, CNOOC 
promptly pledged to continue Unocal’s practice of selling all of the oil and 
gas Unocal produced in the United States to customers in the United 
States.73 
Facing a U.S. domestic political furor fed by Chevron lobbyists in 
Washington and its public relations firms, CNOOC ultimately withdrew its 
bid and issued the following statement: “The unprecedented political 
opposition . . . was regrettable and unjustified . . . . This political 
environment has made it very difficult for us to accurately assess our chance 
of success, creating a level of uncertainty that presents an unacceptable risk 
to our ability to secure this transaction.”74  Once the CNOOC threat had 
  
 69. David Barboza & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chinese Oil Giant in Takeover Bid for 
U.S. Corporation, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/23/ 
business/worldbusiness/23unocal.html?_r=1. 
 70. Id. 
A fee paid if a party voluntarily backs out of a deal to sell or 
purchase a business or a business's assets.  Termination fees are 
usually negotiated and agreed on as part of corporate merger or 
acquisition negotiations. The fee is designed to protect the 
prospective buyer and to deter the target corporation from 
entertaining bids from other parties. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 215, 1609 (8th ed. 2004) (directing readers to the definition of 
“termination fee” in order to define “break-up fee”). 
 71. Barboza & Sorkin, supra note 69. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Associated Press, China’s CNOOC Drops Bid for Unocal: Chinese Oil Firm 
Cites ‘Political Environment’ in the U.S., MSNBC, Aug. 2, 2005, http://www.msnbc. 
msn.com/id/8795682/page/1/. 
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been dealt with, Chevron completed its acquisition of Unocal, raising its bid 
slightly.75    
3.   Dubai Ports World 
Just a few months after the CNOOC threat to the American way of life 
was eliminated in August 2005, another foreign threat appeared. Temasek, a 
Singapore SWF, sought to buy the British ports operator, Peninsular and 
Oriental Steam Navigation Company (“P&O”).  Its offer for P&O, which 
managed ports in eighteen countries, including six major East coast ports in 
the United States,76 was ultimately topped by a bid from DPW. Once 
Temasek withdrew from the bidding,77 DPW voluntarily notified CFIUS 78 
that it would acquire P&O.  As is detailed in Part III of this Article, the 
CFIUS process includes an initial thirty day review that is followed by a 
more exhaustive forty-five day investigation if national security issues are 
raised. 79 
DPW fully briefed representatives of all of the CFIUS Executive Branch 
agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security and interested 
national intelligence and law enforcement agencies.  Following the initial 
review, CFIUS approved DPW’s acquisition of P&O.80 
At the end of 2005, confidence in President George W. Bush and the 
Executive Branch was at a near record low as the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan grew more unpopular.   Once members of Congress, ever-
cognizant of mid-term Congressional elections, became aware that CFIUS 
had authorized the P&O acquisition, they did not miss the opportunity to 
  
 75. People’s Daily Online, Unocal Reject CNOOC After Chevron Raises Takeover 
Offer, July 21, 2005, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200507/21/eng20050721_ 
197449.html.   Chevron raised its offer from $16.5 billion to $17.1 billion, or $63 dollars per 
share in cash and stock, and increased the cash portion to 40% from 25%.  Id.  Unocal’s 
board voted to accept Chevron’s sweetened offer, and rejected a still higher all-cash offer 
from CNOOC worth $67 dollars per share.  Id.  While CNOOC’s offer was higher than 
Chevron’s, the Unocal Board of Directors recommended the Chevron transaction which was 
approved by shareholders.  Id. 
 76. Those six major East Coast ports are New York, New Jersey, Philadelphia, 
Baltimore, New Orleans, and Miami.  Press Release, Rosa L. DeLauro, Rep., U.S. House of 
Representatives, DeLauro Co-Sponsors Legislation to Halt Dubai Port Deal (Feb. 22, 2006), 
http://delauro.house.gov/release.cfm?id=1212. 
 77. Rival Bows out of P&O Battle, BBC NEWS, Feb. 10, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4700144.stm. 
 78. See infra Part II, CFIUS procedures. 
 79. See infra Part III text accompanying notes 137, 139. 
 80. Patrick McGeehan, Despite Fears, A Dubai Company Will Help Run Ports In 
New York, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/17/ 
nyregion/17ports.html (“Stewart Baker, assistant secretary for policy at the Department of 
Homeland Security, said his department had no information about Dubai Ports World that 
justified an objection to the deal.  Indeed, he said, the company has cooperated with the 
department in its efforts to secure American ports and ships in foreign ports.  ‘We did not 
find derogatory information in our review,’ he said.”). 
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demonstrate their patriotism by opposing the acquisition.  In what I 
characterize as both politics as usual and Congressional racial profiling, 
Democrats and Republicans denounced CFIUS for approving the DPW 
transaction without a full investigation.  These critics asserted that the 
United Arab Emirates, of which Dubai is a member, was a state supporter of 
terrorism.81   
President Bush pointed out that port security was the responsibility of the 
U.S. Coast Guard, Homeland Security, and U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, and that management of ports by P&O prior to or following a 
sale to DPW would have no impact on the security of our ports.82  The 
Administration explained that DPW had been the first Middle Eastern entity 
to join the multinational Container Security Initiative, a program designed 
to protect global trade from terrorism.83    The public was also informed that 
Dubai had been the first to join the Department of Energy’s Megaports 
Initiative, a nuclear nonproliferation program aimed at stopping illicit 
shipments of nuclear and radioactive material.84 
Even the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff became involved in this 
“perfect storm” of domestic politics.85   Peter Pace, a Marine Corps four-star 
general, dismissed the terror-link allegations. “In everything that we have 
asked and worked with [the UAE] on, they have proven to be very, very 
solid partners.”86 
Once P&O shareholders approved the sale in early March, to assuage 
fears generated by the politicians and the media, DPW voluntarily submitted 
to the further forty-five day CFIUS investigation demanded by 
Congressional critics, the very investigation CFIUS had determined was 
unnecessary.87 The November elections were just seven months away, and 
the House Appropriations Committee, apparently eager to demonstrate that 
  
 81. “Mr. Schumer said that he was concerned that the company could be infiltrated 
by terrorists with designs on exploiting the vulnerability of American ports.  He noted that 
the September 11 attacks were financed in part by money that passed though banks in the 
United Arab Emirates.”  Id.  
 82. Press Release, George W. Bush, Pres., White House Fact Sheet: The CFIUS 
Process and the DP World Transaction (Feb. 22, 2006), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060222-11.html. 
 83. The Initiative implemented information-sharing and scanning technologies, as 
well as other administrative and technological methods, including pre-screening of 
containers prior to shipment. 
 84. Nat’l Nuclear Sec. Admin., Megaports Initiative, 
http://nnsa.energy.gov/nuclear_nonproliferation/1641.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2009). 
 85. WILLIAM MIRACKY ET AL., ASSESSING THE RISKS: THE BEHAVIORS OF SOVEREIGN 
WEALTH FUNDS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3, 18 (2008), http://www.altassets.com/ 
pdfs/Monitor_SWF_Report.pdf. 
 86. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, The United States-UAE Bilateral Relationship 
(Feb. 23, 2006), http://2001-2009.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/fs/2006/61914.htm. 
 87. Press Release, DP World (Feb. 26, 2006), www.dpworld.com (follow “Media 
Centre”; then follow “News Releases”; then follow “News Releases 2006”; then click on 
hyperlink for Feb. 26 Press Statement). 
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they could not be outmaneuvered by the unpopular President Bush, CFIUS, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and DPW, overwhelmingly approved a 
legislative amendment prohibiting the DPW transaction.  This action was 
rendered veto-proof because it was attached to an appropriation of funds for 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.88  Claiming to enhance national security, 
patriotic Members of Congress courageously jumped in where the War on 
Terror President, multiple agencies of the Executive Branch, and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no need to go.  Thus, Congress 
heroically acted to prohibit a change in management of U.S. ports from 
“Brits” to “Arabs.”  “The two parties seemed to be more interested in 
gaining recognition that their party was stronger on national security issues 
than they were in learning the actual effects that the transaction would 
produce.  It was an election year after all.”89   
F.   Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments in the 2007 Economic 
Slowdown 
The CNOOC and DPW affairs raised public awareness of SWF 
investments.  While we do know of the recent increase in investments by 
SWFs in public companies, we know very little about any other investments 
by SWFs.  If we accept the estimate of $3.8 trillion as the size of SWF 
investable assets in mid-2009 and the projection of $1 trillion as the annual 
rate of increase of SWF assets in future years,90 there can be no doubt that 
the SWFs lack of transparency hides a great deal.  As the economic crisis 
began to develop at the close of 2006 and early in 2007, the problem of how 
SWFs could earn acceptable returns on their ever-increasing amounts of 
investable funds remained.   
The subprime mortgage crisis became apparent in the United States in 
early 2007.   U.S. housing prices had stopped rising at their unprecedented 
pace of the previous few years, and the market for securitized mortgages 
and other derivative instruments created from mortgages and mortgage 
derivatives that had been marketed as risk-free, collapsed.  The world’s 
largest commercial and investment banks, having fully imbibed the 
intoxicating, virtually risk free securitized mortgage instruments Wall Street 
alchemists had concocted, found that at that moment these securities had 
little market value. This collapse in value created a desperate need for bank 
capital.  The somnolent regulatory agencies of the leading developed 
nations made the same discovery at this time.  As had happened in earlier 
banking crises, bank regulators could not or would not close these 
  
 88. House Panel Votes to Block Ports Deal, FOX NEWS, Mar. 9, 2006, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,187147,00.html. 
 89. Waseam Azmeh, Sovereign Wealth Funds (Nov. 17, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the author at MSU College of Law). 
 90. Surowiecki, supra note 58. 
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institutions.  They had become undercapitalized by tens of billions but were 
considered “too big to fail.” 
SWFs were well positioned to be the source of the required additional 
bank capital. Faced with the need for increasing the return on their 
portfolios, SWF managers understood the opportunity presented by the 
banks’ predicament: banks were under regulatory pressure to offer favorable 
terms to secure such investments, and the SWFs had the cash.  Investing in 
the world’s leading banks would give participating SWFs new credibility 
and stature in the global financial community.  What could be more 
attractive than an investment in the premier financial institutions in the 
world’s largest, most successful economies?  Equity investments in 
Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Standard 
Chartered Bank, and UBS provided quite favorable returns, especially in 
light of the rate of return available on U.S. Treasuries and related 
instruments.  The fact that the U.S. Government and other leading nations 
had, explicitly or implicitly, deemed these institutions “too big to fail”91 was 
an important added bonus.  The cash-gorged SWFs did not miss this 
opportunity to take supposedly ultra-safe positions in financial institutions, 
which had been household names for generations.  The investments in 
western money center financial institutions set out in Table 2 are indicative 
of the opportunities seized by the SWFs. 
 
Table 292 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 91. Patrice Hill, Citigroup, Other Banks in Trouble, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007,  
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/nov/21/citigroup-other-banks-in-new-
trouble/print/ (“While the banks’ woes are real and growing, Mr. Beales[, an investment 
analyst,] said the drubbing of bank shares this week has been overdone.  ‘It’s highly unlikely 
that the end game for Citi or its big rivals is collapse,’ he said. ‘They remain too big to 
fail.’”). 
 92. See Kern, supra note 45; MONITOR GROUP, supra note 22. 
Financial Institution Billions Invested by all SWFs 
Deutsche Bank $  1.8 
Standard Chartered $  4 
Morgan Stanley $  5 
Merrill Lynch $  6.4 
Citigroup $17.5 
UBS $24.2
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G.   Financial Crisis: Sovereign Wealth Funds Stabilize Financial 
Institutions 
Through the first months of 2008, the financial community, the business 
press, and government officials dealt with the instability in the global 
banking system as merely the most recent, although perhaps more severe, 
version of prior episodes of banking instability brought on by real estate 
related problems.  Parallels were drawn to the savings and loan problems in 
the United States in the late 1980s.    The trigger for bank losses this time 
was subprime mortgages, which had been packaged and repackaged as 
securitized investments, and which the banks had purchased in the search 
for higher yields and larger personal paydays. 
H.   Mortgage Problems Become a Crisis 
Concern about the stability of banks and the international financial 
system developed during 2007 and grew more serious in early 2008.  In 
mid-March 2008, however, the global economy began to change for the 
worst.  Bear Stearns, Wall Street’s fifth largest investment bank, which, like 
many other financial institutions, had been funding its capital needs in the 
very liquid overnight-borrowing market, suddenly became a pariah to 
lenders.  On Monday, March 10, a rumor spread that Bear Stearns was in 
trouble, and by Thursday, March 13, more than $15 billion in hedge fund 
prime brokerage accounts had been withdrawn from the firm.93  This 
quickly led to disaster.  Bear Stearns suddenly found it nearly impossible to 
rollover its overnight borrowings.  An emergency rescue of Bear Stearns 
was arranged by federal authorities over the March 15–16 weekend.  
JPMorgan Chase, the one major bank not threatened by high exposure to the 
subprime mortgage problems plaguing the industry, with $30 billion in 
support from the Federal Reserve Bank, acquired Bear Stearns for $2 per 
share.94 
The economic crisis continued to deteriorate over the next six months.  
On September 8, 2008, the world learned of the demise of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac.95  Seven days later, Lehman Brothers96 filed for bankruptcy 
  
 93. Steven M. Davidoff & Daniel Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s 
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 463, 473–83 (2009).  
 94. Within days the acquisition price was increased to $10 per share.  For the 
fascinating story of the reasons for this increase see STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS OF WAR 
145–46 (2009). 
 95. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 2301-
04, 122 Stat. 2805 (2008) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase securities 
and other obligations of these mortgage funders) (Act was passed on Aug. 27, 2008). 
 96. Lehman Brothers faced huge losses arising out of the subprime mortgage crisis. 
In the first half of 2008, Lehman stock lost almost 75% of its value. However, on August 22, 
shares in Lehman closed up sharply on reports that the Korea Development Bank was 
considering buying the failing bank. However, when the Korea Development Bank did not 
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protection, and the true condition of American International Group, Inc., 
which by 2009 had received more than $160 billion in federal rescue 
support, became public. 
III.   FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AMERICA: ESSENTIAL FOR THREE 
CENTURIES 
Foreign investment is a vital component of American prosperity.  This 
began in 1607 when shareholders of the Virginia Company sent settlers to 
Jamestown in the New World in search of wealth.  Foreign nations funded 
the American Revolution out of political and commercial rivalry with Great 
Britain.  The Bank of the United States was 62% owned by foreigners in 
1803.97  European debt and equity investments greatly accelerated the 
development of our railroads and created many mining, meatpacking, and 
other industries in the nineteenth century.   
The long history of foreign investment in the United States includes 
many federal laws restricting foreign investment. Early examples are the 
1841 Preemption Act98 and the 1872 Mining Act,99 which reflect attempts to 
regulate the settlement of the vast open lands west of the Appalachians.  
They were not a response to national security threats to a nation protected 
by thousands of miles of ocean.  Such restrictions did little to reduce foreign 
investment.100   
Limitations on foreign investment accelerated in the twentieth century.  
Congress enacted the Pickett Act in 1909 to limit foreign claims on western 
oil-producing land.101  In 1912, Congress authorized the president to restrict 
foreign investment in the fledgling radio industry.102  In the midst of World 
  
consummate the acquisition, Lehman shares collapsed again. The situation with Lehman 
grew worse on September 9, 2008, when the Dow Jones industrial average lost 300 points 
partly due to fears over the fate of Lehman.  In addition, even though the U.S. government 
had previously arranged the rescue of Bear Stearns and had just bailed out Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae by announcing hundreds of billions of dollars in support from the U.S. Treasury, 
the government determined not to assist Lehman.  See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 93. 
 97. SAMUEL BLODGET, ECONOMICA: A STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 198 (1806). 
 98. Preemption Act of 1841, ch. 16, § 10, 5 Stat. 453, 455–56 (repealed in 1891). 
 99. The 1872 Federal Mining Act intended to add incentive to exploration of western 
lands by creating a claim-patent process for land acquisition.  The Act added “proof of 
citizenship” as a part of the process, although that seems to have been meant to incentivize 
Americans to set up companies for foreign investment.  General Mining Act of 1872 30 
U.S.C. §§ 22–47 (2006). 
 100. GAO, supra note 23, at 18. 
 101. Pickett Act of 1910, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847 (repealed in 1943). 
 102. President Woodrow Wilson seized control over all U.S. foreign-owned radio 
stations in 1917 under the Radio Act of 1912.  Later, the General Electric Company spun-off 
the Radio Corporation of America which had been formed as a domestic monopoly at the 
urging of the U.S. Navy.  EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL 
SECURITY AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 10 (2006). 
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War I, President Woodrow Wilson seized control of foreign-owned radio 
stations.103 
In 1920, Congress enacted the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, which limited 
a foreign oil company’s ability to drill in the United States by requiring 
them to lease the land from the Government.104  After World War II, with 
Europe’s capital base destroyed, the United States became the major source 
of global investment capital.  As Europe and Japan gradually became more 
prosperous, the thriving American consumer economy attracted increasing 
amounts of foreign investment. 
A.   The Impact of Recent International Developments 
The oil embargo imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (“OPEC”) in 1973 introduced a totally new category of investor.  
The embargo resulted in a significant increase in the price of crude oil, 
which resulted in a major transfer of wealth to OPEC members, particularly 
in the Middle East.  These “petro-dollars” were recycled by their new 
owners back to the oil importing industrialized nations, especially the 
United States, where most funds were invested in traditional “risk-free” 
U.S. Treasury and related instruments.  Though the 1973 oil embargo 
stimulated public discussion about the threat to America from the 
accumulation of dollars in the OPEC countries, the petro-dollars invested in 
the United States were not viewed as a threat.  There was no indication that 
Middle Eastern investors intended to buy control of American companies.   
Public attention focused on the unfamiliar concept of foreigners having 
enormous amounts of investable dollars.  It was assumed that these 
foreigners had the same investment goals as other investors: an increase in 
wealth. 
A further wave of foreign investment occurred in the early 1980s.  A 
portion of this investable cash derived from a second abrupt increase in the 
cost of crude oil triggered by the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran.  A new 
and different foreign investment threat from Asia emerged shortly 
thereafter. 
By 1980 Japan had fully recovered from the devastation of World War 
II, and in the late 1980s Japan modified its Foreign Exchange Control Law 
to permit Japanese citizens and companies to invest abroad more easily.105  
Over the next decade the Japanese yen strengthened against the U.S. dollar, 
making investments in the U.S. economy very attractive for Japanese 
investors.  By 1989, Japanese direct and portfolio investments accounted for 
  
 103. See Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, § 2, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed 1927). 
 104. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2009). 
 105. See Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, http://www.japanlaw. 
info.forex/law/JS.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2009). 
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17% of all foreign investment in the United States.106  Japanese investments 
were sometimes large; some were quite conspicuous.107  The appearance of 
these large pools of foreign capital in the Middle East and Japan generated 
concern in the United States over foreign investment that remains strong 
today. 
B.   The Modern Approach to Investment by Foreign Investors 
The United States has enjoyed the benefits of foreign investment108 and 
has consistently espoused openness toward investments by foreigners.109  
The restrictions U.S. policy imposed on foreign investment were directed, 
until recently, at specific categories of activities and assets.110  Such 
restrictions were rooted in protecting investment opportunities for 
Americans, not the perception that our national security could be threatened 
by foreign investors. 
More recently, policy concerns have focused upon a concern for national 
security.  Earlier restrictions targeted foreigners as a broad category and did 
not focus on the unique characteristics of particular types of foreign 
investors.   U.S. legislators previously assumed, without analysis, that 
foreign investors were rational economic actors, seeking maximum returns 
from their investments in the United States.   The U.S. economic regulatory 
framework has been based upon the nature of the investment to be made, 
not upon the character of the foreign investor.111  We have assumed that 
investors seek wealth maximization.  An unstated assumption has been that 
all market participants, including foreigners, invest solely to increase their 
own wealth.  The increased investment activity of SWFs and SOEs112 has 
led to a reconsideration of this assumption. 
  
 106. Mira Wilkins, Multinationals in the United States: Continuity and Change, 
1879–1990, 64 BUS. HIST. REV. 585, 610 (1990). 
 107. Pebble Beach Golf Course and Rockefeller Center in New York City are 
prominent examples of high profile investments, perhaps chosen specifically because they 
were high profile. 
 108. GAO, FOREIGN INVESTMENT: LAWS AND POLICIES REGULATING FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN 10 COUNTRIES, GAO-08-320, (2008) (stating that other nations too have these 
restrictions).  Indeed, the United States is ranked relatively high on the list of nations and 
their openness to foreign investment.  Id.  
 109. See George W. Bush, Pres., State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/sou/index.html. 
 110. GAO, supra note 23. 
 111. Lawrence Summers, Sovereign Funds Shake the Logic of Capitalism, FIN. TIMES, 
July 30, 2007, http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2007/07/sovereign-fundshtml/. 
 112. See supra Part II.A. 
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C.   The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
CFIUS is the backbone of America’s legislative efforts to protect the 
nation from any risk arising from foreign investments.  The current CFIUS 
process has evolved over more than three decades of practice and 
intermittent review of its authority and procedures.113 
 
1975 — The Establishment of CFIUS 
At the height of the first OPEC oil embargo in 1974, Congress mandated 
a study to investigate direct and portfolio investments in the United States 
by foreign persons and entities.114  The following year President Gerald 
Ford signed an Executive Order115 establishing an Executive Branch 
committee to review certain investments in the United States by foreign 
investors.  The focus was the risk presented by control of U.S companies by 
foreigners; there was no explicit concern about direct or indirect control of 
American businesses by foreign governments.  The government entity 
responsible for reviewing investments by foreigners was and remains 
CFIUS.   This Committee operates almost totally outside the public arena, 
but we do have some perspective on the level of CFIUS activity.116 In 2006, 
there were approximately 10,000 merger transactions in the United States.  
Of these, 1730 involved a foreign party, but only 113 required review by 
CFIUS.  According to Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Kimmitt, 
not one of these CFIUS-reviewed transactions was blocked.117   
 
1988 — The Exon-Florio Amendment 
CFIUS operated pursuant to President Ford’s Executive Order for more 
than a decade. During the 1980’s, protection of American technology 
companies became a national security concern.  In 1988, Congress amended 
the Defense Production Act of 1950 by enacting the Exon-Florio 
Amendment,118 which empowered the President to investigate “mergers, 
acquisitions, and takeovers” that would result in a foreign person achieving 
control over a company or business119 where such control would impair 
national security.  Implementation and enforcement of Exon – Florio was 
delegated to CFIUS.120   
  
 113. While CFIUS has been a distinctly American response and is the focus of this 
Article, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has called for a CFIUS-like structure for the EU. 
Germany and France already have similar legislation in place. 
 114. Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450 (1974). 
 115. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971–1975). 
 116. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006). 
 117. Robert M. Kimmitt, Public Footprints in Private Markets: Sovereign Wealth and 
the World Economy, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 119, 123 (2008). 
 118. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006). 
 119. 31 C.F.R. §§ 800.302(b)(4), (e) (2009). 
 120. Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 27, 1998) (designating CFIUS  
responsible for the implementation of the new Exon-Florio statute). 
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1993 — The Byrd Amendment 
Congressional concern that the Committee was not being aggressive about 
protecting American security led Senator Robert Byrd to propose new 
amendments to CFIUS authority.  The Byrd Amendment, enacted as section 
837(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, 
changed Section 721 of the Defense Production Act.121  The change required 
an investigation in cases where the acquirer is controlled by or acting on 
behalf of a foreign government and the acquisition “could result in control 
of a person engaged in interstate commerce in the U.S. that could affect the 
national security of the [United States].”122   
 
2007 — FINSA 
In addition to the CNOOC and DPW transactions,123 there have been four 
recent additional proposed acquisitions that involved issues of national 
security but did not attract intense media attention.  These additional 
transactions were: 
• The sale of Tyco International’s undersea fiber-optic cable network 
to an Indian firm;124  
• The Chinese computer company Lenovo’s purchase of IBM’s 
personal computer business;  
• The proposed acquisition of a small internet security business, 
Sourcefire, Inc.,   by Check Point, an Israeli company, which did not 
proceed after an announcement that CFIUS opposed the 
transaction;125 and  
  
 121. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006).  
 122. Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(k)(2)(J)  (amended by 
Pub. L. No.110-49, 121 Stat. 247 (2007)). 
 123. See infra Parts II.E.2–3. 
 124. In April 2005, CFIUS cleared the acquisition of Tyco International’s undersea 
fiber-optic cable network by Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd., an Indian firm.   Videsh apparently 
agreed to data security guidelines with U.S. law enforcement and defense agencies as a 
condition of approval.  Leon B. Greenfield, The CFIUS Process: A Primer, THE THRESHOLD, 
(Winter 2005/2006), at 9. 
 125.  
Security company Check Point Software Technologies called off its 
planned $225 million acquisition of intrusion-prevention firm 
Sourcefire on Thursday, a week before a federal watchdog was 
scheduled to release a report which insiders say would have blocked 
the merger on the grounds of national-security interests. . . . The 
proposed Check Point acquisition was under initial review by the 
U.S. Treasury-led CFIUS, when the Associated Press broke the news 
that United Arab Emirates-based Dubai World Ports planned to close 
a deal which would have given the company responsibility for 
security at six major U.S. ports. The further investigation by CFIUS 
into Check Point’s proposed purchase of Sourcefire was announced 
the following day. 
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• The acquisition of Sequoia Voting Systems, America’s third largest 
manufacturer of electronic voting machines, by Smartmatic, a 
company indirectly controlled by the Government of Venezuela, 
without CFIUS review.126  
 
Congress was spurred to take action by these four transactions, the 
CNOOC and DPW affairs, and the hundreds of billions of dollars that 
continued to accumulate in SWFs, both in the Middle East, from the ever-
increasing price of crude oil, and in Asia, from the balance of trade 
surpluses fed by debt-addicted American consumers’ insatiable appetite for 
more goods.  Congressional options included legislation that reduced 
America’s consumption of imported oil, addiction to consumer debt, or 
both.  Congress, however, preferred to focus on where the SWFs were 
investing, rather than on the unsustainable outflow of dollars.  In 2007 
Congress enacted the Foreign Investment and National Security Act127 
(“FINSA”), which mandated new standards designed to bring CFIUS 
investment review procedures under more direct Congressional oversight. 
On behalf of the Committee, the Treasury Department issued final 
implementing regulations on November 14, 2008.  On December 8, 2008, 
the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Investment Security published 
  
Robert Lemos, Check Point Calls off Sourcefire Buy, SECURITYFOCUS, Mar. 24, 2006, 
http://secuirtyfocus.com/news/11382. 
 126.  
[In November 2007], Sequoia Voting Systems, the nation’s third-
largest electronic voting machine maker, announced that the 
company had been sold to private U.S. investors.  This would be an 
unremarkable transaction except that the seller, Smartmatic 
Corporation, is a Venezuelan-owned company close to the 
government of Hugo Chávez.  And the sale was forced by a belated 
investigation by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (CFIUS).  But for the unprecedented unwinding of 
Smartmatic’s ownership — which almost did not happen — Chávez 
would be in a position to influence the outcome of next year’s 
presidential election. . . .  CFIUS opened an investigation only after 
Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY), who chairs the subcommittee 
overseeing CFIUS and who co-authored FINSA, wrote a letter to 
then-Treasury Secretary John Snow inquiring whether the 
Venezuelan government could use Sequoia to manipulate U.S. 
elections.  Maloney cited the fact that the Venezuelan state had 
invested in Smartmatic’s affiliates, the company’s current ownership 
was buried in a labyrinth of offshore trusts, and revelations that 
Sequoia had flown fifteen Venezuelan nationals to Chicago to 
tabulate votes in a local election. 
Richard Brand & Ilya Shapiro, A Step in the Right Direction, WEEKLY STANDARD, Dec. 19, 
2007, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000%5C000%5C014% 
5C494abixg.asp. 
 127. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Public L. No. 110-49, 
121 Stat. 246 (2007) (codified as amended 50 U.S.C. App. 2170(f) (2007)). 
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“Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.”128  CFIUS now 
operates as prescribed by FINSA. 
1.   CFIUS Membership  
CFIUS membership, as established by the statute, consists of the heads of 
several Executive Branch departments and offices.  These are the 
Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Department of 
Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of State, and the 
Department of Energy.  The Treasury Secretary serves as the chair of 
CFIUS.  In addition, two agencies have membership as non-voting, ex-
officio members.  Those are the Director of National Intelligence and the 
Secretary of Labor.  Other heads of agencies, departments, or offices may 
be added as the President deems appropriate. 129 
2.   CFIUS Transactions 
CFIUS is charged with reviewing and reporting to Congress on any 
proposed “covered transaction”.  A “covered transaction” is any transaction 
that “could result in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate 
commerce in the United States by a foreign government.”130 
CFIUS retains the flexibility to determine control on a case by case 
basis.  Will control be found if the foreigner does not have a majority of the 
board of directors or the formal right to nominate candidates for board and 
executive positions?  How should convertible securities be handled?  What 
if the SWF is the principal creditor of a debt-strapped defense contractor? 
There is no end to the variations and perturbations careful lawyers may 
propose as parties attempt to arrange the best possible positions for their 
clients while not triggering the murky CFIUS standards.  The lack of a 
bright line definition of control is no accident.  Any competent lawyer can 
work around a clear, bright line test.  As Paul Rose has observed: “The 
uncertainty of the rules’ application will likely encourage SWFs to maintain 
their shareholding strategy of passivity and understated influence.”131 
  
 128. Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by the CFIUS, 73 
Fed. Reg. 74567 (Dec. 8, 2008) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800). 
 129. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(k)(2)(J). 
 130. Id. at app. § 2170(a)(3).  
 131. See Paul Rose, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Active or Passive Investors?, 118 YALE 
L. J. 104 (Pocket Part 2008).  To date, SWF investments have been carefully arranged so as 
not to trigger reporting and review thresholds of other U.S. legislation.  Id.  As one example, 
SWF investments in financial institutions have been “passive” and have been kept below the 
10%t reporting threshold of the Bank Holding Company Act.  Id.  
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FINSA has expanded CFIUS’ scope of authority by specifying that the 
term “national security” includes issues relating to “homeland security;”132 
defining “homeland security” to include America’s “critical 
infrastructure;”133 and providing that the term “critical infrastructure” 
encompasses “critical technologies”, which term encompasses “technology, 
components[,] or items essential to national defense.”134 
Another series of issues is presented by the CFIUS element of acting “on 
behalf of a foreign government.”  Exactly when is a nominally private entity 
or party to be considered acting on behalf of a foreign sovereign?  Russian 
oligarchs, fabulously wealthy individuals and families from the United Arab 
Emirates or Saudi Arabia, and Chinese SOEs are just a few examples of this 
fertile area of CFIUS ambiguity.  
In contrast to this ambiguity, the regulations do make one thing clear, a 
10% or smaller holding of voting shares exempts a transaction from CFIUS 
review.135    
3.   CFIUS Procedures 
The formal CFIUS process has four steps.  The initial phase is notice to the 
Committee by the companies involved disclosing that a transaction is being 
considered.  The notice must include a description of the business that the 
domestic company does with U.S. Government agencies, if such business 
has possible national security ramifications.136  Second, a thirty-day 
“National Security Review”137 is then conducted under the direction of a 
lead Executive Branch department designated by CFIUS.   This review 
determines whether there are national security concerns.138  If national 
security concerns are identified or if the transaction is foreign government 
controlled and the parties wish to continue with the transaction, the 
Committee conducts a forty-five day investigation into the national security 
concerns as the third step of the process.139  As a practical matter, CFIUS 
may negotiate mitigation agreements and arrangements to satisfy the 
Committee that U.S. security interests will continue to be protected.  Such 
agreements may include ongoing covenants and obligations that can be later 
enforced by CFIUS. Finally, CFIUS issues a recommendation proposing “a 
Presidential decision to permit, suspend, or prohibit the acquisition.” 140 
  
 132. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(5). 
 133. Id. app. § 2170(a)(5)–(6). 
 134. Id. app. § 2170(a)(7). 
 135. 31 C.F.R. § 800.302(b) (2009). 
 136. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(3)(C). 
 137. Id. app. § 2170(b)(1)(E). 
 138. Id. app. § 2170(b)(1)(B). 
 139. Id. app. § 2170(b)(2)(B)–(C).  
 140. Id. app. § 2170(d)(1). 
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In reviewing a covered transaction that has national security 
implications, CFIUS considers a broad range of issues, including an 
extensive list of “national security factors” taken from the Defense 
Production Act.141  These “national security factors” include: 
 
• Domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements; 
• The capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense 
requirements, including the availability of human resources, products, 
technology, materials, and other supplies and services; 
• Control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens 
as it affects the capability and capacity of the United States to meet the 
requirements of national security; 
• The possible effects of the transaction on sales of military goods, 
equipment, or technology to a country that the Secretary of State has 
identified as supporting terrorism or as being of concern regarding  
proliferation of missiles or chemical and biological weapons; to a country 
that the Secretary of Defense has identified as posing a potential regional 
military threat to the interests of the United States; or to a country  listed on 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation-Special Country List142 or any successor list;  
• The potential effects of the transaction on U.S. international technological 
leadership in areas affecting U.S. national security:143 
  
 141. Id. app. § 2170(f). 
 142. Nuclear Non-Proliferation—Special Country List, 15 C.F.R. § 778, supp. 4 
(1996).  It should be noted, however, that this section was moved to 15 C.F.R. § 7988A, 
supp. 4 later in 1996 before being removed entirely, effective December 31, 1996.  See 
Simplification of Export Administration Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 12714 (Mar. 25, 1996) 
(made effective Nov. 1, 1996). 
 143. Critical sectors of technological leadership include: 
  1. Advanced Materials and Processing 
  1.1 Processes for Super Alloys, Polymers, etc. 
  1.2 Semiconductor Materials 
  1.3 Ceramics 
  1.4 Fiber-reinforced Composites and Metal Matrix Composites 
  1.5 Super Alloys 
  1.6 Polymeric Materials, Plastic Fabricators, Homogenous Injections, Extrusions 
  1.7 Energetic Materials (explosives, propellants, etc.) 
  1.8 Metamaterials (nanostructures with special properties) 
  2. Chemicals 
  3. Advanced Manufacturing 
  4. Information Technology 
  5. Telecommunications 
  6. Microelectronics 
  7. Semiconductor Fabrication Equipment 
  8. Electronics: Military Related 
  9. Biotechnology 
  10. Professional and Scientific Instruments 
  11. Aerospace and Surface Transportation 
  12. Energy 
  13. Space Systems 
  14. Marine Systems 
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• The potential national security-related effects on U.S. critical 
infrastructure,144 including major energy assets;   
• The potential national security-related effects on U.S. critical 
technologies;145 
• Whether the covered transaction is a foreign government controlled 
transaction146 that could result in the control of a U.S. business by a foreign 
government or an entity controlled or acting on behalf of a foreign 
government; 
• A review of the current assessment of the adherence of the subject country 
to nonproliferation control regimes; the relationship of such country with 
the United States, specifically in its record on cooperating in count-
terrorism efforts; and the potential for transshipment of diversion of 
technologies with military applications, including an analysis of national 
export control laws and regulations; 
• The long-term projection of U.S. requirements for sources of energy and 
other critical resources and materials; and 
• Such other factors as the President or the Committee may determine to be 
appropriate, generally, or in connection with a specific review or 
investigation.147 
IV.   THE SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES 
FINSA was the Congressional reaction to the perceived threat from the 
increase in size and impact of SWF investments in the United States.  Other 
nations were also concerned.   The OECD, representing most developed 
nations, also considered the challenge posed by this new, uncomprehended 
threat.  OECD concerns were similar to those expressed in the United 
States.  The large pools of SWF investable cash under the control and 
management of other nations present the risk that SWFs might not always 
act like private investors.148  This concern is not irrational, but presents a 
serious issue for responsible leaders of all nations.  There is the possibility 
that critical domestic economic resources might come under the control of 
SWFs or SOEs that could have political purposes or goals different from 
those of traditional private investors.  OECD concerns have focused on the 
  
2008 COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S. ANN. REP. 39 (2008). 
 144. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(6) (defining “critical infrastructure” as “systems and 
assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or 
destruction of such systems or assets would have a debilitating impact on national 
security.”). 
 145. Id. app. § 2071(a)(7) (providing that “critical technologies” include “critical 
technology, critical components, or critical technology items essential to national defense.”). 
 146. Id. app. § 2170(f)(8). 
 147. Id. app. § 2170(f)(11). 
 148. See generally Edwin M. Truman, Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Need for Greater 
Transparency and Accountability, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. 1 (Aug. 2007) 
(highlighting the fact that SWFs have the potential to complicate the thin line between public 
and private investment policy). 
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opacity of SWFs with respect to their investment goals, current plans, and 
ownership details.   
Early in 2008, the OECD prompted the IMF to take action.  The IMF 
cooperated with a group of twenty-six leading SWFs in organizing the IWG 
of SWFs.  The IWG mission was to prepare guidance that would allay the 
concerns of investee nations with respect to SWF investment activities.149  
By October 2008, the IWG produced its 24 Generally Accepted Principles 
and Practices.150  The GAPP was intended “to identify [a] framework of 
generally accepted principles and practices that properly reflect appropriate 
governance and accountability arrangements.”151 
The GAPP, also known as the “Santiago Principles,” are informative and 
reassuring to read, but as a document drafted by representatives of 
sovereign nations, they have absolutely no binding force and carry no 
meaningful weight.  As the IWG itself makes perfectly clear in its formal 
Introduction to the GAPP: “The GAPP is a voluntary set of principles and 
practices that the members of the IWG support and have either implemented 
or aspire to implement.”152  
The GAPP and this work of the IWG in coordination with the OECD and 
IMF need not be ignored.  Neither should it be relied upon.  The Santiago 
Principles have not had, and will not have, any meaningful, substantive 
impact on SWFs or their investments.  Each of the 24 principles set forth in 
the GAPP uses the verb “should.”  These principles do not relieve the 
concerns of those who perceive a threat from SWFs.153  While the dialog 
may have made SWF managers more aware of the concerns of investee 
states, the GAPP does not eliminate the risk that a SWF might use its 
investment power to act against the interests of another nation.  So long as 
  
 149. INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN 
WEALTH FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES “SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES” 
28–31 (Oct. 2008), http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf (providing a list 
of IWG Countries, SWFs, and institutions that participated in the IWG meetings).  See infra  
App. B. 
 150. There are in fact 24 Santiago Principles.  See generally Santiago Principles, 
supra note 149.   Only the hypothetical introducing this Article has a GAPP 25. 
 151. See for example GAPPs 5, 11, 12, 17, 20.  Id.  See infra App. B. 
 152. Santiago Principles, supra note 149, at 5 (emphasis added). 
 153. Indeed some commentators have derided the entire effort, perhaps losing focus 
on the inescapable reality of what “sovereign” means.   
What is disappointing is [the] utter ineffectiveness of the GAPP 
regime. The Principles accomplish nothing but a reiteration of the 
least common denominators of the status quo. It seems that the 
representatives of the Western free markets, in various states of 
dependency and desperation, suspended their reservations about the 
creeping resurgence of authoritarian capitalism to satisfy their 
national thirsts for liquidity. 
Buhi, supra note 66, at 198. 
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the word “sovereign” retains its current meaning,154  the risk presented by 
SWFs cannot be eliminated by proclaimed principles, or even promises 
made by entities that are ultimately instrumentalities of sovereign polities. 
V.   THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 
One of the principal complaints the OECD investee nations have about 
SWFs is their near total lack of transparency.  Some opacity is typical of 
institutional investors.  For example, hedge funds are extremely protective 
of their financial privacy; they claim secrecy is vital to their trading 
strategies.  Investment companies that manage mutual funds and public 
employee retirement funds do disclose details of their portfolio holdings and 
investment performance, and they are required to undergo regular, 
independent audits.  
SWFs, on the other hand, as creatures of sovereign governments are free 
to do almost anything they like.  As Victor Fleischer has detailed, because 
they are owned by a sovereign government, SWFs are not even taxed by the 
Internal Revenue Service on their U.S. investment earnings or gains.155  
Speaking of his SWF’s transparency, the Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer of China’s CIC said of the IWG’s GAPP: “We will increase 
transparency without harming the commercial interests of CIC. That is to 
say, it will be a gradual process . . . .  If we are transparent on everything, 
the wolves will eat us up.”156    
For all but a very few SWFs157 there is no official, independently audited 
information on their investments.  Verifiable details on total assets, 
investment philosophy and goals, portfolio allocation, or investment 
performance are simply not available.158  Accordingly, an exhaustive 
  
 154. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 218 (2004) (defining sovereign as an “entity 
‘in which independent and supreme authority is vested’”); U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_693.html# 
(explaining that under a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, a state or state 
instrumentality is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state, except with 
respect to claims arising out of activities of the kind that may be carried on by private 
persons). Black’s Law Dictionary defines sovereignty as, “The power to do everything in a 
state without accountability,. . . to make war or peace, to form treaties of alliance or of 
commerce with foreign nations, and the like.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (7th 
ed.1999).   
 155. Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 
445 (2009). 
 156. China Investment Corp. Warns Western Governments Against Protectionism, 
FORBES, Dec. 10, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2007/12/10/afx4424545.html. 
 157. For example, Norway, Alaska, Alabama, Wyoming, and New Mexico.  
Sovereign Wealth Institute, Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, http://www.swf 
institute.org/research/transparencyindex.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2009). 
 158. The SWFs of Norway and New Zealand do provide much more information than 
other SWFs.  Nevertheless, SWFs argue, as do hedge funds, that business operating 
information must not be made available since this disadvantages the fund.   
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examination of the actual performance of SWFs and their behavior in the 
recent economic chaos is not possible.  But it is useful to review how the 
SWFs reacted to the worst decline in the equity markets since the Great 
Depression.  The analysis that follows reveals that despite unprecedented, 
multi-billion dollar losses, SWFs have not panicked and sold their worst 
performing holdings.  Indeed, the evidence we have confirms that, to date, 
SWFs have behaved as long-term, wealth-maximizing private investors. 
The long-term nature of SWF investments is confirmed by some 
remarkable statistics in the Deutsche Bank Report.  Over the fifteen years 
included in the Deutsche Bank SWF database, the gross value of all 
divestitures has been a modest $46 billion.159  With current SWF assets 
between $3 trillion and $4 trillion,160 this is a telling data point.  Many 
privately managed U.S. funds have 100% or higher turnover annually.   In 
this light the Deutsche Bank figure, amounting to less than 1.5% of current 
SWF assets over a fifteen-year period is astounding.161 This data 
persuasively establishes that SWFs have acted like long-term private 
investors, not hostile nations seeking to damage the economies of its 
enemies or pursuing commercial advantage for its own businesses.162 
An analysis of transactions completed by one group of SWFs was 
published by the combined resources of the Monitor Company Group LP 
and the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, an Italian economic research 
institute.  Monitor-FEEM identifies seventeen SWFs that meet its narrow 
definition of SWF.163  They tracked 1,158 of the transactions these funds 
have completed since 1995.164  In April, 2009, Monitor-FEEM published its 
first annual report (the “2008 SWF Annual Report”) summarizing the 
activities of this subset of SWFs during 2008.165  Selected data from the 
2008 SWF Annual Report reveal that from January, 2007 to July, 2008, 
eight of the leading SWFs invested $63.1 billion in six of the world’s largest 
  
 159. Kern, supra note 45, at 30. 
 160. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INSTITUTE, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND ASSET 
ALLOCATION 2009 SPECIAL REPORT 17–18 (2009). 
 161. We do need to keep in mind that there is little available data on the actual 
performance of sovereign wealth funds, including data on total portfolio allocation among 
various asset classes or investment portfolio turnover.  We do not know, for example, what 
portion of the $3.8 trillion or so of SWF assets is invested in equities, and we have no data on 
turnover in the non-public portions of these portfolios. 
 162. Bader Al Sa’ad, managing director of the Kuwait Investment Authority, noted his 
SWFs’ long-term focus at Davos in January 2008:  “Kuwait has been a Daimler shareholder 
since 1968 . . . [and a] BP shareholder since 1986.  We are one of the most stable 
shareholders of these companies.”  Joanne Baynham, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Friend or 
Foe, 1 MILTON ASSET MGMT 1, 1–2 (2008). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Veljko Fotak, Hui Li, & Bill Megginson, Sovereign Wealth Fund Losses in 
Listed Firm Stock Investments, in WEATHERING THE STORM: SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS IN 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 2008 53 (Bernardo Bortolotti & William Miracky eds., 
Monitor Group & Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2009).  
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financial institutions166 in twelve separate transactions.167  By March, 2009, 
this aggregate $63.1 billion investment had been reduced by the collapse of 
global equity markets to $17.6 billion.168  Few categories of legitimate 
investments have lost 70% in value in so short a time. 
Deutsche Bank Research provides a different source of SWF 
performance data with comparable findings. It has been tracking SWFs and 
providing performance updates for several years.169  Table 2 is based upon 
this Deutsche Bank data.  Of the SWF investments in financial institutions 
included in Table 2, the two worst performers for the extremely short period 
of the current economic crisis are Merrill Lynch, where investors could 
have incurred a maximum potential loss of 85%, and Citigroup, where the 
maximum possible loss was 96%. 
Other staggering losses suffered by SWFs include CIC’s ten percent 
stake in The Blackstone Group L.P., purchased with a much publicized $3 
billion investment in April 2007.  This investment was valued at less than 
$1 billion in mid-2009.170  A Dubai SWF invested $5.5 billion in MGM 
Mirage, a casino and hotel operator, with stock purchases made at prices 
ranging from $82 to $95.171  The stock then fell to $12.172  Temasek, the 
transparent Singapore SWF, publicly reported a loss of $27.7 billion for its 
fiscal year ending in March 2009.173   In September 2009, a second 
Singapore SWF, The Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 
(“GIC”),174 announced that its portfolio of more than $100 billion in 
international investments had lost more than 20% of its value through 
March 2009.175  Deutsche Bank estimates that overall equity investment 
portfolios of SWFs (i.e., not just investments in financial institutions 
  
 166. UBS, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, and Deutsche 
Bank.  
 167. Fotak, Li, & Megginson, supra note 164.  Indeed all but one of these investments 
were made in the 12 months preceding the shocking collapse of the New York based 
investment bank, Bear Stearns, in mid-March 2008.  The collapse of Bear marked the 
awakening of the world to the enormity of the economic crisis of the first decade of the 21st 
Century.  The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. on September 15, 2008 
confirmed this for any remaining skeptics. 
 168. Id. at 57. 
 169. See, e.g., Kern, supra note 45. 
 170. Sovereign Wealth: Winners and Losers, INVESTING STRATEGY, July 28, 2009.  
 171. Jonathan Keehner & Serena Saitto, Dubai’s Trail of Dud Deals Shows Sovereign 
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archive&sid=a.arR5VkmJy4.   
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ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PORTFOLIO FOR THE YEAR 2008/09 10 (2009), 
http://www.gic.com.sg/PDF/GIC_Report_2009.pdf. 
 175. Kevin Lim, UPDATE 1–Wealth Fund GIC’s Portfolio Recovers, Looks To Asia, 
REUTERS, Sept. 28, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSSIN48551520090928. 
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included in Table 2) may have fallen as much as 45% between January 2007 
and mid-2009.176 
Despite these unprecedented losses, SWFs did not succumb to panic and 
sell off their losing investments.  The absence of panic selling,, or indeed, 
any significant sell off at all, is consistent with the conclusion that SWFs are 
managed by sophisticated investment managers with a long-term 
perspective.  Thus, even without knowing the investment philosophy or 
long term strategy for many of the SWFs, the available data suggests that 
SWFs have acted like private funds managed for wealth maximization. 
A.   SWF Investment Adjustments Arising from the Crisis 
Redeploying assets is the right of any investor, whether responsible to 
one or more private investors or to a sovereign nation.  In an economic 
slowdown or crisis, however, funds that are set aside for future generations 
and thus deliberately removed from the immediate spending plans of the 
legislature or executive, are attractive to politicians dealing with projected 
budget deficits.  Resisting the temptation to tap SWFs by redirecting 
investment to projects in the SWFs home jurisdiction or to current expenses 
can be particularly difficult, even if economically optimal.177   
In the present crisis there has been domestic criticism in some 
jurisdictions that have SWFs.178  Evidence exists of some refocusing of 
investment behavior by some SWFs triggered, at least in part, by domestic 
political pressures.  A few examples that demonstrate the shift in investment 
behavior are listed below: 
 
• Russia announced that it has removed $43.7 billion from one of its two 
SWFs to cover a shortfall in its 2009 budget.179 
• Brazilian officials have discussed taking a portion of its SWF, established 
only at the end of 2008, to cover a possible upcoming election year budget 
shortfall in 2010.180 
• The Kuwait Investment Authority formally announced that its massive 
SWF will refrain from further international investments and focus on 
domestic investing.181 
  
 176. See Kern, supra note 45. 
 177. It might be noted in passing that the U.S. has seldom been able to resist the 
political pressures to spend and incur additional debt. 
 178. Just two examples are Norway and China. 
 179. Toni Vorobyova, Russia Oil Fund to Cover Budget Shortfalls, REUTERS, Feb. 3, 
2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLNE51203F20090203. 
 180. Andre Soliani, Brazil May Tap Wealth Fund Next Year, Bernardo Says 
(Update2), BLOOMBERG, Aug. 11, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20670001&sid=aHzF5HN4b4dA (“‘Brazil may tap its 15.8 billion real ($8.6 billion) 
sovereign wealth fund next year to help finance spending without widening the budget 
deficit,’ Planning and Budget Minister Paulo Bernardo said.”). 
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• Other SWFs have made international investments that involve immediate 
domestic benefits as well.  For example, an Abu Dhabi investment with 
General Electric includes arrangements for GE renewable energy 
technology to be transferred to Masdar Energy City, a project of Abu 
Dhabi’s Mubadala Development Company. 182  Also, a $2.7 billion 
Daimler transaction, completed in March, 2009, gave Aabar Investments a 
9.1% stake in Daimler and involves a joint venture for electric automobiles 
and a training center in Abu Dhabi for its engineers. 183 
• Temasek, with a long and impressive track record of successful investing, 
is considering packaging and selling portions of its investment portfolio to 
the public. 184   
• Temasek is also considering managing investment funds for others.  With 
its stellar investment record such a move should be successful and would 
blur “the line[] between public and private [debt].  This may be the future 
of sovereign wealth funds.”185 
• Norway has also taken advantage the opportunities accompanying the 
worldwide collapse of equity markets.  It has announced a rebalancing of 
its entire portfolio.  It now plans to have 60% of its portfolio in equities, an 
increase from the previous, more conservative allocation of 40%.186 
 
As further evidence that SWFs act like rational private investors, SWFs 
have been described in the press as “vulture” investors, the latter a term 
normally associated with aggressive hedge funds and others who have the 
cash to seize upon an opportunity to acquire “distressed” assets.187   
One impact of the crisis has been increased focus at home on the foreign 
investment activities of various SWFs.  The transparent, super-large 
Norwegian Government Pension Fund — Global,188 has encountered 
significant domestic political pressures.  In the September 2009 Norwegian 
election, each political party campaigned in part on the proper allocation of 
  
 181. Kuwait SWF to Puruse [sic] Foreign Investments, REUTERS, Jan. 17, 2009, 
http://in.reuters.com/article/asiaCompanyAndMarkets/idINLH69290720090117. 
 182. Paritosh Bansal, Mideast Sovereign Funds Seek Reciprocal Investment, REUTERS, 
Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssComputerHardware/idUSN084148622 
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 183.  Zach Lowe, Sherman & Sterling, Skadden, Freshfields, on Daimler-Abu Dhabi 
Stock Deal, AMLAW DAILY, Mar. 24, 2009, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/ 
2009/03/shearman.html. 
 184. Adam, supra note 173. 
 185. Id.   
 186. Gwladys Fouche, Norway’s Sovereign Wealth Fund: £259bn and Growing, 
GUARDIAN (UK), Sept. 20, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/sep/20/norway-
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 187. Zhang Ruimin, the Chairman and CEO of Haier, the world’s largest 
manufacturer of refrigerators, refers to his company’s acquisition targets as “stunned fish,” 
which are “good companies waylaid, often by circumstances beyond their control.”   
Creative Destruction Proves Winning Strategy for Fridge-Maker, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2009. 
 188. See GERARD LYONS, STANDARD CHARTERED, STATE CAPITALISM: THE RISE OF 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 6 (2007) (“Norway is perhaps the best example of a fully 
transparent fund.”). 
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resources in the national SWF.   Norway’s SWF acknowledges that 
domestic political considerations have had a direct impact on its investment 
decisions.  Despite the objections of the SWF’s CEO, Norway has more 
than twenty-five companies on a blacklist for various, non-financial reasons.  
As one example, the Norwegian SWF’s holdings of Wal-Mart were sold 
because of that company’s resistance to labor union organizing efforts and 
other violations of workers’ human rights.   Elbit, an Israeli company, has 
been blacklisted by Norway because it produces surveillance systems used 
on the wall separating the West Bank from Israel.189  
B.   The Crisis and the Chinese Reaction 
In analyzing the unique risks posed by SWFs, China is a special case.  
The dramatic growth of China’s soft power and influence is the hallmark of 
the first decade of the 21st century.190  Since 2004, the  media has offered 
sound bites to the public that have routinely referred  to the challenge 
China’s currently uniquely successful form of state capitalism191 poses to 
free market forms of capitalism.  China’s stunning success requires that we 
take a brief look at its role in the global economy. 192 
China’s $297 billion SWF, CIC, created only at the end of 2007, has 
been hyper-active during the crisis.  China also has hundreds of billions of 
additional foreign exchange assets in its State Agency for Foreign Exchange 
(“SAFE”), which some believe also acts as a SWF,  making  
unacknowledged  international investments.  China has also deployed its $2 
trillion in foreign exchange reserves as loans from the state to support 
activities of Chinese SOEs in pursuit of goals that coincide with the 
diplomatic and economic goals of China itself. 
The pace of foreign investment by Chinese SOEs and CIC has 
accelerated during the crisis.  Foreign direct investment by Chinese 
companies totaled less than $50 billion in the five years ending in 2007.  For 
2008 and 2009, according to the Chinese Commerce Ministry, Chinese 
companies are on track to invest over $100 billion.193   Fortuitous timing and 
  
 189. Aasa Christine Stoltz & Wojciech Moskwa, Norway Fund Sells Israeli Shares on 
Ethical Grounds, REUTERS, Sept. 3, 2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLNE58201O 
20090903. 
 190. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
 191. See generally Fen Osler Hampson, The New China Syndrome: The Threat to 
Canada, FIN. POST, Sept. 14, 2009, http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fpcomment/ 
archive/2009/09/14/the-new-china-syndrome-the-threat-to-canada.aspx. 
 192. See Fastest-Growing Economies Join G-8 Summit, CBS NEWS, July 9, 2009, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/07/09/world/main5146008.shtml (China is noted as 
one of the five fastest growing market economies; this is evident by their invitation as guests 
to the annual G-8 Summit of 2009 to discuss issues ranging from international trade to global 
economic growth). 
 193. Dexter Roberts & Frederik Balfour, China’s Shopping Spree, BUS. WK., July 27, 
2009, at 42. 
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trillions in investable cash has led China, through its SWF and its SOEs, to 
act just like a wealth-maximizing private investor. 
C.   The Ice Cream Problem 
While China’s acknowledged SWF, CIC, is not the largest such fund, 
China itself holds more than $2 trillion in foreign currency holdings,194 and 
more dollar reserves than any other nation.  Given the fall of the dollar 
against the Euro and the yen and the inflationary potential of the trillions of 
dollars of new commitments the U.S. Government has made to ameliorate 
the impact of the economic crisis, China can be viewed as a prisoner of its 
vast dollar holdings.  Were it to attempt to sell its U.S. Treasury and related 
debt instruments, it is widely understood that the value of its dollar 
denominated holdings would immediately collapse.195  China fully 
recognizes this problem.  It refers to the $1.2 trillion in dollar instruments as 
“melting ice cream.”196  China’s solution to this challenge is to spend its 
dollar assets to purchase or gain access to hard assets, including 
manufacturing facilities and commodities.  
CIC reported in 2008 that it had invested less than 15% of its available 
assets, including 9% in bonds and fixed income securities and only 3.2% in 
equities, leaving 87%, or $260 billion, in cash and cash equivalents 
available to take advantage of the global drop in commodities and other 
prices.197  Although China’s $1.2 trillion in dollar assets may be “melting,” 
CIC, and China’s SOEs are in an ideal position to spend China’s dollar 
assets to acquire manufacturing assets, commodities, or interests in 
enterprises which control commodities, and to do so at favorable prices, 
which reflect the collapse of the global economy. 
Chinese companies have purchased Hummer, one of General Motors’ 
automobile brands, and have sought to purchase both Opel, the German-
based GM car manufacturer, and Volvo, a Ford Motors brand.  The Chinese 
  
 194. Truman, supra note 148, at 16–17 (“The State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE) holds a portfolio of international assets that is about 20 times the size of 
CIC’s international portfolio.”). 
 195. Indeed, even rumors that the Chinese government might decide to reduce its 
dollar dependency have triggered adverse market reaction. 
 196. See also China Reduces Holdings in U.S. Debt, BBC NEWS, Aug. 18, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8207174.stm (noting that despite China’s reduction of 
US debt holdings by 3% in June 2009, “[i]n 2008[] the Chinese increased their holdings in 
US debt by 52% over 12 months”); Chong Mu, Sovereign Wealth Fund Spends Billions to 
Diversify Into Resources Firms, GLOBAL TIMES, Sept. 24, 2009, http://news.alibaba.com/ 
article/detail/business-in-china/100177221-1-sovereign-wealth-fund-spends-billions.html 
(“‘China's $800 billion US treasury bonds are like melting ice cream….’ said Liu Shengjun, 
deputy director of CEIBS Lujiazui International Finance Research Center.”). 
 197. V. Phani Kumar, China Sovereign Funds Sees Positive Returns in 2009, 
MARKETWATCH, Aug. 30, 2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/china-sovereign-fund-
sees-positive-returns-in-2009-2009-08-30. 
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offered to participate in the proposed purchase of SAAB, yet another GM 
brand being divested.   Chinese SOEs have been extremely active in 2009.  
PetroChina signed a $33 billion agreement with Exxon to purchase liquefied 
natural gas from a new Australian offshore field.198  Other Chinese entities 
have purchased, or attempted to invest in Rio Tinto, a British-Australian 
mining giant, and Addax Petroleum, a Swiss-based company, with interests 
in oil fields in Nigeria, Canada, and elsewhere.  In resource-rich Australia, 
the Australian Foreign Investment Review Board reviewed 90 separate 
Chinese investment proposals in just eighteen months.199 
During September, 2009, CIC announced a number of transactions 
indicative of its current approach — spending dollars to acquire real assets 
before the ice cream melts. CIC agreed to purchase $1.9 billion in the debt 
of Indonesia’s largest coal company, PT Bumi Resources and invested $850 
million to purchase a 15% stake in Noble Group Ltd., based in Hong Kong, 
which owns and trades commodities.200  During the same week CIC 
reported committing $1 billion to Los Angeles-based Oaktree Capital 
Management.201  The following week it became public knowledge that (i) 
CNOOC was seeking to purchase access to six billion barrels of oil in 
Nigeria,202 (ii) Sinochem, a Chinese chemicals trading company, had offered 
to purchase an Australian agricultural chemicals maker, and (iii) China had 
invested $939 million to add to its interests in gas and oil producers in 
Kazakhstan.203 
China’s SWF has not been involved in all these transactions, but if there 
is a threat from Chinese ownership of assets, there is no reason to 
distinguish the risks presented by CIC, a SWF, and the Chinese SOEs, such 
as CNOOC, Sinochem, or PetroChina.  Each of these SOEs could be subject 
to demands from China to conduct politically motivated investing.204 
  
 198. Fayen Wong & Tom Miles, Exxon, China Sign $41 Billion Australian Gas Deal, 
REUTERS, Aug. 18, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSTRE57H20A 
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 204. Monk, supra note 46, at 26. 
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It should also be quite clear, however, that each of these investments is 
consistent with the investment approach of a private investor, seeking long 
term investments in currently depressed assets of various types.   
VI.   CONCLUSION 
A.   General Observations 
SWFs have the staying power to be long term investors.  They are not 
under pressure from investors to generate quarterly short term gains.  Long-
term growth is often a SWF’s stated goal.  Knowing their true, as opposed 
to stated, investment philosophies or strategies does not mean that an 
investee nation or its politically sensitive elected officials will know what an 
investing SWF might do in the future.  This applies as well to privately held 
hedge funds and other types of investors.   Markets in the United States and 
elsewhere have been regulated based upon the premise that investors are 
economically rational, acting in their own best interests.  For rational 
investors qua investors, this means that these investors seek wealth 
maximization.  Some fear the theoretical possibility that when a SWF acts 
in its own best interest, that interest may not be wealth maximization, but 
the political, diplomatic, or economic interests of its sovereign owner. 
B.   SWF’s Unique Characteristic: Domestic Political Pressures 
The available evidence establishes that SWFs have thus far invested to 
maximize their wealth, just like large investment funds that are not 
controlled by sovereign nations.  If CIC and other SWFs act like any other 
institutional investor or hedge fund, why the fear-mongering in the press?205  
Can the problem be lack of transparency?  Hedge funds and other large 
investors operate with their investing activities somewhat hidden from 
public knowledge.   Some SWFs as well may not disclose much of what 
they hold or what they do as investors.  But with a constant influx of 
investable funds and freedom from the demands of impatient investors for 
instant gratification, SWFs can and do invest for the long term.  So where is 
the threat?    If SWFs invest for the long term, their interests are aligned 
with the interests of the entities in which they have invested.   Was there a 
need for CFIUS or FINSA or comparable legislation elsewhere? 
The most important distinguishing feature of a SWF is not that it 
unwaveringly seeks its own political ends.   Indeed, Senator Charles 
Schumer, Chairman of the Congressional Joint Economic Committee, has 
  
 205. A Canadian newspaper recently carried Professor Fen Osler Hampson’s 
commentary entitled “The New China Syndrome: The Threat to Canada.”  Hampson states, 
“Though its money is welcome, we should have no illusions that China is a normal investor 
that plays by our rules.”  Hampson, supra note 191. 
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acknowledged that “[i]t would be perfectly rational to expect a government-
controlled fund to have non-economic motivations.”206  Rather, the unique 
characteristic of a SWF or SOE investment is the possibility that the 
sovereign will use its SWF or SOE investments for other than wealth-
maximizing purposes.  A sovereign could use its SWF to take politically 
motivated actions.  There is no evidence that this has occurred.  There is a 
long history of SWF investing with no political or non-economic purposes.  
Nevertheless, regardless of whether one believes the Chinese Communist 
Party, which ultimately controls China’s $2 trillion in foreign exchange, is a 
long-term economic investor or is intent upon undermining the United 
States and displacing U.S. hegemony, the possibility exists that diplomatic 
and political interests or home country economics could drive a  sovereign 
to make an investment decision that is in the best interest of the sovereign 
but not the investee company.207  SWFs and SOEs are “complex political 
and economic institutions”208 subject to forces other than wealth-
maximizing goals. 
We have evidence that domestic demands have been accommodated by 
management of a few SWFs during the current economic crisis.209  But the 
resulting changes in SWF behavior are consistent with carefully considered 
investing decisions by well informed asset managers.    Notwithstanding the 
long history of legitimate SWF investing and the benign results of the 
revealing stress test of SWF behavior during the most severe economic 
crisis in seventy-five years, the risk that a sovereign might direct a SWF to 
make a decision not based upon the interests of the investee company, but 
upon an inconsistent interest of that sovereign, cannot be eliminated.  
Moreover, SWF transparency and democracy may have the perverse impact 
of contributing to the political pressures on SWFs to take action in aid of the 
local economy.210 
It is precisely the transparency that the OECD and major investee nations 
seek, and that the IWG’s Santiago Principles promote, that gives some 
domestic constituencies of SWFs the information necessary to pressure a 
national SWF to change its investment philosophy or to abandon long-term 
investment international investing goals for immediate domestic needs. 
  
 206. Do Sovereign Wealth Funds Make the U.S. Economy Stronger or Pose National 
Security Risks? Before the J. Economic Comm., 110th Cong. 3 (2008) (opening statement of 
Charles E. Schumer, Chairman, Sen.). 
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 208. Fleischer, supra note 155, at 152. 
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Investments by SWFs in the United States are subject to CFIUS.  CFIUS 
has a quite loose definition of control.  Thus, CFIUS can work to deal with 
the theoretical threat some perceive by assiduously reviewing SWF, SOE 
and other foreign investments in U.S. companies.   We shall see over the 
years, as SWFs grow in relative importance, just how well CFIUS works. 
C.   The Bottom Line 
This review began with a hypothetical scenario based upon worst case 
theories about SWFs and their influence upon the U.S. economy.  SWFs are 
pools of fantastic wealth, which will only grow in significance as the global 
economy adjusts to higher energy prices, further economic development in 
Asia and Latin America, and less irresponsible borrowing by American 
consumers. 
We have considered recent SWF investments in the world’s leading 
financial institutions and the losses almost immediately suffered by them as 
the subprime crisis developed into a global economic slowdown.  We have 
looked briefly at CFIUS and FINSA, the Congressional response to the 
SWF threat.  We have seen that investment activities of SWFs have been 
influenced by the financial crisis.  We know of the 24 Santiago Principles of 
the IWG’s GAPP that are intended to head off criticism of SWFs.  We have 
noted the perverse impact of transparency on the capacity of SWFs to 
behave like private investors, driven by wealth maximization. 
SWFs will grow in importance as key factors in the global economy.  So 
long as CFIUS is assiduously applied, it will serve the American public 
interest by permitting the United States to remain open to foreign 
investment while arming the federal government with instruments adequate 
to deal with transactions that could pose a danger to national security. 
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APPENDIX A: SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INSTITUTE ROSTER OF SWFS 
Country Fund Name Assets Inception Origin 
SWF to 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Reserve 
Ratio 
Linaburg-
Maduell 
Transparency 
Index 
UAE - Abu 
Dhabi 
Abu Dhabi 
Investment 
Authority 
$627 1976 Oil 29.5 3 
Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign Holdings $431 n/a Oil 12.7 2 
Norway Government Pension Fund – Global $396.60 1990 Oil 7.1 10 
China SAFE Investment Company $347.1  
Non-
Commodity 0.2 2 
China China Investment Corporation $288.80 2007 
Non-
Commodity 0.1 6 
Singapore 
Government of 
Singapore 
Investment 
Corporation 
$247.50 1981 Non-Commodity 1.9 6 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority $202.80 1953 Oil 12.7 6 
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority 
Investment Portfolio 
$193.40 1998 Non-Commodity 1 8 
Russia National Welfare Fund $178.5 2008 Oil 0.4 5 
Singapore Temasek Holdings $122 1974 Non-Commodity 0.8 10 
China National Social Security Fund $82.40 2000 
Non-
commodity nil 5 
UAE - Dubai 
Investment 
Corporation of 
Dubai 
$82 2006 Oil 2.8 4 
Libya Libyan Investment Authority $65 2006 Oil 0.8 2 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority $65 2003 Oil 8.6 5 
Australia Australian Future Fund $49.30 2004 
Non-
Commodity 1.8 9 
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund  $47 2000 Oil 0.3 1 
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund $38 2000 Oil 1.1 6 
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency $30 1983 Oil  1 
France Strategic Investment Fund $28 2008 
Non-
Commodity 0.2 new 
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South Korea Korea Investment Corporation $27 2005 
Non-
Commodity 0.1 9 
US - Alaska Alaska Permanent Fund $26.70 1976 Oil 0.5 10 
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional $23.10 1993 Non-Commodity 0.3 4 
Ireland National Pensions Reserve Fund $22.80 2001 
Non-
Commodity 36.6 10 
Chile 
Social and 
Economic 
Stabilization Fund 
$21.80 1985 Copper 0.9 9 
UAE - Abu 
Dhabi 
Mubadala 
Development 
Company 
$14.70 2002 Oil 0.3 10 
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company $14 2006 Oil 2.9 7 
UAE - Abu 
Dhabi 
International 
Petroleum 
Investment 
Company 
$14 1984 Oil n/a n/a 
Iran Oil Stabilisation Fund $13 1999 Oil 0.2 1 
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund $11.90 1999 Oil 0.6 9 
US - New 
Mexico 
New Mexico State 
Investment Office 
Trust 
$11.70 1958 Non-Commodity 0.2 9 
Canada Alberta’s Heritage Fund $11.10 1976 Oil 0.4 9 
Nigeria Excess Crude Account $9.40 2004 Oil 0.2 1 
New Zealand 
New Zealand 
Superannuation 
Fund 
$8.60 2003 Non-Commodity 0.8 10 
Brazil Sovereign Fund of Brazil $8.60 2009 
Non-
commodity nil new 
Oman State General Reserve Fund $8.20 1980 Oil & Gas 0.3 1 
Botswana Pula Fund $6.90 1996 Diamonds & Minerals 0.7 1 
Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund $5.30 2008 Oil nil 3 
China China-Africa Development Fund $5.00 2007 
Non-
Commodity nil 4 
East Timor Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund $4.20 2005 Oil & Gas n/a 6 
US - 
Wyoming 
Permanent 
Wyoming Mineral 
Trust Fund 
$3.60 1974 Minerals nil 9 
US - 
Alabama Alabama Trust Fund $3.10 1986 Gas nil 6 
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Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Heritage and 
Stabilization Fund $2.90 2000 Oil n/a 5 
Malaysia 
Terengganu 
Investment 
Authority 
$2.80 2008 Oil New 
 
UAE - Ras 
Al Khaimah 
RAK Investment 
Authority $1.20 2005 Oil X 3 
Venezuela FIEM $0.80 1998 Oil nil 1 
Vietnam 
State Capital 
Investment 
Corporation 
$0.50 2006 Non-Commodity 0.1 4 
Kiribati 
Revenue 
Equalization 
Reserve Fund 
$0.40 1956 Phosphates n/a 1 
Indonesia Government Investment Unit $0.30 2006 
Non-
commodity X X 
Mauritania 
National Fund for 
Hydrocarbon 
Reserves 
$0.30 2006 Oil & Gas X 1 
UAE - 
Federal 
Emirates Investment 
Authority X 2007 Oil X 2 
Oman Oman Investment Fund X 2006 Oil X n/a 
UAE - Dubai Dubai World X 2006 Oil X n/a 
  
 
Total Oil & Gas 
Related $2,259.50     
 
Total Other $1,545.80
 
 
TOTAL $3,805.30
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APPENDIX B:  IWG GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 
(GAPP) – SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES 
In furtherance of the “Objective and Purpose,” the IWG members either 
have implemented or intend to implement the following principles and 
practices, on a voluntary basis, each of which is subject to home country 
laws, regulations, requirements and obligations. This paragraph is an 
integral part of the GAPP. 
 
GAPP 1. Principle 
The legal framework for the SWF should be sound and support its effective 
operation and the achievement of its stated objective(s).  
GAPP 1.1. Subprinciple. The legal framework for the SWF should ensure 
legal soundness of the SWF and its transactions.  
GAPP 1.2. Subprinciple. The key features of the SWF’s legal basis and 
structure, as well as the legal relationship between the SWF and other state 
bodies, should be publicly disclosed. 
 
GAPP 2. Principle 
The policy purpose of the SWF should be clearly defined and publicly 
disclosed. 
 
GAPP 3. Principle 
Where the SWF’s activities have significant direct domestic 
macroeconomic implications, those activities should be closely coordinated 
with the domestic fiscal and monetary authorities, so as to ensure 
consistency with the overall macroeconomic policies. 
 
GAPP 4. Principle 
There should be clear and publicly disclosed policies, rules, procedures, or 
arrangements in relation to the SWF’s general approach to funding, 
withdrawal, and spending operations. 
GAPP 4.1. Subprinciple. The source of SWF funding should be publicly 
disclosed.  
GAPP 4.2. Subprinciple. The general approach to withdrawals from the 
SWF and spending on behalf of the government should be publicly 
disclosed. 
 
GAPP 5. Principle 
The relevant statistical data pertaining to the SWF should be reported on a 
timely basis to the owner, or as otherwise required, for inclusion where 
appropriate in macroeconomic data sets. 
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GAPP 6. Principle 
The governance framework for the SWF should be sound and establish a 
clear and effective division of roles and responsibilities in order to facilitate 
accountability and operational independence in the management of the SWF 
to pursue its objectives. 
 
GAPP 7. Principle 
The owner should set the objectives of the SWF, appoint the members of its 
governing body(ies) in accordance with clearly defined procedures, and 
exercise oversight over the SWF’s operations. 
 
GAPP 8. Principle 
The governing body(ies) should act in the best interests of the SWF, and 
have a clear mandate and adequate authority and competency to carry out its 
functions. 
 
GAPP 9. Principle 
The operational management of the SWF should implement the SWF’s 
strategies in an independent manner and in accordance with clearly defined 
responsibilities. 
 
GAPP 10. Principle 
The accountability framework for the SWF’s operations should be clearly 
defined in the relevant legislation, charter, other constitutive documents, or 
management agreement. 
 
GAPP 11. Principle 
An annual report and accompanying financial statements on the SWF’s 
operations and performance should be prepared in a timely fashion and in 
accordance with recognized international or national accounting standards 
in a consistent manner. 
 
GAPP 12. Principle 
The SWF’s operations and financial statements should be audited annually 
in accordance with recognized international or national auditing standards in 
a consistent manner. 
 
GAPP 13. Principle 
Professional and ethical standards should be clearly defined and made 
known to the members of the SWF’s governing body(ies), management, and 
staff. 
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GAPP 14. Principle 
Dealing with third parties for the purpose of the SWF’s operational 
management should be based on economic and financial grounds, and 
follow clear rules and procedures. 
 
GAPP 15. Principle 
SWF operations and activities in host countries should be conducted in 
compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements of the 
countries in which they operate. 
 
GAPP 16. Principle 
The governance framework and objectives, as well as the manner in which 
the SWF’s management is operationally independent from the owner, 
should be publicly disclosed. 
 
GAPP 17. Principle 
Relevant financial information regarding the SWF should be publicly 
disclosed to demonstrate its economic and financial orientation, so as to 
contribute to stability in international financial markets and enhance trust in 
recipient countries. 
 
GAPP 18. Principle 
The SWF’s investment policy should be clear and consistent with its 
defined objectives, risk tolerance, and investment strategy, as set by the 
owner or the governing body(ies), and be based on sound portfolio 
management principles. 
GAPP 18.1. Subprinciple. The investment policy should guide the SWF’s 
financial risk exposures and the possible use of leverage. 
GAPP 18.2. Subprinciple. The investment policy should address the extent 
to which internal and/or external investment managers are used, the range of 
their activities and authority, and the process by which they are selected and 
their performance monitored. 
GAPP 18.3. Subprinciple. A description of the investment policy of the 
SWF should be publicly disclosed. 
 
GAPP 19. Principle 
The SWF’s investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-adjusted 
financial returns in a manner consistent with its investment policy, and 
based on economic and financial grounds. 
GAPP 19.1. Subprinciple. If investment decisions are subject to other than 
economic and financial considerations, these should be clearly set out in the 
investment policy and be publicly disclosed. 
GAPP 19.2. Subprinciple. The management of an SWF’s assets should be 
consistent with what is generally accepted as sound asset management 
principles. 
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GAPP 20. Principle 
The SWF should not seek or take advantage of privileged information or 
inappropriate influence by the broader government in competing with 
private entities. 
9 
GAPP 21. Principle 
SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental element of their 
equity investments’ value. If an SWF chooses to exercise its ownership 
rights, it should do so in a manner that is consistent with its investment 
policy and protects the financial value of its investments. The SWF should 
publicly disclose its general approach to voting securities of listed entities, 
including the key factors guiding its exercise of ownership rights. 
 
GAPP 22. Principle 
The SWF should have a framework that identifies, assesses, and manages 
the risks of its operations. 
GAPP 22.1. Subprinciple. The risk management framework should include 
reliable information and timely reporting systems, which should enable the 
adequate monitoring and management of relevant risks within acceptable 
parameters and levels, control and incentive mechanisms, codes of conduct, 
business continuity planning, and an independent audit function. 
GAPP 22.2. Subprinciple. The general approach to the SWF’s risk 
management framework should be publicly disclosed. 
 
GAPP 23. Principle 
The assets and investment performance (absolute and relative to 
benchmarks, if any) of the SWF should be measured and reported to the 
owner according to clearly defined principles or standards. 
 
GAPP 24. Principle 
A process of regular review of the implementation of the GAPP should be 
engaged in by or on behalf of the SWF.  
 
  
 
 
  
TRANSCRIPT 
CORRUPTION IN THE NAME OF “DEMOCRACY”: 
THE USA AND RUSSIA IN THE 1990S† 
Alexander Domrin∗ 
Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues – 
Initially, I was thinking about speaking about the Bank of New York 
(“BONY”) case, and about the Bank of New York scandal involving the 
laundering of as much as $10 billion.  However, I’d like to expand that 
topic.  There are two reasons why I decided to do that.  
On the one hand, when getting ready for this presentation, I came across 
a very interesting book which was written by two authors and which is 
dedicated to this case.  The book is called All Is Clouded by Desire: Global 
Banking, Money Laundering and International Organized Crime.1  As I 
understand, it’s the only book in the catalogue of the U.S. libraries that has a 
new special subject: “Bank of New York — Corrupt Practices.”  As a 
review of the book by Frank Scarpittii, Professor of Sociology from the 
University of Delaware says, the authors’ “exhaustive research documents 
the role of the Bank of New York in the theft of billions of dollars of 
Russian assets.  From New York to Moscow and other points around the 
world, this is organized crime at its worst, perpetrated not by street-level 
hoodlums, but by bankers, businessmen, politicians, and others willing to 
bankrupt a nation for personal gain.”2 
The second reason is more substantial.  When you speak just about one 
case, it can send a wrong message to the audience, as if the case was just a 
kind of exception, or as if it was somehow unique.  Well, it wasn’t. 
I teach two courses at the University Iowa College of Law during this 
semester.  And when I teach in America, I try to teach law in “context.”  
Law doesn’t exist in a splendid isolation — that’s one of those things that 
we believe about law in Russia.  Law exists in a broader social “context.”  
It’s not enough just to take a look at a case and analyze that case.  You need 
to see what was there around the case, how it came into existence.  It’s not 
  
 † This presentation was given at the Michigan State University Journal of 
International Law 2009 Symposium, The Global Interdependent Economy: Explorations of 
the Boundaries of International Investment, hosted at the Michigan State University College 
of Law on February 13, 2009. 
∗ Head of International Programs, Pepelyaev, Goltsblat and Partners; Adjunct 
Professor, University of Iowa College of Law; S.J.D. 1998, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School; Candidate of Law (Ph.D. equivalent) 1992, Institute of Legislation and Comparative 
Law; Diploma 1985, Moscow State Institute of International Relations.  
 1. ALAN A. BLOCK & CONSTANCE A. WEAVER, ALL IS CLOUDED BY DESIRE: GLOBAL 
BANKING, MONEY LAUNDERING AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME (2004). 
 2. Id. 
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right just to take a look at a statute or a Constitution and analyze it — you 
need to know how it was adopted and why.  You need to see earlier drafts; 
you need to see the legislative history.  That’s exactly how one of my 
courses at Iowa is called: “Contemporary Russian Law in Historical 
Context.”  So instead of speaking about the BONY case and some other 
cases, let me discuss them within a broader context. 
As you know, in December of 1991, the leaders of three Soviet republics 
— Russia, Ukraine and Belarus — decided to pull their republics from the 
USSR, which in practical terms meant the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
Following the advice of their Western consultants, on January 2, 1992, the 
Russian “reformers” began economic changes in the country generally 
known as “shock therapy.”  In reality, shock therapy proved to be shock 
without therapy. 
American people still remember the Great Depression of the late 1920s 
— early 1930s.  In all senses, the devastation of Russia’s economy in the 
1990s was far worse. 
By 1932, the U.S. gross national product had been cut by almost one-
third.  But within just six months of the 1998 financial meltdown, Russia’s 
economy had fallen by more than two-thirds.  From $422 billion in 1997, 
Russia’s gross domestic product fell to $132 billion by the end of 1998.  At 
the end of 1929, following America’s stock market crash, unemployment in 
the United States reached 1.5 million, representing 1.2% of the total 
population.  Compare that figure to 11.3 million Russians who were jobless 
at the end of 1998 — 7.7% of the nation’s total population.  In the Crash of 
1929, stock prices fell 17% by year end, and 90% by the depth of the Great 
Depression four years later.  By contrast, the Russian stock market lost 90% 
of its value in 1998 alone.  By March 1999, the ruble — and with it, every 
Russian’s life savings — had lost fully 75% of its value.3 
When coming to power in 2000, Vladimir Putin inherited a crushed, 
looted and humiliated country struggling to survive the liquidation regime 
of the “reformers.”4  The country, whose industrial product had shrunk by 
about a quarter more than during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–45,5 
  
 3. For more on a comparison between the Great Depression and collapse of 
Russia’s economy in the 1990s, see, e.g., MEMBERS OF THE SPEAKER’S ADVISORY GROUP OF 
RUSSIA, U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., 106TH CONGRESS, RUSSIA’S ROAD TO CORRUPTION: HOW THE 
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION EXPORTED GOVERNMENT INSTEAD OF FREE ENTERPRISE AND 
FAILED THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE (Sept. 2000), available at http://www.fas.org/news/russia/ 
2000/russia/. 
 4. The definition is used in publications of Moscow authors A. Anisimov and A. 
Kalinin concluding that Yeltsin’s regime cannot be characterized as an “occupation regime” 
because the term “occupation” still presumes a certain degree of care and protection.  A more 
adequate definition of the rule of Yeltsin “reformers” is a “liquidation regime”, i.e. a regime 
liquidating the Russian state, people and culture. Interview with Alexander Kalinin, Moscow, 
Russia (May 4, 2001). 
 5. Russia’s industrial product has plummeted by about 53%.  Back in 1941–45, 
when Hitler troops were occupying about a half of the European part of the USSR, when 
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whose increase in mortality rates (60% since 1990) had been “historically 
unprecedented,”6 whose population was shrinking by up to half percent a 
year, the country which stood in the 134th place among all states in terms of 
male life expectancy (by 1997, death rate among Russian males had equaled 
that of war-ravaged Liberia)7 and in the 100th in terms of female life 
expectancy,8 whose men had a smaller chance to survive to age sixty than a 
century ago,9 and which had more homeless children than after the Bolshevik 
revolution of 1917.10 
What was proclaimed by Strobe Talbott, then Deputy Secretary of State, 
as the beginning of “national rebirth” in Russia11, turned to be an 
unprecedented social catastrophe, “a catastrophe of historic proportions,”12 
  
more than 1,700 cities and 70,000 villages were destroyed in warfare, and about 26.5 million 
Soviet citizens lost their lives, the reduction of the Soviet industrial product was only about 
30%. 
 6. See Nicholas Eberstadt, Russia: Too Sick to Matter?, 95 POL’Y REV. (1999), 
available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3551987.html (“No 
industrialized country has ever before suffered such a severe and prolonged deterioration 
during peacetime.”).  The American scholar draws our attention to another important detail: 
“Remember: The Russian crisis has erupted in a country in a formal state of peace.  In origin, 
duration, and character, Russia’s mortality crisis is fundamentally different from those 
others,” like in Spain (1936–39), Western Germany (1943–46), Japan (1944–45), and South 
Korea (1950–53), which had “record cruel plunges in countrywide life expectancy around 
the middle of the twentieth century.  Merely to note those dates, however, is to see a contrast 
between these cases and the case of Russia.  The mortality crises in Spain, Western 
Germany, Japan, and South Korea were direct consequences of wars or civil war.”  Id. 
 7. See this comparison at the World Bank Transition Newsletter. The World Bank 
Group, Beyond Transition: The Newsletter About Reforming Economies, April 1997, 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/apr97/pgs24-28.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2009). 
 8. See TASS, Mar. 16, 2001. 
 9. This index is 1.5 times smaller than in developed countries. 
 10. In the end of the 1990s, there were between 625,000 (an official figure) to 2 
million (a more adequate figure) abandoned homeless children in Russia.  See Anna 
Bazhenova, Russia Has 625,000 Abandoned Children, TASS, June 29, 1999.  Newspaper 
stories about kids living in card boxes among garbage cans or about a six-year-old Vanya 
Mishukov who was raised by stray dogs no longer looked like a gross dramatization of life in 
Yeltsin’s Russia and most other former Soviet republics.  Tom Whitehouse, Russian Boy, 6, 
Lived Wild with Dogs for 2 Years, GUARDIAN, July 16, 1998; see also Sergei Rykov, In Free 
Russia Children Are Raped, Robbed and Murdered, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA - RIA 
NOVOSTI, Apr. 17, 1997.  The authors of a new study Young People in Changing Societies 
estimate that about half a million children aged 5–14 who lived in Eastern Europe and USSR 
in 1989 have already died, almost half in Russia alone.  INNOCENTI RESEARCH CENTRE, 
UNICEF, YOUNG PEOPLE IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (2000) available at http://www.unicef-
irc.org/cgi-bin/unicef/research/main.sql?file=scheda_products.sql 
&idprod=383.  The mortality rate among young people rose in 11 (out of 27) post-
Communist countries, particularly within the CIS.  Id.  The danger of a young person dying 
was three times greater in Russia than in Slovakia, the Czech Republic or in Hungary.  Id.  
And these deaths are explained by the report by mainly social causes and could have been 
avoided under different social conditions.  Id.  
 11. Senate Hearing on Russia and Former Soviet Union, 103rd Cong. (1993) 
(statement by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State). 
 12. Eberstadt, supra note 6.  
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which was largely ignored by the Western community,13  “a human crisis of 
monumental proportions,” as it was subsequently defined by the U.N. 
Development Program in its Transition 1999: The Human Cost of 
Transition, the Human Development Report for Central and Eastern Europe 
and the CIS.14   
Senior U.S. officials are certainly wrong when they try to give their post-
factum assurances that the U.S. foreign policy since the Cold War has 
included such “overriding goals” as “to work with Russia internationally” 
and “to support Russia’s effort to transform its political, economic, and 
social institutions at home.”15  In reality, since Margaret Thatcher’s 
infamous endorsement of Gorbachev in December 1984 through the latest 
period of contemporary Russian history, the Western governments have 
been promoting a “strategic alliance with Russian reform” rather than an 
alliance with Russia herself.  A guiding principle of the U.S. foreign policy 
was not to support Russia, but to support “Russian reforms” which “were 
considered to be critical to U.S. objectives;”16 not to help Russian people to 
overcome consequences of the Communist rule, but to help Russian 
“reformers” which is not the same.  
The position of the IMF was hardly different in that respect from the 
position of the U.S. Agency for International Development (“US AID”).  
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director of the defunct Harvard Institute for International 
Development and an economic advisor to Yeltsin’s Government, may 
blame IMF for “so many technical mistakes.”17  Yet, even the most devoted 
supporters of “market fundamentalists,” as George Soros names Russian 
  
 13. In the words of a British observer, “the only two things that are certain are that 
there will be more unrecorded, unlamented Russian deaths and that the triumphal pageant of 
western-inspired “reforms” will pass the heaps of corpses by, noses aloft.”  Johnson’s Russia 
List, May 27, 1997, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/jrl-ras-archive.cfm.  Other Western 
observers actually welcome depopulation of Russia, because, in a cannibalistic conclusion of 
a Canadian newspaper, “mortality will provide the solution to many of Russia’s transitional 
problems.” Editorial, The Soviets in Russia, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Aug. 11, 1999. 
 14. See UNDP, TRANSITION 1999: THE HUMAN COST OF TRANSITION (1999) 
http://78.136.31.142/en/reports/regionalreports/europethecis/name,2799,en 
.html. 
 15. Thomas R. Pickering, Russia: Sleeping Superpower?, Address at Meridian 
House/Smithsonian Seminar Washington, D.C. (Mar. 28, 2000) (transcript available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000328_pickering_russia.html) (last visited 
Nov.8, 2009) (emphasis is added). 
 16. GAO, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, HARVARD INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT’S WORK IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 2 (1996) (emphasis is added). 
 17. Interview with Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director, Harvard Institute of International 
Development, on The Crash, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ 
crash/interviews/sachs.html. 
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“reformers,”18 have to admit now that the IMF was acting “like another 
political arm of the U.S. government.”19 
Only in the earliest period of legal and political reforms in the USSR, did 
the U.S. national interests (“objectives”) coincided with the historical 
necessity of the Soviet transition to democracy and the rule of law.  As soon 
as the slogan “Down with Article 6”20 and the never realized slogan “All 
Power to the Soviets” catapulted Yeltsin and radical “democrats” to power, 
the correlation between national interests of the U.S. and Russia became 
less evident.  With disintegration of the USSR and especially after the 
initiation of liberal economic “reforms,” turning Russian into a mineral 
appendix of Western corporations and throwing Russia in her social and 
economic development into the group of third-world countries, the values of 
the Russian transition to the rule of law were finally forgotten and 
supplanted by the interests of the ultimate economic and political 
subordination of Russia. 
This is certainly not true either that Russia’s socioeconomic catastrophe 
was “largely unanticipated,” that deindustrialization of the Russian 
economy was an “unintended consequence” of liberal “reforms” (Thomas 
Graham) or that “when the liberal experiment began, no one, either in 
Russia or in the West, anticipated . . . this strange and troubling outcome” 
(Martin Malia).21  Warnings about inevitability of such collapse and about 
suicidal character of monetarist experiments with the Russian economy 
were repeatedly voiced by the Russian Parliament already in 1992–93 and 
became one of the main reasons of its violent dissolution by President 
Yeltsin.  Dissolution which was unconditionally supported, if not 
encouraged, by the Western “international community” in general and by 
both branches of the U.S. Government in particular.  As it was later 
  
 18. George Soros, Who Lost Russia?, NY REV. OF BOOKS, Apr. 13, 2000. 
 19. Russia’s 2000 Presidential Elections: Implications for Russian Democracy and 
U.S.-Russian Relations, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
(Apr. 12, 2000) (Statement of Michael A. McFaul) [hereinafter McFaul Statement]; 
Johnson’s Russia List, #4247, Apr. 14, 2000. 
 20. The Communist Party hegemony clause. 
 21. Thomas E. Graham, Jr., Putin’s Russia. Why Economic Reform Requires 
Political Support. Reflections on U.S. Policy Toward Russia, 9 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 1–2 
(2000); Martin Malia, The Haunting Presence of Marxism-Leninism, 10 J. OF DEMOCRACY 2, 
41 (1999).  Thomas Graham corrected himself, however, when making the following 
comment:  
The [Clinton] administration backed an economic course — the so-called ‘Washington 
Consensus’ — that did not take sufficient account of Russian political realities, including a 
widespread elite and popular opposition to that course.  Critics were generally dismissed as 
communists, hard-liners, or economic illiterates.  In the end, the administration found itself 
backing a small, unpopular group of radical reformers.  Not only was the economic program not 
implemented, but the way it was pursued cast into doubt American support for the 
democratization of Russia. 
Thomas Graham, US Ignores Russia’s Elite At Its Own Peril, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 
26, 2000, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ 
publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=541. 
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cynically explained by an American scholar, if the “international 
community” gives its support to a “traditionally undemocratic act,” as it did 
in Russia in September 1993, then this act is actually “democratic,” albeit 
“unconstitutionally democratic.”22  As we see, in the coming era of 
globalization and unipolar world, Clinton Rossiter’s classic formula “even if 
a government can be constitutional without being democratic, it cannot be 
democratic without being constitutional” is very easily abandoned.23 
The day after Yeltsin’s issuance of his notorious anti-constitutional 
Decree 1400 (about “dissolution” of the Russian Parliament), Rep. Steny H. 
Hoyer (D-MD) admitted that Yeltsin’s decree was “technically speaking” 
“illegal” but insisted that Yeltsin “acted in the spirit of democracy by 
breaking the letter of the law.”  However, the “primary reason for continued 
Western backing for Yeltsin,” in Hoyer’s words, was not even that he 
“acted in the spirit of democracy,” but that “Yeltsin is explicitly pro-
American, pro-Western, pro-market,” whereas the Parliament “has accused 
the West of seeking to undermine and weaken Russia” and “opposes 
Yeltsin’s privatization program.”  According to the Congressman, “it is 
imperative” “for our own interests,” that Yeltsin’s government “implement 
necessary reforms and keep Russia on a pro-Western track.”24  For obvious 
reasons, the question whether this was “imperative” for the interests of 
Russia herself was never asked. 
The same day Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) welcomed “the swift, 
unequivocal show of support that the Clinton administration has shown for 
President Yeltsin’s move to consolidate democratic reform in Russia” and 
appealed to the Senate to vote for $2.5 billion in “assistance” to Russia and 
other former Soviet republics in order to “to show the reformers in the NIS 
that we are in their corner.”25  Thus again, the senator unambiguously 
demonstrated that U.S. aid was intended not for Russia and the countries of 
the region, but for the “reformers.” 
The speeches and proposals of Rep. Hoyer and Sen. Pell were quite 
typical.  Another prominent Congressman, Rep. Gerald B. Solomon (R-
NY), for instance, expected that the new Federal Assembly “would almost 
certainly be more democratic and friendly to the West than the previous 
parliament,”26 “truly representative,” and concluded that the December 1993 
elections “have a direct bearing on our national security and should be 
  
 22. Donna R. Miller, Unconstitutional Democracy: Ends vs. Means in Boris Yeltsin’s 
Russia, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 876 (1994). 
 23. See CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT 
IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES viii (1948). 
 24. Yeltsin Moves to End Chaos, Congressional Record, P. E2219 (1993) (statement 
of  Rep. Steny H. Hoyer) (extension of remarks). 
 25. Support for Democratic Reform in Russia, Congressional Record, P. S12239 
(1993).  
 26. Letter from Gerald B. Soloman, Congressman, to President Bill Clinton (Oct. 26, 
1993). 
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treated as a top foreign policy priority by the administration.”  “The 
democrats are in desperate need of outside assistance,” Solomon said, “[w]e 
believe it is imperative for the West to provide as much assistance as 
possible to democratic candidates in Russia,” and called on Congress to 
“divert from existing programs whatever resources necessary to achieve the 
objective of ensuring” victory for the reformers in Russia.27  At least one of 
Rep. Solomon’s expectations came true: the new Russian Federal Assembly 
did in fact become a “truly representative parliament,” but without most of 
those “reformers.” 
The list of similar speeches on the Capitol Hill and in the White House in 
the days of Yeltsin’s constitutional coup of September–October 1993 could 
be continued, but what is really important for us here is an open recognition 
by the U.S. officials of not only a possibility but a desirability of use of 
American “aid” as an instrument of interference into Russian internal 
affairs.28 
U.S. support for such undemocratic and anti-constitutional decisions as 
the violent dissolution of the Russian federal parliament, closure of regional 
legislatures throughout Russia, and suspension (for about 18 months) of the 
Constitutional Court made it clear better than ever before that despite its 
verbal assurances in its interest to see Russia as a prosperous, respected and 
democratic “partner,” the U.S. government was quite satisfied with making 
her a client state controlled by a corrupt dependent authoritarian leader, (“a 
corrupt but friendly drunk,” as he is called by The Washington Post today,29 
a new version of Theodore Roosevelt’s “our son of a bitch”).  It’s highly 
indicative that it was in 2000 only when the former Secretary of State James 
Baker publicly appealed to the U.S. “leaders” to finally “recognize that 
Russia will have its own foreign policy, independent of ours.”30  
Yet, Baker contradicted himself when saying that new “Russian leaders” 
allegedly “reject ‘partnership and friendship’” with the West.  This 
statement, just like a similar Thomas Graham’s lament that “a constructive 
U.S.-Russian partnership now appears a distant dream,” is not convincing, 
because a “partnership” with Russia was never an issue.  In fact, Graham 
recognized it himself in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (April 12, 2000) when saying that “the Administration’s earlier 
  
 27. Elections in Russia, Congressional Record, P. E2534, E2536 (1993) (statement 
of Rep. Gerald B.H. Solomon) (extension of remarks). 
 28. And not just “financial” aid.  Richard Nixon’s foreign policy advisor wrote in her 
book that Nixon was shocked to hear that the Clinton administration had considered the idea 
of sending American troops to Moscow to support Yeltsin’s government in his confrontation 
with the Parliament. “‘What is the matter with the goddamned State Department assholes? . . 
.  You can’t send troops to Russia, for God’s sake.  They already have a huge military with 
its own agenda, and when we went against the Bolsheviks, it was a disaster. Besides, we 
can’t be in a position to interfere in their internal affairs - and militarily?’ he shrieked.  ‘Oh, 
my God!’”  MONICA CROWLEY, NIXON IN WINTER 132 (1998). 
 29. Jim Hoagland, Worse Than Yeltsin, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1999.  
 30. James A. Baker III, Repairing Relations with Russia, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2000. 
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talk of “strategic partnership” created expectations in Russia that we were 
never prepared to meet.”31 
The new Russian Constitution is usually more favorably viewed by 
Western experts than similar constitutions of some other former Soviet 
republics.  It is claimed that “the Constitution of the Russian Federation 
created a true federation,” that after the adoption of the constitution in 
December 1993 “all basic civil rights” exist in Russia “not only in theory as 
they did in the past, but in practice as is true in western democracies,” and, 
finally, that “the Constitution of the Russian Federation creates a genuine 
western democracy.”32  The 1996 Constitution of Belarus, on the other 
hand, is usually seen as not meeting “democratic standards of human 
rights,” granting “sweeping powers” to President and establishing 
“dictatorship” and “totalitarian state.” 
The problem is that often correctly criticized Lukashenka’s Constitution 
of Belarus33 is just a stronger version of Yeltsin’s Constitution.34  The real 
reason why Western official figures and, what is more regrettable, many 
foreign experts react so differently to these constitutions can be explained 
mainly by the fact that one of them was endorsed by an “explicitly pro-
American, pro-Western, pro-market” president,35 whereas the other one was 
introduced by a more independent national leader. 
U.S. official support to the dissolved Belorussian parliament and 
orchestration of anti-Lukashenka’s “active measures” from overseas,36 on 
the one hand, and, at the same time, demonization of the Russian Supreme 
Soviet as “nationalist-Communist bloc,” a “nationalist, crypto-Soviet 
opposition, a band of Communist apparatchiks,” a “band of Communists 
  
 31. Johnson’s Russia List, #4244, April 13, 2000. 
 32. Ronald C. Monticone, A Brief Comparative Analysis of the Russian Constitution, 
in CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIA FEDERATION: WITH COMMENTARIES AND INTERPRETATION BY 
AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN SCHOLARS 7, 9, 14 (1994). 
 33. See, e.g., New York Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Presidential Powers 
and Human Rights under the Draft Constitution of Belarus, Oct. 1996. 
 34. Indeed, if, for instance, according to the Russian Constitution, the decision on 
President’s removal from office must be adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the total 
membership of each chamber of the Federal Assembly, and the whole impeachment process 
is to be accomplished within three months after filing the charge against him (Art. 93), the 
Constitution of Belarus has the same provision regarding voting in the lower chamber 
(House of Representatives), but raises the threshold for the Senate to three-quarters of its 
total composition, and limits the time frame to one month (Art.88).  Yet, the Russian 
Constitution provides for five stages in the impeachment process (including participation of 
both the Supreme and Constitutional Courts of Russia), which makes the process more time-
consuming, whereas the impeachment process in Belarus is to be accomplished in four stages 
without involvement of the Constitutional Court.  In practical terms, however, the 
Constitutions of both countries make their Presidents technically unimpeachable. 
 35. Yeltsin Moves to End Chaos, House of Representatives, Sept. 22, 1993 (statement 
by Steny Hoyer, Rep., extension of remarks). 
 36. See, e.g, Press Release, U.S. State Dept., Belarus: Deputy Secretary Talbott 
Meets with Belarusian Opposition Leaders (Feb. 4, 2000), available at 
http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/2000/ps000204a.html. 
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and fascists,” and even “communist fascists masquerading as 
parliamentarians”37 bespeaks of a policy of double standards, which is quite 
typical for the U.S., but hardly healthy for democratic developments in both 
Russia and Belarus. 
The participation of American consultants in the Russian presidential 
election of 1996 once again illustrated that proud words of U.S. officials 
about the necessity of strict observance of laws in a law-governed state and 
about “the promotion of democracy as a key feature of American foreign 
policy”38 are very easily forgotten when the U.S. national interests — at that 
moment, preservation of “the only horse [in Russia] we can ride,” as Yeltsin 
was called by Joe Biden39 — are at stake.  
Although there is no reason to overestimate the role of Richard Dresner’s 
group in Yeltsin’s victory in 1996, what is really important, is the practical 
lesson given to us in Russia by the U.S. consultants, their attitude to legal 
norms and political “necessity.”  When asked, “if he had any compunction 
about the extent to which the Yeltsin campaign was violating election 
spending laws by many orders of magnitude,” Dresner’s answer was “no,” 
because “Yeltsin was for democracy, and whatever it takes to win is OK.”40  
According to a well-informed American observer, the U.S. Embassy was 
expecting pro-Yeltsin falsifications in the 1996 presidential elections and 
“warned” the Moscow US AID Mission to keep a “distance from 
monitoring efforts that might actually uncover fraud.”41 
As Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State in Clinton administration, 
would say next year: “We are not simply neutral by-standers . . . .  Quite 
simply, we want to see the ascendancy of Russia’s reformers.” 42  Clearly, 
the end justifies the means.  
  
 37. Editorial, Russia Without Rules, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 23, 1993; Celestine 
Bohlen, An Old Georgian Story: Dancing with the Devil, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993; 
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Souls College, Oxford University, Oxford, England, Jan. 21, 2000, available at 
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59 (2002). 
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Russia, 30, 31(1999). 
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address at Stanford University, September 19, 1997, available at http://www.fas.org/ 
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A similar approach was used in the activities of at least two of the US 
AID-funded programs aimed at “developing parties and elections” in 
Russia: those of the National Democratic Institute (“NDI”) and the 
International Republican Institute (“IRI”).  Overall, according to US GAO, 
between 1992 and 1997 those programs received $17.4 million, as a series 
of US AID grants, to “help reformist political parties strengthen their 
organizational structures and their role in elections.”43  Needless to remind 
of the disastrous defeats of radical “democrats,” the main US AID 
“assistance”-consumers,44 in every parliamentary elections in Russia since 
1993. 
In the summer of 1995, the US AID Moscow Mission commissioned a 
report to analyze the “effectiveness of U.S. government assistance to the 
Russian Parliament.”45  An independent expert evaluated the three main 
AID-funded programs working with the Russian Federal Assembly: those of 
NDI, IRI, and of the U.S. Congressional Research Service (“CRS”).  The 
report revealed that the activities of the NDI and IRI were based on 
favoritism.  It found that “most efforts” by both the NDI and IRI “were 
channeled to the education and training of staff workers and MPs in the 
Vybor Rossii”46 (Russia’s Choice) faction.  Yabloko was not forgotten 
either.  A former NDI program officer in Moscow has admitted lately that in 
the 1990s, Yegor Gaidar and Grigory Yavlinsky “appeared to favor trips to 
the West vastly more than they did trips to the regions.”47 
The same report also concluded that “some of the IRI activities have 
been marked by unsystematic and over-demonstrating style,” and that the 
seminars of NDI and IRI “leave an impression of some political show rather 
than profound regular work.”48  Ironically, the group of approximately 3,000 
“reformist-minded political activists” trained by the U.S. programs in 1992–
96 also included Vladimir Putin (“trained” by NDI), who is now described 
by Michael McFaul (an NDI consultant in Moscow in the mid-1990s), as a 
potential “Russia’s Milosevic,” someone “willing to use the power of the 
  
 43. GAO, supra note 16, at 37.  
 44. Peter Stavrakis was certainly right in his criticism of the U.S. Agency for 
International Development: “AID programs have failed miserably in helping NIS states 
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structure.”  Peter J. Stavrakis, Bull in a China Shop: US AID’s Post-Soviet Mission, 4 
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 47. Mendelson, supra note 41, at 24. 
 48. U.S. AID REPORT, supra note 45. 
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state and ignore the democratic rights of society in the pursuit of his 
objectives,” whose election as a new Russian President was not a “positive 
step” for the U.S. interests in Russia.49 
Although certain aspects of the CRS program were criticized as well, 
overall the CRS record was recognized to be “much better because all of its 
activities are actually connected with the parliament as such.”  As stated by 
Duma authorities, “within one year of cooperation with the CRS, the Duma 
has been equipped with modern technologies for 10–15 years ahead;” 
according to a Federation Council respondent, “cooperation with the CRS 
resulted in the unique computer network having no analogues even in the 
executive structure.”  
Equally important is the fact that when in the December 1995 
parliamentary elections none of the “reformist” parties, except Yabloko, 
cleared the 5% threshold to bring its members to the Duma (by the party 
lists), the NDI and IRI lost about 90% of their contacts in the Federal 
Assembly, whereas CRS, whose credo was to work on an unbiased and non-
partisan basis with all factions and committees in the Russian Parliament, 
maintained all their contacts.  Paradoxically, it was the low-budget ($2.5 
million) CRS Program which was abruptly stopped by the U.S. authorities 
in 1996, whereas multimillion NDI, IRI and similar Western programs still 
promote the “reform-minded liberals” in Russia and train “pro-Western, 
liberal-minded political activists following strategies developed in Western 
capitals.”50  
Interruption of the CRS—Russian Federal Assembly Parliamentary 
Program became a part of a more general U.S. policy aimed at 
circumventing Russian parliamentary processes.51  When it became apparent 
that the new Russian Federal Assembly was as resistant to the experiments 
of “bolshevist monetarists” (Peter Stavrakis)52 with Russian economy as the 
disbanded Supreme Soviet, U.S. “assistance” to Russia gave precedence to 
decree-making over long-term legal institutional development in the 
country.  Much of the work of Western consultants and USAID-funded 
programs has gone towards executive decrees rather than parliamentary 
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legislation.  According to the US GAO, just one AID-funded program — 
the Harvard Institute for International Development (“HIID”) — in 1994–96 
alone drafted “hundreds of decrees.”53  As explained in the GAO report, 
“HIID supported the use of decrees because it believed that they advanced 
reforms.”54 
Having an unconditional support of Lawrence Summers, first Deputy 
Assistant Treasury Secretary for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union and then Deputy Secretary, in 1992–97, HIID was awarded $57.7 
million.55  In addition to the millions it received directly, HIID helped steer 
and coordinate some $300 million in US AID grants to other contractors.  
As Janine Wedel wrote, “using the prestige of Harvard’s name and 
connections in the Administration, HIID officials acquired virtual carte 
blanche over the U.S. economic aid program to Russia, with minimal 
oversight by the government agencies involved.”56 
The energetic work of the program came to a sudden end in May 1997, 
when after a thorough investigation US AID came to the conclusion that 
key HIID players in Moscow (Andrei Shleifer and Jonathan Hay) having 
“gained influence over nascent Russian capital markets,” had “abused the 
trust of the United States government by using personal relationships . . . for 
private gain”57 to be more precise, Schleifer and Hay used inside 
information to invest in Russian government bonds and canceled the 
Harvard project in Russia.  The Wall Street Journal drew the attention of its 
readers to the fact that “the Harvard men had been assigned to promote, 
among other things, Western ideals of fair play.”58  
The repercussions of the scandal had a devastating effect.  In 2000, HIID 
was disbanded.  Four years later, U.S. District Court Judge Douglas P. 
Woodlock found Shleifer and Hay liable under the False Claims Act, a 
federal law that prescribed heavy damages for violating a contract with the 
government. In a settlement, Shleifer agreed to pay $2 million (even though 
he faced damages of up to $104 million for conspiring to defraud the 
  
 53. GAO, supra note 16, at 46. 
 54. Id.  
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government) and Hay agreed to pay between $1 million and $2 million 
depending on his future earnings.  Harvard University was cleared of the 
fraud allegations but still faced damages for breaching its contract with the 
U.S. Agency for International Development and agreed to pay $26.5 
million.59 
In his opening remarks at hearings on the collusion of corrupt Russian 
and U.S. officials in the 1990s, Jim Leach, then Chairman of the House 
Committee on Banking and Financial Services concluded that the “Bank of 
New York matter raises fundamental issues that demand Congressional 
review, including the extent to which the U.S. financial system has 
contributed to the impoverishment of the Russian people.”60  
In fact, as we believe, the use of the U.S. financial system for the 
“impoverishment of the Russian people” cannot be limited to just the 
BONY scandal. It has had a much stronger effect and should have much 
deeper consequences.  The continuation of the U.S. reliance on a narrow 
circle of corrupt pro-Western liberal intelligentsia (mainly concentrated in 
Moscow and few other urban centers)61 and “agents of democratic change”62 
in Russia proves to be wasteful, eventually unproductive for the U.S. 
interests (if those interests are not aimed at the ultimate subordination of 
Russia and further aggravation of her socio-economic problems) and 
detrimental to the interests of long-term institutional legal and democratic 
development of Russia.  What Western experts should do instead of 
continuation of their futile (and ridiculous) attempts to “pull Russia into the 
West”63 is to follow the advice of Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr.64: “Those of us 
who care about advance of democracy in the world should make it our 
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foremost intellectual and practical task to find out why our reform strategy 
went wrong in so much of the former Soviet bloc.”65 
Thank you very much for your attention and understanding! 
 
 
  
 65. Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., The Feudalization of the State, 10 J. OF DEMOCRACY 2, 
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TRANSCRIPT 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION IN THE 
GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENT ECONOMY† 
Aníbal Sabater* 
Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen, for being here this 
afternoon and thank you very much also to Professor Bean and the College 
of Law for giving me the opportunity to speak to you today. 
Let me warn you from the beginning that this should be an interactive 
presentation, that you can, and should, interrupt me with comments and 
questions, doubts, whatever you think is appropriate; and in this respect, let 
me start by preaching with an example, and ask a couple of questions for an 
unofficial poll. 
How many of the students here can name an arbitration or litigation case 
to which a sovereign or a state was a party? Some cases were mentioned 
today.  Anyone remember a case? 
Audience: It’s not Brown v. Board of Education, obviously. 
But can anyone name a case involving an investor and a sovereign state?  
We talked about Biwater v. Tanzania1  and Loewen v. the United States2 
today.  There are also a good number of cases that you could find and that 
involve Argentina or Russia, some of which are frequently discussed in 
legal forum.  Many of these cases are public, that means that they are 
quoted, that you can go online and download the actual awards and 
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procedural orders from the tribunals, and also, in the case of NAFTA3 and 
now CAFTA4 arbitrations, you can even go online and download the 
pleadings from the parties in those international arbitration cases. 
Audience: It considerably increases your workload. 
Well, it depends on how you look at it.  When you are counsel, it can 
also make your life easier, in that you can go online and download the 
pleadings and see how the parties are arguing their cases; sometimes you 
can even anticipate what the other party may say in your case, because you 
can see for yourself what your counterparty, or someone in the same 
situation, has said before in a similar case.  It cuts both ways.  Excessive 
information can also make your life very difficult, as you then need to triage 
it, and see what’s useful and what’s not. 
Now, let’s go back to the original question, let’s talk for a while about 
disputes between a foreign investor and a sovereign entity or a state.  When 
you have a dispute of this nature, what are the mechanisms that you can, in 
theory, consider to resolve the dispute? What are the mechanisms that you 
can use to resolve the dispute?  We just mentioned some.  You can go to the 
courts of the host state.  You can go to arbitration.  Do you have a sense of 
which of these two dispute resolution mechanisms is most popular in 
practice? 
Let’s go to Europe, for instance.  If you were counsel for a privately-
owned U.S. company which had invested in, say, Finland, and you had a 
dispute against the Finnish government, and if you were given a choice 
(because you don’t always have a choice), what would you advise your 
client? 
Audience: You want to get rid of the home court advantage. 
Exactly.  That’s an important difference between mercantile disputes, or 
disputes involving only entities operating in their commercial capacity, and 
disputes involving a foreign investor and a sovereign entity or a state.  In the 
case of a dispute between a foreign investor and a sovereign state, many 
times you don’t have any other practical choice but to bring the dispute to 
international arbitration.  Let’s say for example that you are the general 
counsel of a company incorporated here in Michigan, a company by the 
name of Michigan Turbines Co., a company that manufactures turbines.  
Let’s also say that one day you are contacted, or your company is contacted, 
by a Finnish company, a privately-owned Finnish company, a company 
incorporated in Finland, which runs a gas-fired power generation plant that 
has a need for your turbines; and the Finnish company orders four turbines 
from you, and you are drafting the contract.  And you write down, of 
  
 3. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
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course, the usual provisions that you often find in a contract: like the clause 
containing the contractual definitions, the clause defining the substantive 
obligations and rights of the parties, the technical specifications that the 
turbines need to satisfy, and the consideration (in this case the price paid for 
the turbines).  Then you get to what traditionally is one of the last clauses in 
a contract, the dispute resolution and the applicable law clause. 
At this moment you are at ease, and you have perfect freedom to choose 
the dispute resolution mechanism that you prefer among those available to 
you (you will later have to see, of course, if the other party accepts it; but 
that’s another issue) of your choice.  Now, what are the dispute resolution 
mechanisms that you might consider for insertion in a contract like this?  
You have a Michigan-based company, you have the Finnish company.  You 
could certainly add an arbitration clause to the contract.  If you do, the 
eventual arbitral award might be enforceable under the 1958 New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards.5  This is one of those international legal conventions that really 
works well.  There are some tweaks here and there; it’s sometimes a bumpy 
road, but generally the Convention is observed and widely applied 
worldwide, which is a good reason for you to consider arbitration. 
What else might you consider?  You might consider litigation.  Where 
could you litigate a dispute between these two parties if they disagree? 
Audience: Either Finland, the U.S., or you could choose a neutral forum 
as well, possibly. 
The problem with choosing a neutral forum is that many countries don’t 
feel comfortable dealing with disputes and resolving disputes that have no 
connection whatsoever with them.  That was the case for example in the 
explosion of the Union Carbide gas plant in Bohpal, India twenty years ago.  
Some plaintiffs, some aggrieved parties, brought a claim in the U.S., and 
U.S. courts declined to hear that case under a forum non conveniens theory, 
essentially saying, well, this dispute doesn’t concern, it has no connection 
with, the U.S.  We might be a neutral venue, or we might be a neutral 
jurisdiction, because we have no connection with the parties and the issues 
at stake, but for that very reason, we shouldn’t mobilize resources for a case 
that is of no direct concern for the land. 
As you can see, sometimes choosing a neutral jurisdiction, to resolve 
your disputes, cuts both ways.  You could try to go to a neutral forum that is 
acceptable for the parties, but the forum may refuse to resolve the dispute.  
Some jurisdictions, especially many of those in the Western hemisphere 
which apply modern versions of the forum non conveniens theory, would be 
hard pressed to take a case completely unrelated to them, unless a denial of 
justice may otherwise take place. 
  
 5. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. 
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But you can certainly consider the Finnish courts, and the U.S. courts, to 
resolve the dispute.  Of course, being an MSU J.D., you would be familiar 
on your own with the U.S. court litigation system.  And you could also 
conduct some due diligence concerning Finland; you could call Finnish 
local counsel, get him or her to explain to you how the Finnish courts work 
in practice, how expeditious they are, how reliable they are, and if you are 
satisfied you might as well end up choosing to litigate the dispute in 
Finland.  So, in essence, you have three choices; in your dispute resolution 
clause you can agree to arbitrate the dispute, you can agree to litigate it in 
Finland, or you can agree to litigate it here, in the U.S. 
Now, let’s move to a different scenario.  Let’s think that the entity that is 
going to buy your turbines is not a privately owned Finnish corporation.  
Let’s say that it is a state entity, owned and controlled by the Finnish 
government.  Let’s even say it is the Finnish electricity monopoly, which 
runs a few power plants in Finland.  Now you’re not dealing with a 
privately-owned company, you’re dealing with the government, wearing the 
hat of a public enterprise, or a publicly-owned state-controlled entity.  And 
now you’re drafting your contract and you need to consider again what 
dispute resolution clause you include in it.  Would you consider litigation?  
We know that litigation in a third, neutral state may not be available, 
especially if that state applies modern forum non conveniens theories.  Still, 
you might consider litigating your dispute in the U.S., or in Finland.  
Someone mentioned that before.  Would you be happy, would you be 
comfortable, litigating in Finland?  No? Why not? 
Audience: I don’t think so.  The entity in this case is a government-
owned company.  You’re obviously going to be concerned about some sort 
of bias on the part of the judiciary in Finland. 
That is right.  However good the court record is in Finland, and it’s 
pretty outstanding, you’re still litigating before the courts which are of 
course an integral part of the same state against which you have a dispute.  
Let’s imagine that the government suddenly decides to cancel the contract 
for the acquisition of the turbines, for instance, because it has now decided 
to use only solar and wind energy.  If that happened, and as a result, the 
government tried to bail out from its contract and to avoid paying the 
turbines it was going to buy, would you be comfortable bringing your 
claims against Finland in Finland?  Well, you, as the general counsel of the 
turbine company, might have a hard time advising that litigating in Finland 
is the best option for your client. 
Now, conversely, can you expect to litigate this dispute here in the U.S.?  
Number one, the Finnish government is unlikely to agree to that.  Number 
two, would you be able to have a case conducted here in federal court 
against the Finnish government?  It is uncertain.  Depending on the nature 
of the case and the applicable provisions of, among others, the Foreign 
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Sovereign Immunities Act,6 the Finnish government may enter a special 
appearance in federal court and assert its sovereign immunity.  You’re 
familiar with sovereign immunity, aren’t you?  Ok, just raise your hands if 
you have any questions related to that. 
So essentially, that means that out of the two court litigation options that 
you might have in theory, neither is really good.  This way, arbitration 
suddenly becomes the most practical dispute resolution option for a contract 
of the type we have been discussing.  This is one of the reasons that 
arbitration has become a very popular dispute resolution option for disputes 
between foreign investors and states. 
I’m not going to enter into the details as to how you agree to an 
arbitration of this nature, but for the purposes of this presentation, it will 
suffice to say, that you can agree to an investment arbitration with Finland 
in two different instruments.  You can agree to it in the contract that you are 
drafting, or you can have an arbitration consent contained in one of the 
investment treaties that have been alluded to earlier during the seminar 
today.  So the constitution of the arbitral tribunal can come from two 
different sources, a treaty or an arbitration clause in a contract.  But until the 
early 1990’s, contracts were the usual source for arbitration consents in 
disputes between foreign investors and states.  In the last 20 years, however, 
bilateral investment treaties have become so widely used, I think there are 
close to 3,000 in force, that if you are an investor and do some planning and 
organization of your investment, you can obtain the protection of a bilateral 
investment treaty in a relatively easy manner.  Perhaps you may need to 
invest through a vehicle established in another jurisdiction, but the odds are 
that if you have the ability to do properly structure your investment, an 
investment treaty containing an arbitration consent will be available to you. 
Now, the investment arbitration system has been somewhat maligned in 
the last few years.  There has been criticism of sometimes bias in favor of 
the investor, sometimes excessive leniency in favor of the state.  I tend to 
agree with Rene,7 my practical experience is that still, to a degree, 
investment arbitration has not been as bad for states as sometimes argued by 
certain governments.  In commercial arbitration, for instance, you can easily 
see awards in amounts exceeding one billion dollars being issued in favor of 
one party.  And that’s virtually unheard of in the investment treaty and the 
investment arbitration system nowadays.  The largest awards are usually in 
the region of 300, 400 million dollars. 
In any event, despite some criticism of how the system works, the 
important thing I’d like you to remember is that sometimes arbitration is the 
only available, the only reasonable option for resolving investment disputes. 
Is there anyone here from Mexico, or anyone familiar with Mexico?  
O.K., thanks.  Between 1864 and 1867, Mexico had an emperor, 
  
 6. See 28 U.S.C. §§1602-1611 (2006)). 
 7. Rene Cardieux  
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Maximilian, from the Habsburg dynasty.  And he was not enthroned by the 
Mexican people, he was enthroned by Napoleon the Third, then Emperor of 
France.  Napoleon the Third, with support from the Spanish and the British 
fleets, invaded Mexico in 1861.  One of the reasons, the official one, given 
for the intervention was that Mexico had defaulted on its loans vis-à-vis 
some French private banks.  The government of Mexico had not repaid 
some loans that the French banks had made to the Mexican government. 
So here you have the classic investor-state type of dispute, in which the 
investor, back in the 19th century, had no specific remedy and had no 
standing to bring the dispute before an international forum.  His claims back 
then were simply taken or espoused by his home state, which pursued them 
if, how, and when it considered appropriate.  And in this case, Napoleon the 
Third, head of the investor’s home state decided to resolve the dispute his 
own way, by invading Mexico.  That was not an unusual occurrence in the 
19th and the earlier part of the 20th century.  In 1902, Britain, Germany, and 
Italy imposed a naval blockade on Venezuela until Venezuela made its then 
outstanding payments to bondholders from those nationalities. 
Later in the 20th century, investment disputes were sometimes resolved 
through trade wars and trade sanctions.  States then said: If I see that a 
foreign government is not repaying loans to my own nationals, what I’ll do 
is I’ll essentially raise import duties on the foreign goods coming from the 
state which failed to repay the loans.  Or I’ll no longer trade with that nation 
which has failed to repay my own nationals. 
So in some respects, when nowadays countries such as Bolivia or 
Ecuador make declarations to the effect that they may leave the foreign 
investment arbitration system, the risk is that there is no serious, effective 
alternative to a solid supranational mechanisms for the settlement of 
investment disputes.  You cannot go back to the — I won’t say the 19th 
century days —  but to the mid-20th century days during which trade 
sanctions and severe restrictions were frequently used.  Those sanctions and 
restrictions were oftentimes more damaging in economic terms for the host 
state than any adverse award that could be rendered in the foreign 
investment arbitration system.  So with all its imperfections, arbitration still 
remains an effective way to resolve investment disputes.  It may be 
perfected, it may be replaced with a supranational investment court, but it 
cannot be credibly buried without having an alternative in place. 
Now, one of the greatest upsides of the foreign investment arbitration 
system, as we know it, is that it affords standing to private companies to sue 
states directly.  This means that the resolution of the dispute is not done 
state-to-state, through gunboats, trade sanctions, etc. as in the 19th century 
and the earlier part of the 20th century. 
Until, essentially 1965, private companies couldn’t sue a foreign 
government in an international venue, if a foreign government had 
somehow failed to fulfill its contractual obligations, or somehow failed to 
abide by its international commitments vis-a-vis an investor.  That changed, 
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essentially, with the World Bank system.  Do you know, or are you familiar 
with, the World Bank system?  Do you know how it works in practice, the 
different agencies? 
Well, the World Bank is made up of different agencies.  Some work, and 
I use the term very loosely, some work as an insurance agency for investors 
who invest in certain countries, and provide insurance, for instance, for 
political risk.  And the World Bank also works as a lending institution, 
loaning money for developing countries, and loaning money for certain 
projects that may benefit developing countries.  But the World Bank also 
offers mediation and arbitration facilities.  The World Bank agency which 
runs these facilities is known as ICSID, the Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes.  And it works more or less like as an international 
arbitration and mediation institution.  With some significant differences 
given the particularities of the foreign investment system, ICSID works 
more or less in practice like, for instance, the Court of Arbitration of the 
ICC, the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, a major international 
arbitration provider.  A significant difference being, however, that while the 
ICC administers almost all types of international arbitrations, ICSID will 
only administer arbitration cases involving a sovereign state or a designated 
state entity and a foreign investor that is a private investor from a different 
country. 
Now ICSID was set up by means of the 1965 Washington Convention8 
which was devised by Aaron Broches.  Aaron Broches was a Dutch lawyer 
and the general counsel for the World Bank.  And he had this vision.  He 
thought that part of the problem, or part of the reason that investment was 
not really flowing abroad to developing countries, was that sometimes 
investors were afraid that if the government from a developing country 
didn’t repay the loan or the promissory note, if the government didn’t pay 
for the turbines, or if the government suddenly changed the rules of the 
game in the middle of the game by for instance, raising taxes by 80 percent, 
then they would have no direct remedy.  Investors would be left unprotected 
in a case like that.  They would have to resort to the government from their 
own country, tell it about the claim related to their investment and hope that 
the government of their country of origin would espouse that claim, and 
somehow decide to address it, diplomatically or otherwise, with the 
investment host state.  In practice, this meant that the investor frequently 
went unpaid and did not receive any effective reparation. 
So Aaron Broches thought that investors had to be granted standing to 
bring their own claims against states.  This idea was, of course, much easier 
to accept for host states, as it gave them a straightforward and more 
predictable dispute resolution path than the previous gunboat diplomacy and 
trade wars.  That’s how the current foreign investment arbitration 
  
 8. See Convention on the Settlement of the Investment Disputes Between States and 
the Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
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mechanism was established.  Now, this mechanism has been working and 
has been expanding, more or less on a regular basis, in the last forty years, 
with investment arbitrations becoming increasingly more frequent.  Its wide 
acceptance doesn’t mean that the system is flawless, but the system 
essentially adds some predictability to investment relations, as well as 
protections for both the investor and the host state. 
Now, I committed to talk a bit about the impact of the current economic 
crisis on international arbitration and arbitration for investors and states.  
How do you think the economic crisis is affecting the global dispute 
resolution system?  Do you think we are likely to have more disputes now 
that there’s a crisis (including more disputes between foreign investors and 
states), or do you think we are likely to see less?  What are your views on 
that? 
Audience: There will be more defaults on loans and things like that, so I 
think that as the economic crisis worsens, I think you’re going to see more 
disputes, more everything. 
That’s conventional wisdom, that in times of economic crisis you’ll see 
more defaults.  And companies and states have less money, so that they 
need to fight for every dime.  And the expectation is that you might see an 
increase in disputes.  I’ll get to that in a second.  Reality, however, is much 
more complex than conventional wisdom would have it.  I can give you an 
example.  The last six or seven years some governments in Latin America, 
Africa, the Middle East, and other regions in Asia have been engaged in 
what some people call petro-nationalism.  Many of these governments have 
large oil and gas fields.  Yet, they somehow lack the technology or the 
money to explore and produce oil and gas from those fields, so they’ve 
traditionally needed foreign investors to do that.  And, as a result, in many 
cases, those investors have entered into exploration and production sharing 
contracts with the government that had a duration of 20, 30, or even 40 
years. 
In recent years, however, some of these governments have decided to 
increase taxes and royalties for those contracts or to impose a renegotiation 
of them.  So now, some investors have to pay significantly higher taxes than 
what they had paid for earlier on.  In some cases, and I am not saying this is 
always true, but in some cases, these petro-nationalistic measures 
constituted a breach of international standards.  They may amount, for 
instance, to a breach of the unfair and inequitable treatment standard or of 
the expropriation standard set forth in many bilateral investment treaties.  
Now, when these breaches took place, some foreign companies had 
potential causes of action against the host governments which appeared to 
be breaching international law.  However, only a few companies actually 
brought claims for those breaches. 
In fact, many companies decided not to sue the host governments, 
because they said, “when we modeled these contracts, when we modeled 
these investments, oil prices were at $35 a barrel, or even lower.  We then 
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had these long-term production sharing agreements with the government, 
and we never thought oil prices would go higher than $55 a barrel.  Now it’s 
at $120, $130, so we’re making more money than we ever expected.  So 
yes, admittedly, the government is taking more money from us through 
taxes and otherwise than we thought it would, but on the other hand, we are 
still exceeding our best expectations, so we will probably preserve our long-
term deal with the government and not upset them by bringing claims 
against them.” 
Now, the situation has changed.  Those very same companies find 
themselves now in a situation in which the markets are lower and oil prices 
are sinking below the $55 per barrel level or below the levels at which they 
legitimately expected to operate.  So going back to John’s original point, 
that would support the idea that perhaps those companies would now 
reconsider, to the extent they still have claims under international law that 
have not been waived,  they might reconsider the decision not to sue a 
foreign government which is arbitrarily raising taxes, expropriating them, or 
treating them unfairly and inequitably.  Those companies’ revenues have 
been affected and are now below what they originally planned or 
legitimately expected to receive.  This is why dispute resolution long-term 
planning and the preservation of rights are always important.  Preserve your 
rights and claims now because later on you may end up deciding to exercise 
them. 
But the flip side, and what makes the whole situation very unpredictable, 
is that international arbitration cases are expensive (often exceeding five 
million dollars in fees and costs per party), and as I said before, in 
investment arbitration the awarded damages are not always as high as 
foreign investors would expect and are frequently entitled to.  When you’re 
the general counsel of a corporation, you usually have a limited budget for 
litigation.  If you’re a mid-size company, and you’re the general counsel, or 
the head of litigation, you might have five or seven million dollars for 
yearly budget for settling company disputes, and anything that exceeds that 
budget would be an extraordinary expense.  So, it might not be easy for a 
general counsel to move out from that framework.  And sometimes, foreign 
investment cases against a sovereign are very costly, and regrettably, under 
existing practices, there is no guarantee that you will be awarded costs even 
if you prevail, or that the damages in the award will get close to your actual 
loss or the amount you were claiming. 
Occasionally in purely contractual disputes you have a damages 
liquidation clause that somehow facilitates the calculation of damages a 
party is entitled to seek.  That, however, seldom happens in an investment 
dispute.  In an investment dispute, usually, and simplifying things very 
much, the measure of damages is the delta between what you actually 
obtained from your investment and what you would have been entitled to 
obtained if the government had not interfered with it or wiped it out. 
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That delta is complicated to calculate, especially for long-term contracts.  
I mean it’s hard to calculate the expected revenue of the foreign oil 
company which has a forty-year deal with the government, for the 
exploration and development of some oil fields that is suddenly and in the 
middle of its existence terminated or significantly taxed by the government.  
What is the amount of damages then?  Well, this figure depends on a vast 
number of factors, such as what are proven reserves from the field and how 
easy is it to produce oil found there?  Is it heavy crude?  Light crude? Hard 
to refine?  What would you expect oil prices to do during the remaining 
years of the contract?  Would they go up?  Would they go down? 
Add to that the complexity, in my view, the reluctance, from some 
investment tribunals to award large damages and the situation is made even 
more difficult.  For some arbitrators, in calculating the amount of damages, 
you should take into account the impact that the award may have on a 
state’s annual budget or the percentage it represents from the nation’s GDP.  
If the impact or the percentage is too large, well then, some arbitrators say, 
we should perhaps lower the amount of damages awarded.  This is a very 
problematic way to approach damages that, in my view, is not helping 
international arbitration nor is consistent with international law 
requirements. 
So, back to my original point, what I wanted to say is that it’s sometimes 
expensive to arbitrate these cases and the ultimate amount of damages you 
may get is uncertain.  And in times of crisis, it’s unclear which way 
companies will go.  The only way to make the system work, the only way to 
preserve the availability of international arbitration as an effective dispute 
resolution mechanism for investment disputes, is to ensure that the tribunals 
are more courageous than they have thus far been in awarding damages and 
allocating costs.  This means awarding the damages sustained by the 
claimant, however large or small, and ordering, more frequently, the losing 
party to pay all or most of the costs incurred by the winning party.  
Otherwise, at some point these cases will no longer make sense from an 
economic standpoint.  The cost-benefit analysis of bringing these cases, if 
things do not change, may continue to be negative. 
And this is a significant difference between commercial arbitration and 
investment arbitration.  Commercial arbitration cases involve two parties 
acting in their commercial capacity, meaning that neither is or has acted as a 
sovereign.  As I mentioned before, arbitration tribunals have traditionally 
been less reluctant than investment tribunals to award costs and large 
amounts of damages in commercial cases. 
Another significant difference between investment arbitration and 
commercial arbitration is that, in investment arbitration you probably see a 
lower settlement ratio.  I think that everyone might have a different 
experience, but mine is that about 50 to 60 or 65 percent of commercial 
disputes end up being settled at some point, before the final award is issued.  
However, I have seen significantly less settlements of investment disputes.  
2009] Foreign Investment Arbitration 141 
 
Can anyone guess why that happens, why sometimes it might be harder to 
settle an investment dispute with a sovereign? 
Audience: The valuation of what your investment is going to be worth is 
going to be so, I mean obviously the person who’s investing is going to 
have — they are probably going to be so far apart that it’s not, ever going to 
. . . . 
That is right.  That might be a factor, but that also happens in 
commercial disputes.  Can you think of other reasons? 
Audience: If you have a state party involved, then the state party might 
be less likely to settle with a merchant because they have . . . . 
Why should they be less likely to settle? 
Audience: Theoretically, the resources are where the party probably has 
more money. 
Well, it’s become very sophisticated already.  Several host states have 
many years of experience in arbitration and retain expensive and 
experienced law firms to represent them in investment cases.  I agree with 
both of what you said.  I think that bureaucracy, the complexities of the host 
states’ legal and political system, and also strategic gambits all play a role. 
Sometimes administrations say, “Well, if I settle this case, my voters are 
going to think that somehow I’ve sold my soul to foreign multinationals.  
They’re not going to be happy with me.  Whereas, if I let the case go by, 
well, I might lose, but then I can put the blame on foreign multilateral 
institutions, the World Bank, neo-colonialism and all that,” and you know, 
you might actually lose but no longer be in power by the time the final 
award comes down.  That’s happened in the past.  It takes sometimes three, 
four, five years to get an award, so by the time the government loses the 
cases the previous administration may no longer be in power and the 
problem would no longer be theirs.  I remember having settlement talks 
with a Latin American country, where we met with three different ministers 
of economy, and with five different ministers of development over a five 
year period.  So administrations keep changing, and the dispute is a hot 
potato that one administration keeps passing to the other. 
Additionally, a lot of countries, especially developing economies have 
strict accounting policies and aggressive district attorneys that sometimes 
use their power to participate in the political process.  Thus, if members of 
an administration agree to make a payment to a foreign corporation they can 
be audited and perhaps criminal charges may be brought against them, on 
real or artificial grounds, that they might be making an inappropriate use of 
public funds.  So settling a case might be a source of personal problems that 
some officials in certain countries may try to avoid. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following scenario:  Tori, a recording artist, creates a song in 
France, which is distributed in France and internationally through legal 
channels of commerce.  Tori’s song is protected from direct infringement by 
national laws, which are, in part, influenced by international copyright law.1  
Furthermore, national laws protect Tori’s song from vicarious or 
contributory infringement in France.2  Thereafter, a new internet technology 
is created that allows a user to download a file, called a torrent, from a 
website located in France.  The torrent file does not contain any of the 
copyrighted content of the song, but the file enables individual users across 
  
 * J.D., Michigan State University College of Law, 2009; B.A., University of 
Michigan, 2006.  Many thanks to Professor Sean Pager for his direction and commentary on 
the numerous drafts of this Article. 
 1. For example, France has been a signatory to the Berne Convention since 1887.  
World Intellectual Property Organization, Contracting Parties, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ 
en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15 (last visited Oct. 8, 2009) [hereinafter WIPO Contracting 
Parties]. 
 2. For instance, Article 1382 of the French Civil Code provides, “Any act whatever 
of man, which causes damage to another, obliges the one by whose fault it occurred, to 
compensate it.”  Code civil [C. CIV.] art. 1382 (Fr.).  This article provides the basis for 
secondary liability in France.  See also J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW 511–12 
(2d ed. 2003). 
144 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 18:1 
 
the globe to access and download the copyrighted material free of charge 
from each other.  Upon learning of the website and its ability to facilitate 
copyright infringement, Tori is furious because she fears that her sales will 
fall due to mass illegal distribution of her song. 
The recording industry representing Tori sends a threatening cease-and-
desist letter to the owner and operator of the website, Frank, frightening him 
enough to retain legal counsel.  Frank’s counsel researches a forum to host 
the website that might be more lenient on the website’s facilitation of 
copyright infringement.  Frank’s counsel discovers that the Ukraine could 
provide an excellent safe haven for Frank because the Ukraine does not 
recognize any form of secondary liability for copyright infringement.  Frank 
acts on his counsel’s advice, and moves his host to the Ukraine.  Since the 
files on Frank’s website do not contain copyrighted material, Frank is safe 
from liability to Tori in the Ukraine.  Furthermore, due to the fact that 
Frank’s website host is located in the Ukraine, Tori does not have any legal 
recourse against Frank elsewhere. 
Frank’s website obtains worldwide publicity, and he openly flaunts the 
fact that the website facilitates rampant copyright infringement and that 
nothing can be done to stop him.  Users in the United States, Australia, 
Canada, and almost any nation with internet access can download Tori’s 
song from other torrent users without purchasing it.  Tori could seek legal 
remedies against these individual users, but there are millions of them and 
many would be difficult to track down.3  Due to these unfortunate 
circumstances, Tori loses an immeasurable amount of income for a song she 
spent a large amount of time and energy to create.  Tori is not alone.  There 
are hundreds of artists of many nationalities whose copyrighted works are 
illegally shared by users in many nations, all through the same hub. 
This hypothetical scenario has occurred in reality and will continue to 
occur until something is done to stop it.  Demonoid,4 one of the larger 
BitTorrent5 trackers, was originally located in the Netherlands before 
moving to Canada after legal threats from the Dutch anti-piracy group 
BREIN.6  In Canada, however, Demonoid was forced to block all Canadian 
user traffic before eventually facing additional legal threats from the 
Canadian Recording Industry Association (CRIA).7  Instead of fighting the 
  
 3. This is especially true recently because software (e.g., Ipredator) has been made 
available on a mass scale which enables a user to become “anonymous” so that others cannot 
see the user’s individual Internet Protocol address.  This in turn makes prosecuting direct 
infringement exponentially more difficult.  See Pirate Bay Gains from the Swedish Law 
Against Them, SOFTSAILOR, Apr. 9, 2009, http://www.softsailor.com/news/1259-pirate-bay-
gains-from-the-swedish-law-against-them.html. 
 4. Demonoid.com, http://www.demonoid.com/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2009). 
 5. BitTorrent technology will be explained in more detail, infra Part II. 
 6. Ernesto, Demonoid Shut Down by the CRIA?, TORRENTFREAK, Sept. 25, 2007, 
http://torrentfreak.com/demonoid-shut-down-by-cria-070925/. 
 7. Ernesto, Demonoid Returns, Forced to Block Canadian Traffic by CRIA, 
TORRENTFREAK, Sept. 30, 2007, http://torrentfreak.com/demonoid-returns-070930/.  
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CRIA in Canadian courts, Demonoid moved to the Ukraine where the 
copyright laws are more favorable.8  This is just a sample case, illustrative 
of a torrent distribution website’s ability to forum shop for a more lenient 
forum of laws; however, a number of other torrent websites, such as The 
Pirate Bay,9 have followed similar paths. 
This Article illustrates the need for international harmonization and 
minimum standards of substantive secondary liability law.  Part II of this 
article provides a brief overview of the most recent file-sharing technology 
in the form of BitTorrent.  Part III examines the current state of 
international treaties relating to copyright law, looks at a spectrum of 
national laws relating to secondary liability, and briefly discusses other 
solutions to illegal file-sharing.  Part IV calls for a multi-lateral treaty 
containing provisions that establish a minimum standard for secondary 
liability.  It also analyzes the potential pitfalls of such a treaty and suggests 
an outline of the treaty that addresses these concerns and minimum 
standards. 
International copyright law has expressly addressed direct copyright 
infringement.  However, it woefully lacks in its ability to bring legal action 
against secondary copyright infringers.  Likewise, technological solutions 
and national solutions have failed to curb rampant file-sharing.  In order to 
allow international copyright law to continue to be effective and for 
copyright infringement through file-sharing to be stopped, secondary 
liability must be implemented on an international level in the form of a 
multi-lateral treaty.  If secondary copyright infringement is not adequately 
addressed, there are broader potential consequences, including the death of 
effective copyright protection.  BitTorrent and similar technologies enable 
copyright infringement to occur on a massive scale.  Despite the existence 
of copyright laws addressing direct infringement, it is incredibly difficult to 
enforce those laws against every infringer.10  Without international 
secondary liability laws in place, the facilitators of mass copyright 
infringement will likely not be stopped.  If the facilitators of mass 
  
 8. Ernesto, Demonoid Tracker Moves to Ukraine, TORRENTFREAK, Mar. 16, 2008, 
http://torrentfreak.com/demonoid-tracker-moves-to-ukraine-080316/. 
 9. See The Pirate Bay, http://thepiratebay.org/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2009). 
 10. “When a widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it may 
be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, 
the only practical alternative being to go against the distributor of the copying device for 
secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement.”  MGM Studios 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929–30 (2005).  For instance, in the United States, the 
RIAA has sued thousands of direct copyright infringers.  See, e.g., eLaw & Management, 
RIAA Sues 784 Alleged Copyright Infringers, LEGALBRIEF TODAY, July 6, 2005, 
http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story=20050706091217719.  However, for the 
Demonoid.com website alone, U.S. visitors represent over thirty-five percent of the website’s 
user traffic.  See DomainTools, Whois Record for Demonoid.com, http://whois.domaintools. 
com/demonoid.com (last visited Apr. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Demonoid Whois].  See infra 
Part III.B. 
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infringement are allowed to continue, copyright law will be left weakened 
on the whole, if not irrelevant.11 
II.   BRIEF OVERVIEW OF BITTORRENT TECHNOLOGY 
BitTorrent technology facilitates a specific form of file-sharing.  It 
involves a few important pieces: a music/movie/software file, the BitTorrent 
software client, “seeders” and “leechers” (combined, referred to as “peers”), 
torrent files, and trackers.12  A person seeking a song, for instance, must 
have a BitTorrent software client13 installed on his computer and then must 
search for a torrent file on a website.14  The user downloads the torrent file 
and opens it using the BitTorrent client.  The client then uses the tracker to 
locate “seeders,” which have either the entire song file or pieces of the song 
file.  The client proceeds to download pieces of the song file from the 
“seeders” until the entire song is downloaded.15  The client also 
simultaneously uploads pieces of the file already downloaded to other 
“peers” seeking that file.  In this way, the technology is extremely efficient 
because there is a large swarm of peers simultaneously transmitting pieces 
of the file, instead of one central server sending the entire file to each 
individual downloader. 
Under U.S. law, the programmers of the BitTorrent software clients are 
not liable for direct, contributory, or vicarious copyright infringement, as 
long as the software client is marketed for legitimate purposes and not 
receiving any commercial income from the software client.  Basically, 
BitTorrent clients are analogous to VCRs in Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal Studios, Inc., where the court found VCRs to be not liable for 
contributory copyright infringement.16  Therefore, the main potential 
infringers from BitTorrent technology are the websites that hold the torrent 
files for download (secondary liability) and the “peers” (direct 
infringement). 
  
 11. Tracking down individual infringers will only become more difficult, as new 
software programs have been created and distributed that hide the user’s Internet Protocol 
address, without which the RIAA and similar groups have no way to track the transfer of 
copyrighted files from an individual computer.  See Kerstin Sjoden, The Pirate Bay’s 
Anonymity Service Signs 100,000 Users Pre-Launch, WIRED, Apr. 8, 2009, 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/04/the-pirate-bays/. 
 12. See generally Chamith Kumarage’s Guide for Systems Administrators, How 
BitTorrent Works, Oct. 19, 2008, http://saguide.wordpress.com/2008/10/19/how-bittorrent-
works/ [hereinafter BitTorrent Guide]. 
 13. There are a number of clients: µTorrent, Azureus, and BitComet, just to name a 
few. 
 14. BitTorrent Guide, supra note 12. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) 
(holding that the Sony-created VCRs were not liable for secondary infringement because the 
VCRs had legitimate purposes and Sony held no control over the VCR after the first sale of 
the unit). 
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There are a number of different players involved in the process of file-
sharing using BitTorrent technology.  This Part of the Article has already 
discussed two of the major players: the programmers of the client software 
and the users that “seed” or download pieces of a file.  Note that these 
programmers and the users “seeding” or downloading the pieces of the file 
can be physically located anywhere in the world.  Additionally, the website 
that allows visitors to download torrent files usually runs a “tracker,” which 
directs a user’s computer to other computers with pieces of the file that is 
being sought.17  Finally, in order for the copyrighted work to be made into a 
transferable file, a user must “rip” the file from a DVD, CD, or other form 
of media, create a torrent file connected to the “ripped” file (and also 
pointing to a tracker), and upload that torrent file to a torrent website.18  
These various actors will be revisited in greater depth later in this Article.19 
III.   EXISTING SOLUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
A number of different potential solutions have been implemented at 
various levels in an attempt to curb copyright infringement through file-
sharing.  These solutions have come at international, national, and 
technological levels, but none have effectively stalled copyright 
infringement through file-sharing.  While some have accomplished more 
than others in the area of direct infringement, very few solutions have 
focused on secondary infringers, such as torrent websites.  This lack of 
attention has allowed for the facilitation of direct infringement through 
torrent websites. 
Considering the relative failures of each of the existing solutions to 
international copyright infringement, the argument is reinforced for a multi-
lateral treaty addressing secondary liability in international copyright law as 
a wholly necessary, and furthermore, an entirely appropriate solution.  The 
failure of these existing solutions is what merits removing national 
sovereignty in defining secondary liability in copyright and replacing that 
sovereignty, at least to a degree, with an obligating international 
definition.20 
  
 17. See Carmen Carmack, How BitTorrent Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, Mar. 26, 
2005, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/bittorrent2.htm. 
 18. For a description of how to create a torrent file see Ernesto, How to Create a 
Torrent?, TORRENTFREAK, Mar. 23, 2006, http://torrentfreak.com/how-to-create-a-torrent/. 
 19. See infra Part IV.B. 
 20. For a more in depth discussion of national sovereignty, the subsidiarity principle, 
and federalism, as wagered against a new multilateral treaty on secondary liability in 
copyright, see infra Part IV. 
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A.   The Failures of Current Treaties and Conventions 
The Berne Convention (“Berne”), while not the first copyright treaty, is a 
landmark copyright agreement.21  Berne’s most important contribution to 
international copyright law was the creation of national treatment for 
copyright.  Berne established that “[t]he works mentioned in [Article 2] 
shall enjoy protection in all countries” that sign and ratify it.22  However, 
until relatively recently, a number of nations did not assent to and ratify 
Berne, most notably the People’s Republic of China and the Russian 
Federation.23  Due to these nations’ refusal to accede to Berne, the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPs”) was created in 1994 with hopes of bringing a larger number of 
nations into copyright law harmony.24  “[T]he substantive standards of 
Berne (articles 1–21 and the Appendix) are incorporated directly into the 
TRIPs Agreement.”25  Since TRIPs is associated with the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”), enforcement mechanisms for implementing the 
treaty are already in place.  The WTO already has a dispute settlement 
process in place, and it authorizes trade retaliation against uncooperative 
members,26 both of which streamline the transition to TRIPs. 
Berne and TRIPs both provide a number of positive contributions to 
international copyright law, but are lacking in any provisions relating to 
secondary liability.  The result of this simple fact is that torrent distribution 
websites are unaffected by any international agreement.  Plainly stated, 
Berne and TRIPs have not kept up with technological advances, especially 
internet advances. 
While the aforementioned agreements were successful in establishing 
minimum rights “within the traditional copyright categories of rights of 
reproduction and distribution, and of communication to the public,” the 
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (“WCT”) of 
  
 21. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 
1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended on Sept. 29, 1979, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 
828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
 22. Id.  This provision is referred to as “national treatment.”  See generally SAM 
RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: 
THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 295–301 (2d ed. 2006). 
 23. The Berne Convention entered into force with respect to the People’s Republic of 
China on Oct. 15, 1992.  WIPO Contracting Parties, supra note 1.  It entered into force with 
respect to the Russian Federation on Mar. 13, 1995.  Id.  Additionally, the United States did 
not become a signatory to Berne until Mar. 1, 1989.  Id.   
 24. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 
I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs].  The agreement also extended to other areas 
of intellectual property, including patents and trademarks.  Id. 
 25. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 22, at 158.  However, Article 6 bis, 
pertaining to moral rights, is excluded from TRIPs.   Id. at 159. 
 26. See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2009). 
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1996 extended enforcement beyond traditional borders.27  Articles 11 and 12 
of the WCT added a digital dimension to international copyright law.28  
These provisions relate to Digital Rights Management (“DRM”), direct 
trafficking of copyrighted works, and expand upon the basis laid out by 
Berne and TRIPs, but they do little to provide a cause of action against 
torrent distribution websites.  This is because torrent distribution websites 
do not traffic any copyrighted works directly. 
International law completely lacks in the area of secondary liability, and 
therefore, fails to address the problem of mass copyright infringement 
through torrent distribution websites.  There are, however, many individual 
nations with laws in place that do address the problem.  But, as the 
following Part will illustrate, these laws are inconsistent and in gross need 
of harmonization, as they span a broad spectrum of coverage from strict to 
lenient enforcement.  If these laws are not harmonized, copyright 
infringement may perpetually persist on an international scale through 
torrent distribution websites. 
B.   The Many National Flavors of Secondary Liability 
Both Canada and the United Kingdom focus on aspects of authorization 
and control when it comes to assessing liability.29  In the United Kingdom: 
A person does not necessarily authorise an act to be done merely because 
he intentionally puts into another’s hands the means by which the 
infringing act can be done if those means can also be used for a perfectly 
legitimate purpose, even where it is known that they will in fact inevitably 
be used for an infringing purpose.  This will be particularly so if the 
supplier has no control over how the means will be used, since it is the 
essence of a grant or purported grant that the grantor has some degree of 
actual or apparent right to control the relevant actions of the grantee.30 
Under U.K. law, “authorizing someone else to commit an infringing act 
is itself direct copyright infringement.”31  In Canada, “authorization . . . 
  
 27. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 
I.L.M. 65, (1997) [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty]. 
 28. For an in depth analysis of WCT Articles 11 and 12, see generally RICKETSON & 
GINSBURG, supra note 22, at 964–93. 
 29. See Lynda J. Oswald, International Issues in Secondary Liability for Intellectual 
Property Rights Infringement, 45 AM. BUS. L. J. 247, 268–69 (2008). 
 30. COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT 471 (Kevin Garnett et al. eds., 14th 
ed. 1999) (quoting CBS, Inc. v. Ames Records & Tapes Ltd., [1981] Ch. 91, at 95 (U.K.), 
“[T]here is no authorisation where . . . the defendant is in no position to control the conduct 
of the person alleged to have been authorised.”). 
 31. Oswald, supra note 29, at 268 (citing STERLING, supra note 2, at 211). 
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requires a demonstration that the defendant did give approval to; sanction, 
permit; favor, encourage.”32 
In Australia, “secondary liability for copyright is primarily statutory in 
origin.”33  Like U.K. law, authorization qualifies as direct infringement 
under Australian law.34  The Federal Court of Australia heard a case very 
similar to Grokster,35 Universal Music Australia v. Sharman License 
Holdings, and came to a similar decision.36 The only difference was that 
instead of closing down the site, the Australian court allowed Sharman to 
modify its system “in a targeted way, so as to protect the applicants’ 
copyright interests (as far as possible) but without unnecessarily intruding 
on others’ freedom of speech and communication.”37  Although there are 
variances in the degree of punishment for offenses, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Australia all have implemented relatively strict laws which, 
comparatively speaking, have been effective against copyright 
infringement.38  However, despite these laws, a simple search of the 
WHOIS information associated with the popular Demonoid.com torrent 
website shows that six percent of the visitors to the website are from the 
United Kingdom, almost four percent are from Canada, and more than three 
percent are from Australia.39  While these percentages may appear low, they 
represent the third, fourth, and fifth most common visitors to the website.40  
These visitors may not be illegally obtaining copyrighted material using 
domestic websites, but they are, nonetheless, obtaining copyrighted material 
illegally by transcending national borders via the Internet. 
Whether there is a statutory basis for secondary liability in copyright 
infringement in the United States is debated.41  Some scholars argue that the 
  
 32. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Canadian Assoc. of 
Internet Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, 2004 SCC 45, ¶¶ 122, 127 (Can.). 
 33. Oswald, supra note 29, at 274. 
 34. “Direct infringement . . . occurs when a person ‘does . . . or authorizes the 
doing’” and “[a]uthorization occurs when a person ‘sanctions, approves or countenances’ 
another’s doing of an act that would [constitute] direct infringement.”  Id. (citing Australian 
Copyright Act, 1968, §§ 36, 101 (Austl.)). 
 35. See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929-30 (2005).   
 36. See Universal Music Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd., 
(2005)  220 A.L.R. 1, ¶¶ 517–26 (Austl.). 
 37. Id. at ¶ 520. 
 38. BitTorrent websites which receive a large amount of traffic are almost entirely 
absent from these countries.  See Araditracker BitTorrent Site Shutdown After Legal Action, 
TORRENTFREAK, Aug. 29, 2008, http://torrentfreak.com/araditracker-bittorrent-site-
shutdown-after-legal-action-080829/ (reporting on a torrent site which was shut down in the 
U.K. and Canada). 
 39. Demonoid Whois, supra note 10. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See Brief  for Sixty Intellectual Property and Technology Law Professors and the 
United States Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computing Machinery as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005) (No. 04-480), reprinted in 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 552  (2005) (arguing that the 
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phrase, “the owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights to do and to 
authorize,”42 creates a statutory basis for secondary liability.43  Regardless, 
the leading case in the United States dealing with secondary liability, at 
least as it pertains to the situation that this Article is addressing, is MGM 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.44  The Grokster court found the Grokster 
software program creators liable for copyright infringement because the 
makers showed intent to induce infringement.45  Interestingly, a group 
calling itself “International Rights Owners” (“IRO”) filed a brief in support 
of MGM and cited U.S. international treaty obligations as the source for the 
Grokster court to find liability.46  Specifically, the IRO argued that Article 
41(1) of TRIPs gave nations the ability to enforce copyright through 
“expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which 
constitute a deterrent to further infringements.”47  However, this Article 
“deals purely with enforcement and procedural issues and does not deal 
with substantive obligations.”48  Clearly, as established above, no such 
international obligation exists.  Another amicus brief filed by Sharman 
Networks argued this point: 
[E]loquently stated . . . ‘[t]he IRO’s belief that [the U.S. Supreme] Court 
should concern itself with trade policy, diplomacy, the raising of 
international norms in America’s interest, and the setting of precedents for 
foreign jurisprudence not only goes well beyond the mandate of even this 
Court, it usurps the role of Congress and has no constitutional 
underpinnings.’49 
  
phrase “to authorize” in 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002) “is an exceptionally thin reed on which to 
premise secondary liability”). 
 42. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002). 
 43. Brief for United States Senator Patrick Leahy and United States Senator Orrin G. 
Hatch as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 7, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 
545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2005 WL 152923. 
 44. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 913.  The Supreme Court dealt with secondary liability in 
copyright pertaining to VCRs some years before Grokster in Sony Corp. v. Universal City 
Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). However, Grokster pertains to file-sharing software somewhat 
similar or analogous to torrents (as it is essentially the direct predecessor to torrent 
technology).  545 U.S. at 913. 
 45. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937–40. 
 46. Brief for International Rights Owners as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2004 WL 2569686 
(citing TRIPs and the WIPO Copyright Treaty, among other international obligations). 
 47. TRIPs, supra note 24, art. 41(1) (emphasis added). 
 48. Brief for Sharman Networks Ltd. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 
7, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2005 WL 508106 
[hereinafter Sharman Networks Brief]. 
 49. Oswald, supra note 29, at 265 (citing Sharman Networks Brief, supra note 48). 
152 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 18:1 
 
Sharman Networks made a valid point, and one that the Grokster Court 
may not have considered strongly enough.50  While secondary liability in 
copyright in the United States based in statute is still hotly debated, case law 
has served to step in and attempt to cover the area of law.51  However, as 
with the nations mentioned above, the United States eradicated illegal 
torrent distribution websites from its own soil, and yet still contains a large 
number of infringing users.  For example, the Demonoid.com WHOIS 
information shows that the United States ranks first in number of visitors to 
the Demonoid torrent site, representing over thirty-five percent of the 
website’s visitors.52  Despite reasonable domestic efforts to curb 
infringement, users in the United States can and do simply use internet 
servers in more lenient nations to illegally obtain copyrighted material. 
In contradiction to those nations with seemingly strict copyright laws, 
there are some nations that provide safe havens for torrent distribution 
websites and direct infringers alike.  Some nations, such as Sweden, have 
not fully established a position against secondary liability.  Recently, 
Sweden sentenced four persons associated with the popular BitTorrent 
website, The Pirate Bay, to a year in prison.53  While the verdict was a 
victory for copyright holders, it was based solely on the intent of the 
website’s creators to commit infringement, and was entirely against them 
individually, not against the website itself.54  At the time of writing this 
Article, The Pirate Bay continues to operate, and does not appear to be in 
jeopardy.55  If Sweden had substantive laws on its books relating to 
secondary liability in copyright, The Pirate Bay would probably be a clear-
cut case — The Pirate Bay clearly engages in secondary infringement of 
copyright, and it further openly flaunts the fact that it can continue to do 
  
 50. For a more in depth discussion of Grokster and the Amici Curiae Briefs filed in 
Grokster, see Oswald, supra note 29, at 259–66. 
 51. A bill was introduced in the Senate relating to secondary liability in copyright 
infringement.  Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. 
(2004).  It stated that whoever intentionally induces any copyright infringement shall be 
liable as an infringer.  Id.  However the bill was not enacted.  See id.  Passage of such a bill 
would provide a more explicit statutory presence in the area of secondary liability and a true 
definition for the courts to adhere. 
 52. Demonoid Whois, supra note 10. 
 53. The Pirate Bay, supra note 9; Cora Nucci, Pirate Bay Verdict: Founders 
Sentenced to Jail, Fined, INFORMATIONWEEK, Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.informationweek. 
com/news/internet/policy/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=216600196&cid=iwhome_art_Inter_
mostpop. 
 54. Enigmax, Pirate Bay Trial Day 7: Screenshots for Evidence, TORRENTFREAK, 
Feb. 24, 2009, http://torrentfreak.com/pirate-bay-trial-day-7-screenshots-for-evidence-
090224/. 
 55. Other articles have addressed The Pirate Bay and Sweden and the fact that “the 
issue of secondary liability for copyright infringement has not yet been tested by a Swedish 
court.”  Ulric M. Lewen, Note, Internet File-Sharing: Swedish Pirates Challenge the U.S., 16 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 173, 188 (2008). 
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so.56  Until Sweden’s laws change, The Pirate Bay will likely continue to 
operate its web servers from Sweden. 
Spain, like Sweden, is somewhat murky in its approach to torrent sites 
and secondary liability.  One of Spain’s largest BitTorrent sites, 
TodoTorrente.com, was shut down for copyright infringement, only to be 
exonerated on appeal within a year.57  Furthermore, it is legal in Spain to 
provide hyperlinks to copyrighted material.58  The fact that Western nations, 
like Sweden and Spain, have allowed for file-sharing as a result of lax laws 
on secondary liability is interesting.  One would almost expect lenient 
copyright laws from more underdeveloped nations, where there are fewer 
artists and copyright holders with international followings; but Spain, which 
has produced popular artists such as Enrique Iglesias, has a larger stake in 
the copyrighted material of its domestic artists.  This leniency allows users 
in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, and many 
other nations with strict copyright laws to continue committing willful 
direct infringement of copyrights worldwide.  With stricter laws in place in 
these specific nations, users would not be able to infringe as easily. 
C.   Business Models and Technological Solutions 
Outside of statutorily-based legal solutions, there are also solutions that 
have been tested and implemented with the goal of curbing illegal file-
sharing of copyrighted material.  Success of these solutions, standing alone, 
has been mild at best.  This Subsection will briefly discuss three: copyright 
levies, Digital Rights Management (“DRM”) and watermarking, and 
legitimate business models of file-sharing. 
Copyright levies are not a new idea.  They have been proposed 
separately and in varying forms by William Fisher and Neil Netanel.59  
While the two scholars differ in the scope of their respective plans, each 
plan has a common element: government taxes on copying devices (CD and 
DVD burners, Digital Video Recorders, etc.) and on recording media (blank 
CDs, DVDs, and hard disk-based devices such as mp3 players).  Levies also 
have existed for internet access — taxing of Internet Service Providers 
  
 56. The Pirate Bay has received numerous legal threats and openly makes humorous 
responses to such legal threats.  The Pirate Bay, Legal Threats Against The Pirate Bay, 
http://thepiratebay.org/legal (last visited Sept. 23, 2009). 
 57. Enigmax, BitTorrent Sites Step Closer to Legality in Spain, TORRENTFREAK, 
Nov. 4, 2008, http://torrentfreak.com/bittorrent-sites-step-closer-to-legality-in-spain-081104/. 
 58. Enigmax, Linking to P2P Downloads Confirmed Legal in Spain, 
TORRENTFREAK, Sep. 19, 2008, http://torrentfreak.com/linking-to-p2p-downloads-
confirmed-legal-in-spain-080919/. 
 59. See generally WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, 
AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a 
Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 
(2003); Salil K. Mehra, The iPod Tax: Why the Digital Copyright System of American Law 
Professors’ Dreams Failed in Japan, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 421 (2008). 
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(“ISPs”).60  The proceeds of these taxes are distributed to artists in some 
manner.  While copyright levies are certainly useful to guarantee copyright 
owners constant income, the levies are arguably overbroad and discriminate 
against innocent internet and blank media users.  Many internet users do not 
engage in illegal file-sharing.  Further, many of them use legitimate pay-for 
services, such as iTunes, and legally place the songs they purchase on an 
iPod.  Why should individuals who are buying licenses to copyright 
materials be forced to pay the price for the illegal actions of others?61 
A popular technological solution to the BitTorrent file-sharing problem 
is implementing DRM.  DRM technology is attached to a file and controls 
access to and use of the file.62  While DRM technology is useful, the 
practical result is that “all DRM systems, no matter how sophisticated, face 
the likelihood of being cracked by ‘computer geeks’ across the globe.”63  
Furthermore, DRM systems “also may limit legitimate use”64 because 
“DRM systems can thwart the exercise of fair use rights and other copyright 
privileges [and] compel users to view content they would prefer to avoid 
(such as commercials and FBI warning notices), thus exceeding copyright’s 
bounds.”65  Due in part to these issues, watermark technology was 
invented.66  “At its most precise, a watermark could encode a unique serial 
number that a music company could match to the original purchase.”67  
“Digital watermarking is the process by which identifying data is woven 
into media content . . . giving [that content] a unique, digital identity.”68  In 
the context of BitTorrent, watermarks can be placed on individual broken 
up pieces of a file, but the same major DRM problem exists with 
  
 60. See Lewen, supra note 55, at 197. 
 61. Narrowing the scope of ISP levies to those that actively file-share would be 
preferable, “[h]owever, such a modification would, of course, require monitoring, and the 
fees would have to be even higher since fewer people would pay into the system.”  Id. at 198.  
Furthermore, at least some of the proceeds would likely be paid out to the pornographic 
industry, which may cause publicity concerns.  Id. 
 62. Id. at 200. 
 63. Id. at 201–02. 
 64. Id. at 201. 
 65. Pamela Samuelson, DRM {and, or, vs..} the Law, 46 COMM. OF THE ACM 41, 42 
(2003). 
 66. David Kravets, DRM is Dead, but Watermarks Rise from Its Ashes, WIRED, Jan. 
11, 2008, available at http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2008/01/ 
sony_music. 
 67. Id.  (describing how watermarks are a form of “soft DRM,” except that 
watermarks “do not restrict listeners from making backup copies or sharing music with 
friends, as does DRM coding.”). 
 68. Digital Watermarking Alliance, Quick Facts, http://www.digitalwatermarking 
alliance.org/quickfacts.asp (last visited Sept. 24, 2009). 
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watermarks: watermarks can be cracked, hacked, or otherwise 
circumvented.69 
Finally, new business models have emerged which facilitate a legitimate 
form of file-sharing.  The most popular example of this business model is 
Apple’s iTunes store.  Users can download iTunes software for free from 
Apple’s website.  Then, users can purchase songs from the iTunes store for 
ninety-nine cents each.  This business model is not without drawbacks.  
Ninety-nine cents is a relatively expensive price for a song, when an 
individual song’s worth is entirely subjective.70  Additionally, iTunes 
generally contains a lesser variety of available content versus peer-to-peer 
services, and therefore, may be less useful to some potential users.71  While 
this type of business model is certainly something to continue to consider 
and revise, in its current state it is not enough to curb illegal file sharing.72 
IV.   THE NEED FOR A NEW MULTILATERAL TREATY – THE FIRST STEP TO 
SOLVING INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
A.   Reasoning Behind a New Multilateral Treaty 
The previous Part of this Article illustrated the extensive failures of 
various legal, technological, and business solutions to international 
copyright infringement.  It is the failure of these solutions that creates the 
necessity for a new multilateral treaty that seeks to harmonize substantive 
national laws relating to secondary liability in copyright.  As is usually the 
case in international law, most nations are not quick to accede to treaties 
because treaties call on those nations to give up a degree of sovereignty and 
alter their substantive law to conform to other nations.73  Therefore, it is 
appropriate to analyze the principles that necessitate, in this case, giving up 
this sovereignty. 
In the United States, this principle is known as federalism, where many 
areas of law are left to the states, which are more adept to acting as a “Petri 
dish.”  As Judge Brandeis aptly stated, “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of 
  
 69. See Ed Felton, How Watermarks Fail, FREEDOM TO TINKER, Feb. 24, 2006, 
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/how-watermarks-fail (explaining various 
potential methods to circumvent digital watermark technology). 
 70. Sean Silverthorne, Delivering the Digital Goods: iTunes vs. Peer-to-Peer, Apr. 
16, 2007, http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/5594.html.  
 71. Id. 
 72. Over one billion songs have been purchased and downloaded from the iTunes 
music store; however, there are “an estimated ten million users of Internet-based peer-to-peer 
(p2p) networks logged on at any one time to swap music.”  Id. 
 73. For instance, the United States was initially unwilling to accede to Berne because 
of the provisions relating to Moral Rights directly conflicting with the Freedom of Speech in 
the U.S. Constitution, differences in copyright term, and a lack of any formalities as a 
prerequisite to copyright protection (the United States required notice and deposit, whereas 
Berne did not).  EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT (2000). 
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the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, 
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”74  In essence, the creation of new 
laws defaults to the individual states, unless the federal government steps in.  
Certain areas of law are limited to the federal government.  One of these is 
copyright law.75 
Analogous to the principle of federalism, the European Community has a 
“subsidiarity” principle.76  The Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (“EC Treaty”) sets out the definition of the subsidiarity 
principle and its application to future EU action: 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community 
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if 
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or 
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.77 
The definition is further explored in Protocol on the Application of the 
Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality annexed to the EC Treaty.78  
The Protocol, in addition to reiterating the provision from Article 5, sets out 
a number of guidelines to use in determining whether the conditions in 
Article 5 are fulfilled: 
- [T]he issue under consideration has transnational aspects which cannot 
be satisfactorily regulated by action by Member States; 
- [A]ctions by Member States alone or lack of Community action would 
conflict with the requirements of the Treaty . . . or would otherwise 
significantly damage Member States’ interest; 
  
 74. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 75. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering the U.S. Congress “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).  Federal 
copyright law preempts any state copyright law in the United States.  17 U.S.C. § 301(a). 
 76. Consolidated version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 5, 
2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, 42 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 308 (annexed to the consolidated versions of the Treaty 
on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European Community) [hereinafter 
EC Treaty Protocol 30]. 
2009] Eradication of a Secondary Infringer's Safe Havens 157 
 
- [A]ction at Community level would produce clear benefits by reason of 
its scale or effects compared with action at the level of the Member 
States.79 
There is one problem with diverse approaches to international copyright: 
in practice, these diverse approaches are not successfully protecting 
copyright, therefore, weakening copyright law on the whole.  As illustrated 
by the previous Parts of this Article, if a torrent distribution website faces 
legal threats in a given country, it can simply be physically moved to 
another country with more lenient laws.  Furthermore, users across the 
planet can access these torrent files and continue to commit willful direct 
infringement of copyrights by downloading copyrighted materials.  This 
process represents an end run around the national systems of copyright. 
Due to the fact that torrent sites can effectively forum shop for more 
lenient laws, something must be done in the international legal community 
to draw a greater number of nations across the globe into a unified set of 
international copyright laws.80  If this does not happen, users in every nation 
will continue to be able to download copyrighted material at will.81  It is 
BitTorrent’s ability to transcend physical borders of nations that forces the 
necessity for an international solution.  An international copyright solution 
would be effective in unifying national standards through existing 
international means,82 and therefore, would be effective in closing the door 
to the end run around national systems of copyright. 
The reasoning for a treaty focused on international secondary liability is 
not all that different from the reasoning behind the Berne Convention; it is 
merely the next step in the form of a response to a newer technology.  Berne 
came about as a result of the lack of national boundaries: 
[t]he printed word, the musical composition, and the artistic creation know 
no national boundaries.  They may just as readily be appreciated by the 
citizens of one country as by those of another, even where translation into 
another language . . . is necessary for this potential to be fully realized.83 
  
 79. Id. at 309. 
 80. Especially the modernized nations with the infrastructure to provide persons with 
the Internet and other related technologies necessary to commit infringement on the broad 
scale laid out in this article. 
 81. Organizations such as the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) 
have focused their efforts mainly on those who upload or “share” copyrighted material, not 
those that download the material.  Therefore, users of torrent websites, such as Pisexy.org, 
which give “upload credits” to users who donate money to the server voluntarily (note that 
some torrent websites require a reasonable download to upload ratio for a user, to be allowed 
to continue using that website to obtain torrents), may not ever have to upload a file in order 
to download large numbers of files. 
 82. For instance, through an addition into TRIPs or the greater WTO. 
 83. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 22, at 19. 
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Furthermore, “[t]he circulation of pirate copies . . . was not necessarily 
confined to the pirate’s own country; as these were more cheaply produced, 
it was often profitable to smuggle them back to the work’s country of origin 
where they could undercut the price of copies of the original work.”84  At 
this time, nations “did not regard the unauthorized exploitation of foreign 
works as either unfair or immoral,”85 but merely protected the works of their 
national authors.86 
The current situation concerns the commercial exploitation of a 
copyrighted work via piracy, and the significant diminution of copyright 
holder’s commercial stake in their copyrighted material due to piracy.  Any 
individual can visit a torrent website, download a torrent, and be directed to 
a location where they can obtain an entire album of music for free.87  
Arguably, this situation is as bad as, if not worse than, the situation which 
provided reasons for creating Berne.  The current situation produces a 
disincentive for artists to create — international file-sharing leaves a 
number of users with an incredibly simple and free method of obtaining 
artists’ works, rather than purchasing those works through legitimate 
methods.  A new international solution is needed.  This is not a problem 
faced on a national scale — it is an international problem because of the 
cross-border nature of the Internet and BitTorrent.88 
B.   The Model Definition of a New Secondary Liability Multilateral 
Treaty 
Harmonization of international copyright law must come on an 
international level in the form of a treaty that provides a required standard 
for national laws.  The standard must be defined to meet a “sweet spot” 
along the spectrum of national laws noted in Part III.  It should be as similar 
as possible to most current national laws, while still strict enough to solve 
the problem of mass copyright infringement through BitTorrent.  Hopefully 
a large number of nations would accede to the new standard, creating an 
  
 84. Id. at 10–20. 
 85. Id. at 19. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Each album could cost anywhere from $10 to $20 in retail.  This Article 
recognizes that not all individuals downloading this material would have otherwise 
purchased the material; however, conservatively removing those groups of people from 
estimation still leaves a substantial number of users that would have purchased the album.  
Therefore, a large profit is lost for the copyright holder. 
 88. Arguably, the failure to address this international problem on an international 
scale may render other international copyright laws useless.  Certainly, those laws address 
direct infringement sufficiently enough, however, with the changing technologies, direct 
infringement is becoming more difficult to track, and therefore more difficult to stop.  A 
solution is needed to stop those that can facilitate copyright infringement (i.e. secondary 
infringers), or else international copyright law may be rendered useless in protecting 
copyright holders’ works. 
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international coalition.  This international coalition could then sufficiently 
pressure nations less willing to agree.  Additionally, this “sweet spot” 
standard should take into consideration the different parties that may be 
involved in the BitTorrent process.89 
This Article suggests a definition that is somewhat in line with the 
definitions in existence in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
and Australia.  In the United States, secondary liability is broken down into 
two subcategories: vicarious liability and contributory liability.  
Contributory infringement occurs “by intentionally inducing or encouraging 
direct infringement.”90  Contributory infringement of copyright is defined as 
either “(1) actively inducing, causing, or materially contributing to the 
infringing conduct of another person, or (2) providing the goods or means 
necessary to help another person infringe.”91  Vicarious liability occurs “by 
profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop 
or limit it.”92  The profit must be a direct financial benefit from the 
infringement.93  Vicarious infringement is defined as “a person’s liability for 
an infringing act of someone else, even though the person has not directly 
committed an act of infringement.”94  Contributory infringement has a 
closer connection to the actual directly infringing conduct, while one who 
vicariously commits infringement may be profiting from the infringement or 
otherwise condoning the infringement. 
Many torrent distribution websites do generate a profit, although from 
advertising placed on the site.95  It is questionable whether such advertising 
could be construed to be profiting from a direct infringement;96 however, 
the aspect of control requisite under the U.S. standard may be met by torrent 
sites.  Torrent site administrators can undoubtedly remove material placed 
on their websites by individual users, and furthermore, can likely ban user’s 
Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses from the website.97  The administrators 
have a large degree of control over the torrent site itself and any material 
placed on the site.98 
  
 89. See supra Part II. 
 90. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 
1170 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 91. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 796 (8th ed. 2004). 
 92. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930; Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1173. 
 93. Id. 
 94. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 797 (8th ed. 2004). 
 95. See, e.g., Chris Williams, International Copyright Talks Seek BitTorrent-killer 
Laws, THE REGISTER, May 27, 2008, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/05/27/acta_leak/. 
 96. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 940. 
 97. FileShareFreak, How to Set Up your own BitTorrent Website, 
http://filesharefreak.com/2008/02/22/how-to-set-up-your-own-bittorrent-website-part-i/ (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2009) (showing the degree of control that BitTorrent website creators and 
administrators hold over the website and its content and illustrating the ability of those 
administrators to remove torrents that facilitate copyright infringement). 
 98. Id. 
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Contributory liability is the better approach to curb file-sharing as the 
technology currently stands because it is significantly closer to the directly 
infringing conduct, and without the contributory infringement, the direct 
infringement may not have been possible.  As such, a “contributorily liable 
person/organization in copyright infringement,” according to this Article, 
should be defined as “one that intentionally induces, assists, encourages, 
authorizes, or facilitates direct copyright infringement and who makes 
available, and has control over, the means to commit direct infringement.”99  
The standard should be a rebuttable presumption of intent. 
The first and arguably most important part of this definition is “intent.”  
In some cases, such as with The Pirate Bay, intent will be fairly obvious — 
the “contributory infringer” will actively state that it desires to facilitate and 
promote copyright infringement.100  In other cases, intent will have to be 
inferred.  This is analogous to common law tort principles, which define 
intent to mean “that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or 
that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from 
it.”101  Torrent site administrators should be substantially certain that when 
they create a website, make it public, and allow other users to upload files 
that can be downloaded from the website, some of these files can and will 
point to copyrighted materials and that these files will be downloaded 
without the copyright holder’s authority.  These results are foreseeable for a 
reasonable person creating such a site.  The general knowledge of 
substantially certain consequences is important, and should be presumed. 
Torrent site administrators generally know that users may upload torrent 
files to the torrent site, and that these files may direct users to copyrighted 
material.  Therefore, since torrent site administrators have this general 
knowledge and the control to remove torrents pointing to infringing works, 
there should be an affirmative duty to remove these torrent files upon notice 
from a copyright holder.  From a practical standpoint, torrent site 
administrators should employ a filtering system that removes some torrents 
that point to infringing content.  At the very least, this would provide a 
rebuttal to the presumption that torrent administrators are intentionally 
committing contributory infringement. 
On the other hand, as in Sony Betamax, persons or organizations who 
create, sell, or give out a technology without the intent to commit direct 
infringement, and furthermore, without control over the technology once it 
  
 99. It is important to note that this Author believes that this definition would be 
successfully implemented by nations such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and 
the United States with, at worst, only minimal alterations to each nation’s current state of 
law. 
 100. The “Legal” section of The Pirate Bay webpage states that “0 torrents has [sic] 
been removed, and 0 torrents will ever be removed.”  The Pirate Bay, Legal Threats Against 
The Pirate Bay, http://thepiratebay.org/legal (last visited Apr. 22, 2009). 
 101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). 
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is placed in the hands of others, will be held to be not liable.102  Unlike a 
website, which is constantly in flux of content and, more importantly, 
constantly in the administrator’s control, a piece of software given out to the 
world leaves the creator’s control and passes entirely to the user’s control.  
A piece of software, such as a BitTorrent client, also has many legitimate 
uses, which are not infringing upon any copyright.103  A single torrent file 
on a website is either infringing or not infringing104 – there is no middle 
ground.  While a torrent website is capable of non-infringing uses, unlike 
BitTorrent client software, a torrent website administrator retains control 
over the website. 
A large issue faced by the imposition of such a definition will be the 
initial reaction by every sovereign nation to scaling back its sovereignty.  
The definition set forth above requires elements of intent and control, while 
generally, definitions in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia require 
some combination of “authorization” and “control.”105  Authorization, 
especially when combined with elements of control, seems to be similar to 
“intent” in the sense of general foreseeable awareness of probable unlawful 
uses, as defined above.  Therefore, in order to conform to such a treaty, 
nations such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the United 
States would have to change relatively little substantively.  Assuming these 
nations were to implement such a substantive change, each would be able to 
place greater pressure on other nations, such as Spain and Sweden, which 
would need to make more substantive changes to their current laws in order 
to conform. 
While this standard offers a presumption of intent to contribute to 
copyright infringement, that presumption should be rebuttable.  The ability 
to rebut intent to contribute to infringement should help to limit the amount 
of collateral damage if the standard is applied to others.  Returning to the 
various actors in the BitTorrent situation, some will be able to rebut the 
presumption of intent easier than others, and the following discussion will 
lay out some potential rebuttals that could indicate a lack of intent.  For 
instance, BitTorrent client programmers do not retain control over the 
software program once they disseminate it to others.  Additionally, 
BitTorrent client software has many substantial non-infringing uses.  
Without explicit evidence of intent, like a programmer stating that he 
created the software in order to facilitate copyright infringement, the 
presumption of intent should be rebutted.  The standard articulated above 
  
 102. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 103. A particular user could, for instance, create a song, digitize it, create a torrent 
file, and upload that torrent file.  By doing so, the user has authorized others to download the 
song using the torrent file, and therefore, his copyright on the song has not been infringed. 
 104. This is true at least in most cases.  In theory, a user could create a torrent file that 
linked to multiple files, some infringing, some not, but regardless, that file would be 
facilitating infringement if used. 
 105. See supra Part III.B. 
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probably is less important when applied to some of the other “BitTorrent 
actors” such as the “peers,” “seeders,” “rippers,” and creators and uploaders 
of torrent files.  This is because these actors are directly infringing copyright 
through circumventing DRM (in the case of rippers) and trafficking in 
copyrighted materials without authorization (in the case of “peers,” 
“seeders,” and “uploaders”). 
Where the standard becomes murkier is in its application to torrent 
websites and trackers.  This is because a level of control is maintained in 
both situations, but also both torrent websites and trackers are capable of 
substantially non-infringing uses.  Due to the level of control, and the fact 
that there are substantially non-infringing uses, another element — that of 
filtering systems or regular removal of potentially infringing torrent files — 
should be examined in determining whether intent is present.  These are, of 
course, merely examples of potential rebuttals to the presumption of intent, 
but if a torrent website is attempting to avoid infringing copyrights 
proactively, intent and, therefore, liability should not be found. 
Additionally, the nations listed above should find contributory liability 
and, in general, secondary liability to be a relatively simple step in 
substantive law — a mere extension to already existing international 
copyright law.  The step is especially well-illustrated when compared to the 
steps taken by agreements like Berne, which caused these nations to alter 
course significantly in terms of copyright law.106  Prior to Berne, most 
nations did not recognize copyright in foreign authors’ works, only in 
domestic works.107  Berne introduced national treatment, which forced each 
agreeing nation to recognize, and protect, foreign authors’ works.  This was 
not an extension to any existing law, but a complete reversal of legal course 
and policy.  This addition of substantive law, which some nations already 
have, and which others are slowly moving toward, will speed up the process 
— not reverse any course already charted. 
This rebuttable presumption of intent will likely create a lot of 
opposition.  Therefore, a non-exhaustive exemplary list of rebuttals to the 
presumption should, from a policy standpoint, help to limit the collateral 
damage from such a strict standard.  While there will certainly be some 
opposition to the implementation of contributory liability in a copyright 
infringement definition at an international level, the benefits and quick 
forward progress of such a substantive law would, hopefully, quickly 
eradicate secondary infringement of copyrights.  Eradicating secondary 
infringers internationally, especially the torrent sites that so efficiently 
facilitate direct infringement, would impede the direct infringement of 
copyrights worldwide. 
  
 106. Berne Convention, supra note 21. 
 107. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 22, at 19. 
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C.   Peripheral Issues to a New Multilateral Treaty 
While this Article focuses mainly on a new international definition for 
contributory infringement of copyright, the creation of a multilateral treaty 
would likely face a number of external issues in its creation.  Though these 
are peripheral issues, this Article will acknowledge a few, namely: problems 
relating to amendment, what entity will promulgate the treaty, enforcement 
measures and remedies, and conflicts of laws. 
Technology is constantly in flux, and new inventions crop up frequently.  
Any new multilateral treaty will require amendment, at some point in the 
future, to keep up with these changes.  Without sufficient amendment 
provisions, issues could arise that may lead to non-adherence, making the 
treaty inadequate.108  Likewise, there may be questions as to what nation’s 
law to apply in a given situation, necessitating a conflict of laws provision.  
There may also be problems caused by enforcement differences.  Finally, a 
treaty must also address the question of what entity would be most effective 
in promulgating it.109 
V.   CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that national laws relating to secondary liability in 
copyright have been largely ineffective in stalling copyright infringement on 
the international scale.  These laws may stop the secondary infringement 
from occurring within the borders of that given nation, but the secondary 
infringer can simply move to a nation with more favorable laws.  This 
enables anyone, including persons within a nation with “strict” secondary 
liability laws, to commit direct infringement with the assistance of the 
moved secondary infringer.  Other solutions to this problem, especially as it 
is facilitated by the BitTorrent technology, have been largely 
unsuccessful.110  Secondary liability in copyright is wholly absent from 
international agreements.  A new multilateral treaty, providing a substantive 
definition for secondary liability — more specifically, contributory liability 
in copyright — would effectively create a coalition of nations pledged to 
  
 108. For instance, the European Patent Convention, and subsequent Community 
Patent Convention, in the European Union, are effectively impossible to amend in practical 
application, due to a de facto unanimity provisions.  See generally Vincenzo Di Cataldo, 
From the European Patent to a Community Patent, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 19 (2002) 
(describing the failures of the EPC and CPC relating to the community patent in Europe). 
 109. This author believes that the WTO would likely be the best option for the 
promulgation of such a treaty, since the WTO has a large membership of nations, a dispute 
settlement process already in place, and authorizes sanctions by (and of) its Member States.  
There will be, without a doubt, other issues not mentioned here, and therefore the issues 
mentioned are stated merely as examples of peripheral issues.  However, these issues lie 
outside the scope of this Article. 
 110. See generally supra Part III. 
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preventing infringement.  This coalition would place pressure on the nations 
that provide safe harbors for secondary infringers. 
A new substantive definition, however, is only the first step in the fight 
against international copyright infringement.  While there are other positive 
steps that should be further explored, such as new business models, this first 
step is arguably the most important because it unifies the law in every 
nation, eradicating the places for secondary infringers to use as a “base of 
operations” to facilitate direct infringement.  New business models should 
continue to be investigated, especially business models using legitimate 
BitTorrent websites that feed copyright owners royalties.  BitTorrent is one 
of the most efficient technologies to date, and it would be a waste of 
resources not to look into legal business models utilizing those technologies.  
Hopefully, large-scale international copyright infringement will be curbed, 
while providing both copyright owners and consumers the incentive to use 
new technologies in legal ways. 
 


